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Abstract 
In this thesis I consider the problem of the minority shareholder in the private 
corporation who seeks to recover compensation on behalf of the company 
where the wrongdoers are in control and thus prevent any action being taken. 
At common law the minority shareholder was severely restricted by the Rule 
in Foss v. Harbottle. This stated that the company was the proper plaintiff for 
wrongs done to it and that internal irregularities could be cured by the 
company in general meeting. From this various exceptions developed to allow 
the minority shareholder the right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the 
corporation. The conditions to allow this to happen were, however, extremely 
restrictive. Accordingly various law reform committees recommended the 
introduction of statutory remedies to alleviate the problems of the minority 
shareholder. In Australia, the principal statutory remedy introduced was the 
oppression remedy, now contained in s.260 of the Corporations Law. This 
remedy has suffered from a number of defects. The judiciary has given s.260 
a more narrow scope than was arguably intended and there are a number of 
problems with the wording of the section and its interrelationship with other 
areas of the law. It is therefore apposite to consider the alternatives offered to 
the minority shareholder in England, Canada and the United States, as well as 
other common law options available in Australia. These options including the 
personal action by the minority shareholder to recover on the basis that there 
has been a breach of the constitution of the company and/or an action in tort. 
Both Canada and the United States have developed a procedural framework to 
allow shareholders to bring a derivative action and this appears to provide the 
member with easier access to the courts than the present Australian options. 
Finally, I conclude by submitting that the existing avenues; the oppression 
remedy, the personal action and the tortious remedy do not provide convenient 
avenues for the minority shareholders to pursue wrongs to the corporation by 
those in control and that Australia would benefit from the introduction of the 
statutory derivative action. 
The law is stated as at 31/8/1992. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this thesis is to contrast the remedies developed by 
the judiciary in the Courts of Law to assist minority interests in 
private companies, with the remedies the legislature have put in 
place to assist these same interests. It will concentrate on the 
minority shareholder, that is, the person unable to command a 
majority in the general meeting, who is seeking to correct an 
abuse of management. In this sense the thesis will consider 
wrongs done to a private company, for which the company is 
unable or unwilling to bring proceedings in its own name. 1 
The minority shareholder is in effect seeking to return to the 
company property or profits of the company which have been 
misappropriated by the controllers of the company: 
One would expect those concerned for the integrity and 
future of private business institutions to applaud the 
intrepid souls who ferret out corporate wrongdoing, and 
risk their own time and money against a contingency of 
being rewarded if in the end sin is found to have 
flourished. Not at all. Such men are not treated as 
honoured members of the system of private enterprise, but 
as scavengers and pariahs... At least they are viewed as 
necessary evils, the Robin Hoods of the business world, 
The company is of course a separate legal entity, Salomon v. Salomon 
[1897] A.C. 22. 
2 
for whom a patronising word may sometimes be said, 
when they succeed in revealing some particularly 
horrendous act.2 
The first thing that becomes apparent upon researching this area 
is that the right of a minority shareholder to bring an action to a 
court of law to rectify an abuse of management was very 
limiting. The minority shareholder had to establish standing to 
bring an action, fraud by the wrongdoers, and that the 
wrongdoers were in control of the company. The courts were 
always reluctant to interfere in commercial decisions. What is 
disappointing is that the legislative remedies, such as s.260 of 
the Corporations Law 1990, have only ameliorated that attitude 
to a small extent, and it has only been in the most blatant cases 
of injustice that the minority shareholder has been successful.3 
The statutory remedies are not just limited to minority 
shareholders, however it is unlikely that a majority shareholder 
would ever need to rely on the provisions: 
Shareholders who command a majority can look after 
themselves. They can dictate the board's composition and 
2 	S.M. Beck, "The Shareholders Derivative Action" (1974) 52 Can. B.R. 
159 at p.163. Beck was quoting from E. Rostow, "To Whom and for 
What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?" in Mason (ed.), The 
Corporation in Modern Society (1959) p.49. 
3 	The wording of s.260 is, in substance, unchanged from its predecessor, 
s320 of the Companies (Tas) Code 1981. 
3 
indirectly much of its management policy. They can pass 
resolutions and, if numerous enough, change the 
constitution of the company ... the realities of corporate 
life dictate that majority decisions usually prevail and that 
decision making rests with relatively few persons in the 
corporate hierarchy.4 
This paper will be primarily concentrating on the situation where 
a wrong is done to the company and the directors are unwilling 
to bring an action in the name of the company. In essence I will 
be considering the derivative action: 
A derivative action is an exception to the elementary 
principle that A cannot, as a general rule bring an action 
against B to recover damages or secure other relief on 
behalf of C for an injury done by B to C. C is the proper 
plaintiff because C is the party injured, and therefore the 
person in whom the cause of action is vested. This is 
sometimes referred to as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
when applied to corporations, but it has a wider scope and 
is fundamental to any rational system of jurisprudence. 5 
J.F. Corkery, "Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers - What can a 
Shareholder do about it? An analysis of s.320 of the Companies Code" 
(1985) 9 Adel. L.R. 437 at p.439. 
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries [1982] 2 All E.R. 
354 at p.357. 
4 
The dissertation will also be concentrating on the private or 
proprietary company rather than the public company. 6 The 
shareholder in the public company listed on the stock exchange 
will generally have no role to play in management and if there 
are abuses of management the minority shareholder will be able 
to cut his losses by selling on the stock exchange. The 
shareholder in the private company will not have this option, 
and is thus susceptible to abuses of management The private 
company will generally have some, if not all, of the following 
characteristics: 
(i) Small number of shareholders. 
(ii) Restrictions on transferability. 7 
For a discussion of the minority shareholder's role in the control of the 
public company see A.A. Berle, "Modern Functions of the Corporate 
System" (1962) 62 Columb. L Rev. 433; J.L. Weiner, "The Berle-Dodd 
Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation" (1964) 64 CoItimb. L Rev. 
1458. 
Section 116 of the Corporations Law provides that - 
A company having a share capital (other than a no liability company) 
may be incorporated as a proprietary company if a provision of its 
memorandum or articles - 
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares. 
(b) limits to not more than 50 of the number of its members. 
(c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares 
in the company; and 
(c) 	prohibits any invitation to the public to deposit money with the 
company 
5 
(iii) Remuneration for shareholders will generally be by salary 
rather than dividend. 
(iv) Shareholders will usually be entitled to participate in the 
management of the company. 
(v) The business may previously have been run as a 
partnership, and may have been incorporated to obtain the 
benefits of incorporation and limited liability. 
It is important to examine this area of the law to determine if the 
position of the minority shareholder in the private company has 
been improved by the legislation and to consider what reforms, 
if any, are needed to further assist the minority shareholders. 
It should be noted that the structure and general composition of 
Australia's minority shareholders protection laws is not being 
put into question by this thesis. What this paper intends to 
address is whether minority shareholder litigation can be 
facilitated by changes to the present framework. The policy 
assumptions that underlie the rule in Foss v. Harbottle and the 
statutory remedies will not be examined. 
The difficulties facing the minority shareholder in a small private 
company include some or all of the following: 
6 
(i) The withholding of information so that the shareholder is 
unable to properly evaluate the decisions of management 
(ii) The misappropriation of company assets by the directors 
for their own use. 8 
The dilution of voting power through share issues. For 
example, in Clemens v. Clemens9 the share issue if it had 
been validated would have removed the power of the 
minority shareholder to block a special resolution. 
(iv) Exclusion from management. 10 
(v) A refusal to register share transfers which results in the 
minority shareholder being 'locked in,' and unable to 
realise his investment. 11 
(vi) A refusal to distribute dividends, which means that if the 
shareholder is locked in he or she will be receiving no 
return on his investment. 12 
(vii) Management inefficiency such as the sale of assets at a 
gross undervaluation. 13 
8 	See, for example, the facts of Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 554. 
9 	[1976] 2 All E.R. 268. 
10 
	
For example, Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1972] 2 All E.R. 
492. 
See Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance v. Ure (1923) 33 C.L.R. 199. 
See Re G. Jeffrey Pty. Ltd. (1984) 2 A.C.L.C. 421. 
See the facts of Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] Ch. 565. 
7 
(viii) Self interested contracts and disloyalty such as the 
favourable treatment of a company controlled by the 
directors. 14 
As Beck comments: 
The shareholder in the private company is still likened to 
the capitalist of old - a man who invests all, or a large 
portion of his capital in the enterprise, is himself one of 
the managers and has a day to day knowledge of the 
workings of the company and the activities of 
management. In so far as there is fraud or over-reaching 
by fellow directors or shareholders, he is in a position to 
personally blow the whistle and to seek a remedy. He 
does not, however, have the securities market exit and if 
he cannot find redress in the narrow and tortuous legal 
avenues open to him he may well fit unhappily into the 
corporate jargon of being "locked in", "frozen out", 
"squeezed" or simply oppressed. 15 
By contrast with the shareholder in the private company the 
shareholder in the public company has received substantial 
protection. There is now a number of statutory provisions 
14 	Re Norvabron [1986] 11 A.C.L.R. 33. 
15 	S.M. Beck, op. cit. at p.161. 
8 
which provide protection for the investor in the public company. 
These include the Chapter 6 of the Corporations Law, Australian 
Securities Commission Act 1989, and the Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules will also have some protection for the investor in 
the public company. As the private company is prohibited from 
inviting the public to subscribe for shares in the company, these 
Acts do not have the same degree of relevance to the investor in 
the private company. 
In considering the legislation which is available to the minority 
shareholder, the initial impression is that the legislation was 
drafted because of the deficiencies of the common law. The 
preconditions for bringing a derivative action, that is an action 
whereby the minority sues to recover on behalf of a company, 
were restrictive and notoriously difficult to establish. The 
ingredients being, that the shareholder had to establish standing, 
fraud by the wrongdoers, and that the wrongdoers were in 
control of the company. The minority shareholder must also 
establish that the company in general meeting has not approved 
the conduct in question. 16  It was for these reasons that the 
statutory remedy for oppression was introduced. Chapter 2 
addresses the difficulties facing the minority shareholder at 
common law, as well as considering the concerns of the law 
reform commissions which investigated the problems facing the 
minority shareholders. 
16 	See the discussion of these points in Chapter 2. 
9 
Chapters 3 and 4 examines the efficacy of the statutory remedies 
provided for the minority shareholders. It will also consider the 
judicial attitude to these remedies, to determine if the court has 
reversed its previous reluctance to assist the minority 
shareholder. Possible deficiencies in the legislation will also be 
investigated. 
Chapter 5 will discuss the principal comparative remedies 
available to the minority shareholder in the United States, 
Canada and England. In the North American jurisdictions the 
common law derivative action has been put into a statutory 
form. The advantages and disadvantages of this procedure, 
over what Australia has done will be considered. 
It must of course be noted that institutional differences between 
Australia and the United States will always make litigation more 
attractive in the latter jurisdiction. These differences include 
contingency fees, the availability of class actions and the 
situation where a successful defendant in the United States 
usually pays his own costs; whereas, the unsuccessful plaintiff 
in Australia will pay the taxed costs of the defendant. It is not 
the aim of this thesis to consider the procedural disincentives to 
litigation in this country or the availability of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques. 
10 
The shareholders remedy via a personal action will also be 
considered. 17 This thesis will primarily be considering wrongs 
done to the company and thus it may be argued that the personal 
action would have no application. However, it will be 
submitted that a wrong to the company can also be a wrong to 
the shareholder, via the diminution in the value of that person's 
investment. In addition to this it may be possible for a 
corporate wrong to be viewed as a breach of the statutory 
contract, or as a dilution of the shareholder's control within the 
company thus providing a personal action for the minority 
shareholders. Also there will be a consideration of a tortious 
action by the minority shareholder to remedy a corporate wrong. 
It may be argued that the directors wrong to the company may 
also support an action in deceit or conspiracy by the minority 
shareholders. 
The fmal chapter will conclude with a review of the problems 
surrounding the minority shareholder, and a consideration of the 
proposals for reform in this area: 
It is a fundamental principle of our law that a company is 
a legal person, with its own corporate identity, separate 
and distinct from the directors or shareholders and with its 
own property rights and interests to which it alone is 
entitled. If it is defrauded by a wrongdoer, the company 
17 	See Chapters 6 and 7. 
11 
itself is the one person to sue for damage. Such is the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 
[S]uppose [however] that [the company] is defrauded by 
insiders who control its affairs, by directors who hold a 
majority of the shares - who then can sue for damages? 
Those directors [who] are themselves the 
wrongdoers...will not authorise...proceedings to be 
taken.. .against themselves.. .If a general meeting is called, 
they will vote down any suggestion that the company 
should sue themselves. Yet the company is the one 
person who is damnified. It is the one person who 
should sue. In one way or another some means must be 
found for the company to sue. Otherwise...[i]njustice 
would be done without redress. 18 
Thus in summary the thesis will firstly examine the difficulties 
of the minority shareholder at common law, and the need for 
reform of the common law. The legislation will then be 
considered, and any problems with the legislation will be 
discussed. Alternative remedies for the minority shareholder in 
tort or in equity will be considered, as will the solutions offered 
by other jurisdictions. The thesis will conclude with a 
recommendation that the position of the minority shareholder 
will be improved by way of legislative amendment, with the 
introduction of a statutory derivative action. 
18 	Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] Q.B. 373 at p.390. 
12 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DERIVATIVE SUIT - FROM CONCEPTION TO 
STATUTORY REFORM 
The introduction of the derivative action arose from the abuses 
of management occurring in associations and corporations. The 
courts were required to develop a process which would allow a 
shareholder, or a member of the corporation or association to 
complain about abuses by the controllers of the entity. If a 
process was not developed by the courts the matter would then 
go without remedy and the controllers would have a free hand to 
divert the assets of the corporation to their own use. The reason 
for this is that the proper plaintiff, the corporation or 
association, would not bring the action, as the wrongdoers were 
in control of the association. Thus "the shareholders' right to 
command a judicial forum comes in answer to a demonstration 
of need".' 
The History of the Derivative Action 
The common law always imposed its rules on natural persons, 
and it followed from this that when disputes arose concerning 
That need was to correct the abuses of management occurring in 
associations and corporations. 
13 
associations those same rules would be imposed upon the 
associations. As early as 1307 Edward I required the abbot to 
keep the corporate seal in a particular place so as to prevent its 
use to the detriment of members. Similarly, ordinary 
corporations were subject to visitation by the King, while 
ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations were subject to 
visitation by the bishop, and founder respectively. 2 During the 
sixteenth century, the Charitable Gifts Act 43 Eliz.1,c.4, 
provided the Chancellor with a mandate to inquire into corporate 
affairs on the complaint of any party aggrieved. 
Examples of this visitorial power, and the authority of the 
Chancellor are Eden v. Foster3 and Charitable Corporation v. 
Sutton.4 In Eden v. Foster the issue before the Court was 
whether the Crown could exercise a right as a visitor against a 
school founded by the King. It was held by the Court of 
Chancery, that where the King is founder then he can exercise 
visitorial rights, whereas if a private person is founder, then by 
implication that person or someone nominated by him can be a 
visitor. 
In Charitable Corporation v. Sutton an action was brought 
against Committee-men (directors) for breach of trust, fraud and 
2 	See W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English low Volume IX Methuen and 
Co. Dd. 1926 at p.58-59 where he details this development. 
3 	(1725) 2 P.Wms 325, 24 E.R. 750. 
4 	(1742) 2 Atk 400, 26 E.R. 642. 
14 
mismanagement, the action being brought by the corporation. 
In holding the committee-men liable the Lord Chancellor stated, 
"[i] will never determine that frauds of this kind are out of the 
reach of courts of law or equity, for an intolerable grievance 
would follow from such a detennination". 5 
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton was a case of a corporation 
seeking relief against wrongdoers, the next step was not just to 
allow protection to members, but to allow members themselves 
to institute proceedings. This was achieved in Adley v. 
Whitstable Company. 6 
A member of the Whitstable Company sought an account of 
profits denied to him by virtue of a by-law, which penalised any 
member who worked for a rival company. The Whitstable 
Company submitted that the Court of Chancery had no 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. To this the Court of Chancery 
stated that, "unless I can be satisfied that the party has such a 
remedy at law as ought to bar his application to a Court of 
Equity, I conceive he has a right to apply here for such relief'. 7 
The decision is important in that it was the first time that a 
shareholder was permitted to litigate an intra-corporate dispute. 
5 	Id. at p.645. 
6 	(1810) 17 Ves Jun 315, 34 E.R. 122. 
7 	Id. at p.126. 
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Adley v. Whitstable Company involved a shareholder 
challenging a by-law which affected all members. The next 
step in the development of remedies for minority shareholders 
was to allow a shareholder to come to equity on behalf of 
himself, and all other shareholders, for the redress of a wrong 
done to the company. This was achieved by the introduction of 
the representative derivative action. 
In Hichens v. Congreve 8 a suit was instituted by certain 
shareholders in the Arigna Mining Company on behalf of 
themselves and all other shareholders, except the Defendants, 
against the chairman and acting directors of the company, and 
other persons connected with the company, alleging a 
promotional fraud. The relief sought was that the moneys 
misappropriated be restored to the company. The defendants 
filed a demurrer claiming the shareholders had no jurisdiction to 
come to equity, but this was overruled by the Lord Chancellor. 
The Lord Chancellor stating: 
In the present case, it appears to me that justice may be 
done in one suit. All shareholders stand in the same 
situation; the property has been taken out of their 
common fund; they are entitled to have that property 
brought back again for the benefit of the concern. 9 
8 	(1828) 4 Russ & M. 562, 38 E.R. 917. 
9 	Id. at p.922. 
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Similarly in Wallworth v. Ho10 0 shareholders of a joint stock 
bank brought a representative suit against the directors 
requesting an accounting of the assets of the bank. A demurrer 
for want of equity, and want of partners was overruled. Lord 
Chancellor Cottenham commenting that: 
I think it the duty of this Court to adopt its practice and 
course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and 
not by too strict an adherence to forms and rules, 
established under different circumstances, to decline to 
administer justice, and to enforce rights for which there is 
no other remedy. 11 
Similarly in Preston v. The Grand Collier Dock Company 12 the 
representative suit was sanctioned as there was, 'a plain equity 
for the Plaintiff to be relieved'. 13 Prunty comments, that the 
representative suit, "made the action possible, it permitted the 
adoption of the class action where there was no other basis for 
jurisdiction." 14 
10 	(1841) 4 My & Cr. 619, 41 E.R. 238. 
11 	Id. at p.244. 
12 	(1840) 11 Sim 327, 59 E.R. 900. 
13 	Id. at p.907. 
14 	B.S. Prunty, 	"The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its 
Derivation" (1957) 32 New York University Law Review 980 at p.983. 
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Hichens v. Congreve, Wallworth v. Holt, Preston v. Grand 
Collier all show that the right of shareholders to sue on behalf of 
themselves and all other shareholders, to redress a wrong done 
to the members of the company, or to the company, was 
recognised prior to the 1843 decision of Foss v. Harbottle. 15 
The Decision of Foss v. Harbottle 
The decision in Foss v. Harbottle represented a major statement 
of the law in regard to minority shareholders; though it cannot 
be seen as a major advance for minority shareholders. The 
pleadings in Foss v. Harbottle were as complete as those utilised 
in Hichens v. Con greve and Preston v. Grand Collier yet the 
minority shareholders were denied any standing to remedy what 
they saw as a misapplication of the corporate funds by the 
directors of the company. Seen in this sense, the decision can 
be seen as a restriction rather than an expansion of the right of a 
shareholder to seek judicial intervention. 
The Facts of Foss v. Harbottle 
The Victorian Park company was incorporated by an Act of 
Parliament in 1837 to develop ornamental gardens and parks and 
15 	(1843) 2 Ha 461, 67 E.R. 189. 
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also to erect housing with attached leisure grounds and then to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the property. There were eight 
promoters of the scheme; Harbottle, Adshead, Byron, 
Westhead, Bealey, Denison, Bunting and Lane; the first five 
were the directors. Foss, one of the shareholders brought a 
derivative suit alleging that the promoters had conspired together 
to profit by the establishment of the company, and at the 
expense of the company. This being achieved by the company 
purchasing land belonging to the promoters at exorbitant values. 
The defendants demurred to the bill on the basis that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to represent the Victorian Park 
Company, and this could not be cured by adding the corporation 
as a defendant. 
The Arguments by Counsel 
The argument by Counsel in support of the demurrers centred 
on the pleadings used by the plaintiff - the representative 
derivative action. On behalf of the defendants it was alleged 
that if the Plaintiffs had any ground for impeaching the conduct 
of the Defendants, they could have brought proceedings using 
the name of the corporation, in response to which the 
Defendants could have applied to the Court to prevent use of the 
corporate name. The Court would then have been in a position 
to determine the merits of the plaintiffs claim. Alternatively, 
the suit may have been brought by the Attorney-General to 
correct an abuse of powers granted for public purposes. 
19 
The plaintiffs argument was that the corporation was not to be 
treated as an ordinary corporation, and that in fact it was 
analogous to a partnership, and should be governed by the rules 
applicable to partnerships. 
The Decision of the Vice Chancellor Sir James Wigram 
The Vice Chancellor held for the defendant on two grounds. 
The first ground was that the corporation, being a separate entity 
from the members of the corporation should sue in its own 
name, and in its corporate character. Sir James Wigram states: 
In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the 
corporation are not the same thing for purposes like this; 
and the only question can be whether the facts alleged in 
this case justify a departure from the rule which, prima 
facie, would require that the corporation should sue in its 
own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of 
someone whom the law has appointed to be its 
representative.16 
16 
	
Id. at p.203. 
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The second ground for the decision of Sir James Wigram has 
become known as the 'internal management' aspect of the rule 
of Foss v. Harbottle. The Act incorporating the Victorian Park 
Company provided that the directors were the governing body 
of the company, subject to the superior control of the members 
assembled in general meeting. His Honour states: 
[I]t is only necessary to refer to the clauses of the Act to 
show that, whilst the supreme governing body, the 
proprietors at a special general meeting assembled, retain 
the power of exercising the functions conferred upon 
them by the Act of Incorporation, it cannot be competent 
to individual corporators to sue in the manner proposed 
by the Plaintiffs on the present record. 17 
His Honour also discussed both Hichens v. Con greve and 
Preston v. The Grand Collier Dock Co. Whilst expressing his 
cordial concurrence with Hichens, he distinguishes this case by 
alluding to the point that the promoters fraud in that case gave 
rise to an action for misrepresentation. He distinguishes 
Preston, by characterising the wrong in that case as one which 
could not be ratified by a meeting of shareholders. Prunty 
comments, "whether these characterisations are accurate or not, 
one point is clear: in Foss v. Harbottle the Vice-Chancellor was 
announcing his refusal to intervene in business affairs which 
could be effectively resolved by the members of the organisation 
17 	Ibid. 
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in question". 18 Thus Sir James Wigram was the first judicial 
officer to state openly, and plainly, that the court will not 
interfere where a majority of members may lawfully ratify the 
conduct in question. This principle of ratification was to bedevil 
the minority shareholder when attempting to pursue a wrong 
done to the company by the controllers. To determine the origin 
of this principle of majority rule, it is appropriate to briefly 
discuss the sources of the internal management principle. 
The internal management principle can be traced to a series of 
cases decided by Lord Chancellor Eldon in the early 19th 
century. 19 Lord Eldon refused to intervene in partnership 
disputes except where a dissolution was requested. A decision 
which exemplifies this idea is Carlen v. Drury.20 A 
partnership of 1600 shares was formed with the aim being to 
sell beer to the public. One of the articles of the partnership 
deed provided that the managers may at any general meeting be 
removed. A bill was filed by the plaintiff and all other 
shareholders against the managers alleging circumstances of 
gross mismanagement and neglect on the part of the managers. 
Lord Eldon bluntly stated, "[t]his Court is not to be required on 
every occasion to take the management of every Playhouse and 
18 	B.S. Prunty, op. cit. at p.983. 
19 	Waters v. Taylor (1807) 15 Ves 10, 33 E.R. 658. Carlen v. Drury (1812) 
V & B 154, 35 E.R. 61. Ellison v. Bignold (1821) 2 Jac & W. 503, 37 
E.R. 720. 
20 	(1843) V & B 154, 35 E.R. 61. 
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Brewhouse in the Kingdom. The Plaintiffs have a remedy in 
their own hands to which they have not resorted". 21 
Similarly in Ellison v. Bignolc122 a bill was filed by ten of the 
directors of the National Union Fire Association, on behalf of 
themselves and all other members, against the remaining 
directors of the Union alleging various aspects of 
mismanagement. The complaining directors had the power 
under the by-law to regulate whatever they objected to in the 
defendant's behaviour. Lord Chancellor Eldon dismissed the 
complainants' bill stating, "[i]f they (the directors) would not act 
upon their deed, the Court would not manage their affairs for 
them".23 
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle in its purest form would allow 
directors and/or majority shareholders to trample completely the 
interests of minority shareholders. The minority shareholder 
seeking to redress a wrong done to the company would be met 
with the defence that the company is the proper plaintiff, or 
alternatively, that the members in a general meeting have 
resolved not to institute proceedings, that is, it is a matter of 
internal management. To correct this imbalance in favour of the 
directors and/or majority shareholders, generations of judges 
21 	Id. at p.62-63. 
22 	(1821) 2 Jac. & W. 503; 37 E.R. 720. 
23 	Id. at p.724. 
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subsequent to Sir James Wigram V.C. in Foss v. Harbottle have 
developed exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.. In fact, 
Sir James Wigram, himself provided the forerunner for the 
development of these exceptions, stating that, "the claims of 
justice would be found superior to any difficulties arising out of 
technical rules".24 
The most often repeated statement of the exceptions to the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle derive from Jenkins L.J. in Edwards v. 
Halliwel1. 25 These were stated as follows: 
(1) "Where the act complained of is wholly ultra vires the 
company or association". 
(2) "Where the issue is such that it could not 'validly be 
done or sanctioned by a simple majority of the 
members. ..but only by some special majority". 
(3) Where the "personal and individual rights of (the 
shareholder) have been invaded". 
24 	(1843) 2 Ha 461; 67 E.R. 189 at p.202. 
25 	[1950] 2 All E.R. 1064. 
24 
(4) 	Where "what has been done amounts to a fraud on the 
minority and the wrongdoers are themselves in control 
of the company". 26 
The first three exceptions listed are not exceptions in the correct 
sense of the word. They are situations where the rule does not 
have any role to play. The first two exceptions allow a 
shareholder to bring an action where some ultra vires or illegal 
act has taken place, whereas the third exception is simply a 
statement that ownership of shares carries with it personal or 
individual rights. As Maloney comments, "[a]ll are 
independent actions regardless of the Foss v. Harbottle rule. 
The only true exception is that of fraud on the minority". 27 
Consequently, it is this exception which has caused most of the 
problems.28 Accordingly, I will now consider the elements of 
this exception. 
Fraud on the minority when the wrongdoers are in control 
Fraud on the minority, defined loosely, concerns an abuse 
of power, usually by the directors. The applicant must 
26 	Id. at p.1067. 
27 	M.A. Maloney, "Whither the Statutory Derivative Action" (1986) 64 
Can. B.R. 309 at p.311. 
28 	In Chapter 6 I will consider the personal rights exception which has 
recently gained prominence as a way to subvert the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle. 
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show evidence of abuse and furthermore that the conduct 
was not in the best interests of the company. 29 
The term fraud on the minority though commonly used is strictly 
speaking inaccurate. In this type of situation we are dealing 
with the position where a wrong has been done to the company, 
and the minority shareholder is seeking a right to recover on 
behalf of the company. The exception would be more accurately 
categorised as a, "fraud on the company when the wrongdoers 
are in control".30 There are two principal elements to this 
exception that need to be considered, fraud and control. 
(i)Fraud 
The common law definition of fraud is primary a duty of 
honesty: 
[H]onesty in the stricter sense is by our law a duty of 
universal obligation. This obligation exists 
independently of contract or of special obligation. If a 
man intervenes in the affairs of another he must do so 
honestly, whatever be the character of that intervention. If 
29 	M.A. Maloney, op. cit. at pp. 311-312. 
30 	H.H. Mason, "Fraud on the Minority : The Problem of a Single 
Formulation of the Principle" (1972) 46 	67 at p.68. 
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he does so fraudulently, and through that fraud damage 
arises, he is liable to make good the damage. 31 
Equitable fraud, or the fraud required to establish a fraud on the 
minority is wider than this. It extends to an abuse, or misuse of 
power.32 Furthermore, an actual intent to cheat must not be 
proved.33 
The authorities may go so far as to suggest that mere negligence, 
which benefits the wrongdoers without any allegation of fraud, 
may be sufficient to constitute fraud in the sense of fraud on the 
minority. For example in Pavlides v. Jensen34 a minority 
shareholder sought to bring an action on behalf of himself and 
all other shareholders save and except three directors. The 
action was brought on the basis that the directors were guilty of 
gross negligence in effecting a sale of a valuable asset worth 
1,000,000 pounds for 182,000 pounds. The minority 
shareholder was unsuccessful. 
31 	Nocton v. Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 933 at p.954. 
32 	Estmanco. Ltd. v. Greater London Council [1982] 1 All E.R. 437 at 
p.445. 
33 	Nocton v. Lord Ashburton [19141 A.C. 932 at p.954. See the discussion 
of the concept of equitable fraud in R.P. Meagher, W.M.C. Gummow and 
J.R.F. Lehane Equity Doctrines and Remedies 2nd ed. Butterworths at 
p .3 23 . 
34 	[1956] Ch. 565. 
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This decision can be contrasted with Daniels v. Daniels. 35 A 
minority shareholder in that case sought to bring a derivative 
action against two directors who were husband and wife, and 
who controlled the company. It was alleged that they had been 
negligent in selling land to the wife for 4,250 pounds, the land 
being subsequently resold four years later for 120,000 pounds. 
Templeman J. considered that different considerations apply 
where not only are the directors negligent but they themselves 
benefit from their negligence. "It would seem to me quite 
monstrous particularly as fraud is so hard to plead and difficult 
to prove if the confines of the exception to Foss v. Harbottle 
were drawn so narrowly that directors could make a profit out of 
their negligence". 36 
The definition of fraud is linked with the issue of what the 
members in a general meeting can or cannot ratify. 
Wedderburn suggests37 that if the general meeting can ratify the 
conduct in question then the alleged conduct will not amount to 
fraud. He goes further and submits that the breaches of 
fiduciary duty, which cannot be ratified arise where directors act 
in bad faith, or where the legal or equitable property of the 
company has been misappropriated. The difficulty with this 
test is determining what amounts to bad faith, or when the 
35 	[1978] 2 All E.R. 89. 
36 	Id. at p.96. 
37 	(1981) 44 M.L.R. 202 at p.205-208. 
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property of the company has been misappropriated.38 The 
debate over what can, or cannot be ratified complicates this area 
of the law, and was partially responsible for the introduction of 
the oppression remedy. Recent authority such as Smith v. 
Croft (No. 2)39 also indicates that ratification may not be an 
element of fraud, but an element distinct in itself. 
In Smith v. Croft (No. 2)40 a company, Film Finances Limited, 
was in the business of guaranteeing the completion of films on 
time and within budget. In 1982, the executive directors of 
Film Finances Limited obtained a majority shareholding 
amounting to 63% of the voting rights in the company. Film 
Finances Ltd. then lent money to a number of companies 
associated with the directors of Film Finances Ltd. The 
plaintiffs, a number of minority shareholders of Film Finances 
Ltd. holding approximately 12% of the voting stock then 
brought a derivative action against the directors alleging inter alia 
that the directors had paid themselves excessive remuneration, 
and that the payments to the associated company were an ultra 
vires gift. Wren Trust Ltd., the only other substantial 
shareholder with 20% of the voting stock was opposed to the 
bringing of the action. His Honour, Knox J. having decided as 
a preliminary issue that the matter came within the proper 
38 	See the discussion by J.F. Corkery, Directors Duties and Powers 
Longman Professional 1987 at p.165. 
39 	[1987] 3 All E.R. 909. 
40 	Ibid. 
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boundaries of the exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle,41 
then went on a formulated a third limb for the minority 
shareholder to satisfy before he could bring a claim under the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle. Stamp, in his discussion of Smith v. 
Croft (No. 2) states: 
It was necessary for the minority shareholder to establish 
that the independent shareholders were not opposed to the 
bringing of the claim. In order to determine whether any 
particular shareholder was independent one had to apply a 
test based on the Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. 
[1900] 1 Ch. 656 formulation for alteration of articles, 
i.e. whether there was a substantial risk of the votes 
having been cast in order to support the defendant as 
opposed to securing the benefit of the company. In the 
present case the Wren Trust passed this test and 
accordingly the plaintiffs' application was struck out. 42 
This third limb makes the claim of a minority shareholder even 
less likely to succeed. The views of majority shareholders 
should be sought initially to determine if a fraud has been 
committed,43 not at some later stage after fraud has been found 
41 	His Honour by determining this as a preliminary issue was adopting the 
procedure used by the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v. Newman 
Industries (No. 2) [1982] 1 All E.R. 354; this issue of standing will be 
discussed later. 
42 	M. Stamp, "Minority Shareholders : Another Nail in the Coffin" (1988) 
9 Co. Law. 134 at p.135. 
43 	See the excellent discussion of what can be ratified in R. Baxt, "Judges in 
their Own Cause : The Ratification of Directors' Breaches of Duty" (1978) 
5 Mon. Uni. L.R. 16. 
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to exist. In effect the majority shareholders are being allowed 
'a second bite of the cherry'. 44 
First, the [majority shareholders] may use their votes to ratify 
any wrongs they have committed, provided that the ratification 
would not amount to a fraud. If ratification of the wrong would 
amount to a fraud, or the majority are unable to carry such a 
vote, they may attempt to convince the independent shareholders 
that it is not in the best interests of the company that a claim be 
brought.45 
The onus of establishing the independence or otherwise of the 
shareholders, who object to the bringing of proceedings is also 
cast upon the minority shareholder.46 The minority shareholder 
will be required to show that the exercise of voting power by the 
shareholders to forestall proceedings was not, "bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole". 47 This principle is 
objectionable as it is subjectively, rather than objectively 
based.48 The test is whether, the particular shareholders of that 
company think the resolution is for the benefit of the company 
as a whole, rather than whether the hypothetical reasonable 
44 	M. Stamp, op. cit. at p.135. 
45 	Ibid. 
46 	Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers [1927] 2 K.B. 9 at p.18. 
47 	Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Oa. 656 at p.671. 
48 	L. Crabb, "Minority Protection and Section 75" (1982) 3 Co. Law 3 at 
p.4. 
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shareholder would think the resolution is for the benefit of the 
company as a whole.49 
(ii)Control 
The meaning of the concept of control is still uncertain. 50 
Control can obviously be displayed if the wrongdoers have 51% 
of the voting stock. However, control can also be obtained by 
far smaller shareholdings. As stated by the Court of Appeal in 
Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries (No. 2)51 control, 
"embraces a broad spectrum extending from an overall absolute 
majority of votes at one end to a majority of votes at the other 
end made up of those likely to be cast by the delinquent himself 
plus those voting with him as a result of influence or apathy".52 
While this statement does not precisely define the minimum 
requirement for control it still indicates that control now extends 
from purely de-jure control to at least de-facto control. 
49 	Shuttleworth v. Cox Brothers [1927] 2 K.B. 9 at p.18. 
50 	See a further discussion on the aspect of control in Chapter 7. 
51 	[1982] 1 All E.R. 354. 
52 	Id. at p.364. 
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Standing to Sue 
An additional problem for the minority shareholder besides 
establishing fraud and control is that at the start of proceedings, 
the company, at the behest of the directors will seek to strike out 
the proceedings on the basis that the company is the proper 
plaintiff. This occurred in the decision of Foss v. Harbottle 
itself. In Tasmania, the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 
allow two avenues for the company to have the action struck 
out. For example, Order 16 provides that: 
Any defendant to an action may within ten days after 
appearance, or at any time by leave of the Court or a 
judge, apply to a judge for summary judgment and the 
judge if satisfied that the action is frivolous or vexatious 
and that the defendant has a good defence on the merits or 
that the action shall be disposed of summarily or without 
pleadings, may order that judgment be entered for the 
defendant. 
Order 28, Rule 4, also provides that: 
The court or a judge may order any pleading to be struck 
out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of 
action or answer and, in any such case or in case of the 
action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be 
33 
frivolous or vexatious, the Court or a judge may order the 
action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered 
accordingly, as may be just. 
Recent authority indicates that it is the latter order which is more 
appropriate.53 
The application of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle to the locus 
standi of the minority shareholders was before the English Court 
of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries (No. 
2). The facts of this case can be briefly summarised. 
Prudential Assurance was a minority shareholder in Newman 
Industries. Two of the directors of Newman Industries, Bartlett 
and Laughton, were also directors of a 'friendly company', 
T.P.G. In 1975, T.P.G. was in serious financial difficulties. 
Bartlett and Laughton devised a plan whereby Newman 
Industries would purchase T.P.G.'s assets, in exchange for a 
cash payment, and Newman Industries assuming all of the 
liabilities of T.P.G. The valuation placed on T.P.G. was 
erroneous due to misleading information supplied by Bartlett 
and Laughton. Bartlett and Laughton persuaded the Board of 
Directors of Newman industries to accept the transaction and a 
meeting of shareholders subsequently approved the transaction 
by a small majority. Prudential Assurance then brought a 
53 	Smith v. Croft (No. 2) [1987] 3 All E.R. 909. 
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derivative action against Bartlett and Laughton seeking equitable 
damages for a breach of fiduciary duty by Bartlett and Laughton 
to Newman Industries. 
The English Court of Appeal decided that the first issue to be 
considered was whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the 
derivative claim against the defendants. The plaintiff was 
required before proceeding to establish a prima facie case, and 
that the action fell within the proper boundaries of the exception 
to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. In determining this the 
allegations in the statement of claim which alleged fraud and 
control on behalf of Bartlett and Laughton were not to be treated 
as facts. 
The Court was also of the view that if the standing of the 
plaintiff was not decided as a preliminary issue then: 
...the rule in Foss v. Harbottle can have little, if any role 
to play. Either the wrong is proved, thereby establishing 
conclusively the rights of the company or the wrong is not 
proved so cadit quaestio. 54 
54 	Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries (No. 2) [1982] 1 All E.R. 354 
at p.365. 
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The Court of Appeal, by their approach, did nothing to improve 
the position of the minority shareholder who is attempting to 
right a wrong done to the company. In essence they reasserted 
the rationale for the rule in Foss v. Harbottle; that being that 
business decisions were best left to the commercial community. 
They have 'firmly reasserted conservative orthodoxy'. 55 
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Prudential 
Assurance v. Newman Industries (No. 2) has been questioned 
by the South Australian Supreme Court in Hurley and Anor. v. 
B.G.H. Nominees Pty. Ltd. 56 The Court considered that the 
issue of the minority shareholder's standing to bring a derivative 
action ought to be determined in each individual case according 
to the circumstances of that case.57 In the matter before the 
Court the question of standing was determined upon the basis 
that the allegations of fraud and control in the statement of claim 
were to be treated as facts. 58 
55 	A.J. Boyle, The Prudential, the Court of Appeal and Foss v. Harbottle " 
(1981) 2 Co. Law 264 at p.266. 
56 	[1982] 6 A.C.L.R. 791. 
57 	See the comments by King C.J. Id. at p.795. 
58 	The Full Court of Western Australia in Dempster v. Biala Pty. lid. (1989) 
15 A.C.L.R. 191 at p.193 also considered that there is no universal rule 
that the question of standing should be determined as a preliminary issue 
and that each case must be considered on its merits. The Court followed 
an earlier Western Australian Supreme Court decision on this point 
Eromanga Hydro Carbons N.L. v. Australian Mining N.L. (1988) 14 
A.C.L.R. 486. 
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Resolution of Conflict between Hurley and Prudential 
The conflict between Hurley v. B.G.H. Nominees and 
Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries could possibly be 
resolved by the adoption of the procedure that is utilised when 
the granting of an interlocutory injunction is in issue. The 
House of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon 59 decided 
that the Court did not have to find that there was a prima facie 
case before they would grant an interlocutory injunction; they 
only had to be satisfied that the claim was not frivolous or 
vexatious and that there was a serious question to be tried. The 
Court, on the preliminary matter, was not to "resolve conflicts 
of evidence as to facts".60 
Having decided that there was a serious question to be tried, the 
Court would then go on to consider whether the balance of 
convenience lies in granting the interlocutory injunction. This 
decision has been followed by the High Court of Australia in A. 
v. Hayden.61 
It is submitted that a Court could utilise this procedure when 
considering an application to strike out a derivative action. 
First, is there a serious question to be tried, if so, does the 
balance of convenience remain in allowing the action to proceed 
59 	[1975] 1 All E.R. 504. 
60 	Id. at p.510. 
61 	See A. v. Hayden (1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 7 and Murphy v. Lush (1986) 60 
A.L.J.R. 523. 
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in the name of the minority shareholder. The adoption of this 
procedure may go some way towards alleviating some of the 
difficulties facing the minority shareholder in obtaining locus 
standi to redress a wrong done to a company. 
Subsidiary problems with the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
The minority shareholder, even if he has established fraud, 
control, standing to sue, and that the independent shareholders 
have not ratified the wrongdoing, will still face a number of 
other obstacles. First, the alleged wrongdoers control all the 
information which the minority shareholder requires to establish 
his case. The plaintiff has to rely on the rules of discovery 
applicable to individual litigation and 'it is submitted that these 
are totally inadequate in the special circumstances of a 
shareholder suing directors'.62 The second problem that could 
arise results from the company being joined as a nominal 
defendant, despite the fact that if the minority shareholder is 
successful, the beneficiary of the judgment will be the company. 
The problem the plaintiff faces is that if he/she is unsuccessful, 
costs may be awarded against him/her. In effect, the minority 
shareholder is bearing the risk of failure, but won't enjoy the 
fruits of any success. This problem however, has been 
alleviated somewhat by the decision of the English Court of 
62 	O.C. Shriener, "The Shareholder's Derivative Action" (1979) 96 South 
African L.J. 203 at p.237. The applicable Tasmanian provision for 
discovery is Order 33 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1965. 
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Appeal in Wallersteiner v. Moir.63 The Court of Appeal in 
Wallersteiner arguing by analogy with trustees,64 or agents,65 
held that a minority shareholder can seek an indemnity order so 
that, in the event of loss, a company would prima facie be 
responsible for the payment of costs. The procedure to be 
followed by the minority shareholder in seeking an indemnity is 
as follows: 
1. The shareholder should apply ex-parte by summons to the 
master. 
2. The summons should be supported by the opinion of 
counsel. 
3. The Court could, in appropriate circumstances, join other 
persons. 
4. The evidence presented before the hearing would not 
normally be made available to the defendants should the 
principal action proceed. 
63 	[1975] Q.B. 373. 
64 	See Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch. 547. 
65 	Re Famatina Development Corporation [1914] 2 Ch. 271. 
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5. The Court could require the minority shareholder to 
proceed to a certain stage and then require 'him to return to 
the Court for further directions. 
Some ten years later in Smith v. Croft (No. 1)66 the 
Wallersteiner procedure was modified somewhat by the decision 
of Walton J. His Honour considered that applications should 
generally not be ex-parte; the relevant evidence should be shown 
to the company, and Walton J. also thought it important to 
consider the liquidity of the plaintiff, to determine if the plaintiff 
had sufficient financial resources to finance the action on his 
own. This point is justifiably subject to criticism by Prentice. 67 
The plaintiff is bringing his application as a "representative" of 
the company and his financial resources should be irrelevant in 
determining the status of the plaintiff to bring the action. 
Legislative Reform 
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle poses a serious impediment to the 
minority shareholder seeking to redress a wrong done to the 
company. He must grapple with the intricacies of fraud, 
control, ratification and standing to sue, together with subsidiary 
66 	[1986] 2 All E.R. 551. 
67 	D.D. Prentice, "Wallersteiner v. Moir : A Decade Later" [1987] Cony. and 
Prop. Law 167. He considered that on grounds both of principle and 
practicality, the wealth of the plaintiff should not be a relevant 
consideration. 
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matters such as discovery and costs. For these reasons, many 
law reform committees68 have all suggested a statutory remedy 
for minority shareholders. 
Along these lines Corkery notes that: 
The difficulties of a minority shareholder seeking to bring 
a derivative action are legendary. The so called rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle even with its 'exceptions' stultifies 
minority shareholder action against corporate mischief. 
Simply getting standing is very difficult.... Defining and 
proving fraud on the minority, showing the wrongdoers 
are in effective control of the company and grappling with 
the intricacies of corporate ratifability befuddle the 
minority shareholder who lacks influence and access to 
corporate funds, information and procedures. 69 
It is now proposed to briefly detail the major concerns of the law 
reform committees who have considered the plight of the 
minority shareholder. 
68 	E.G. Cohen Report, Cmd. 6659, United Kingdom 1945; Jenkins Reports 
Cmnd 1749, United Kingdom 1962; Lawrence Report, Interim Report of 
the Select Committee on Company Law, Ontario 1967; Dickerson 
Report, Proposals for a New Business Corporations law for Canada, 
Ottawa, 1971. 
69 	J.F. Corkery, "Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers" (1985) 9 Adel. 
Law Review 437 at p.458. For a recent decision discussing the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle see Farrow v. Registrar of Building Societies [1991] 2 
VLR 589. 
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Cohen Committee:- United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom Cohen Committee70 were concerned with 
two particular practices which, in their opinion, amounted to 
oppressive conduct of minority shareholders. These practices 
were restrictions on the transfer of shares, which resulted in 
minority members having to sell their shares to directors at an 
undervalue,71 and excessive remuneration paid to directors 
which left nothing for shareholders by way of dividend. 72 The 
Committee saw these practices as illustrations of a general 
problem.73 Accordingly they considered that an oppression 
section should be introduced so that the Court would be 
empowered to make whatever settlement was just and equitable 
on the facts of the case before them: 
[The Court] should be empowered instead of making a 
winding up order to make such other order, including an 
order for the purchase by the majority of the shares of the 
minority at a price to be fixed by the Court. 74 
70 	1945 Cmd. 6659. 
71 	Id. at para. 58. 
72 	Id. at para. 59. 
73 	Id. at para. 60. 
74 	Cohen Report Cmd. 6659, para. 60. 
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It is clear that the Cohen Committee were addressing their 
remarks to disputes between members of small private 
companies, commonly known as quasi-partnerships. The 
characteristics of these companies often include a small number 
of shareholders, restrictions on the transferability of shares, 
shareholder participation in management and shareholders being 
remunerated as officers of the company rather than by the 
declaration of dividends. 75 
The legislation76 which was based on the Cohen Report was 
not however restricted to private companies, but 'by requiring 
facts justifying a winding up order, it remained firmly anchored 
to quasi-partnership companies' .77 
Jenkins Committee - United Kingdom 
The legislation based on the Cohen Committee came up for 
review in 1962 with the Jenkins Committee.78 The Committee 
noted,79 that while it may be theoretically desirable for 
shareholders to have a more effective voice in management, in 
75 	See the comments by G. Shapira, "Minority Shareholders' Protection - 
Recent Developments" (1982) N.Z.U.L.R. 134 at p.138. 
76 	See the Companies Act 1948, s.210. 
77 	'bid 
78 	1962 Cmnd. 1749. 
79 	Id. at para. 14. 
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practice, the officers of the company must be given a reasonably 
free hand in the day to day management of the company: 
It is no doubt necessary for the protection of shareholders 
that activities of companies and those responsible for their 
management should be subject to a considerable degree of 
statutory regulation and control... [However we recognise 
the] undesirability of imposing restrictions which would 
seriously hamper the activities of honest men in order to 
defeat an occasional wrongdoer and the importance of not 
placing unreasonable fetters upon business which is 
conducted in an efficient and honest manner. 80 
The Committee then goes on to discuss the oppression remedy 
which resulted from the recommendations of the Cohen 
Committee. They state: 
Many witnesses have, however, expressed their opinion, 
with which we agree, that even as interpreted ... the 
section as it stands calls for amendment if it is to afford 
effective protection to minorities in circumstances such as 
those with which it is intended to dea1. 81 
80 	Jenkins Report, 1962 Cmnd. 1749 at para. 11. 
81 	Id. at para. 200. 
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The Jenkins Committee also considered the restrictive conditions 
of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.82 After reference to the 
requirements of fraud and contro1, 83 the Committee 
recommended that the statutory oppression remedy should be 
extended to not only cover acts which were unfairly prejudicial, 
but also to allow a court to order that proceedings be brought in 
the name of the company by such person, or persons as the 
court may direct. 84 
It is not our intention to encourage litigation in cases in 
which, for instance, an independent majority has reached a 
bona fide decision to the effect that in the interests of the 
company as a whole no action should be taken. But we 
think that the discretion we propose should be given to the 
Court in such cases and the probable liability for costs of 
an unsuccessful litigant will be a sufficient safeguard 
against abuse. 85 
The potential for this provision is enormous. As Shapira 
comments: 
82 	Id. at para. 206. 
83 	Ibid. 
84 	Id. at paras. 206, 303-304. 
85 	Jenkins Report, 1962, Cmnd 1749 at para. 207; the legislation was 
comprehensively reformed in 1980 and the recommendations of the 
Jenkins Committee are now contained in Companies Act 1985 (U.K.) 
ss.459-461. 
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The statutory jurisdiction may supersede Foss v. 
Harbottle. Alternatively, it may perhaps be possible to 
use (the section) as a statutory base to reform the 
unsatisfactory aspects of the rule while retaining its main 
advantage - the protection of the company against being 
forced into vexatious or uneconomic litigation. 86 
Macarthur Committee - New Zealand 
The Macarthur Committee,87 largely endorsed the 
recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee. They 
similarly considered that the term 'unfairly prejudicial' should be 
added to oppression and that the court should be in a position to 
order the company to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue 
proceedings. 88 Like the legislation emanating from the 
recommendations of the Jenkins Committee the legislation 
resulting from the Macarthur Committee represented a 
considerable step forward in the protection of the interests of 
minority shareholders, particularly those in quasi-partnerships. 
86 	G. Shapira, op. cit. at p.162. 
87 	Final Report of the Special Committee to Review the Companies Act, 
March 1973 (hereafter referred to as the Macarthur Committee). 
88 	Id. at para. 364 ff. 
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Lawrence Committee - Canada 
The Lawrence Committee89 disagreed with the reform measures 
adopted in the United Kingdom. After analysing the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle and the oppression remedy utilised in the 
United Kingdom, they state: 
It is sufficient for the Committee to state that the very 
existence of [the oppression section] is a recognition by 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom that the rights of 
minority shareholders were inadequate and that new and 
different remedies were therefore required to redress 
wrongs done to the company or to minority shareholders. 
In our opinion [the oppression section] raises as many 
problems as it lays to rest and, more importantly, is 
objectionable on the ground that it is a complete dereliction 
of the established principle of judicial non-interference in 
the management of companies. The underlying 
philosophy of [the oppression section] has an air of 
reservation and defeatism about it, as if the legislature was 
unable to offer any solution to the plight of minority 
shareholders other than abandoning the problems to the 
judiciary to be dealt with ad hoc on the basis of 
determining, from case to case, whether or not "the affairs 
89 	Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, Ontario, 1967 
(hereafter referred to as the Lawrence Committee). 
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of the company are being conducted in a manner 
oppressive to some part" of the shareholders.90 
The Lawrence Committee then considered the alternatives to an 
oppression section, and concluded that the statutory derivative 
action would be the most appropriate means of achieving relief 
for minority shareholders against the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
91 : 
The Committee therefore recommends that the Ontario Act 
be amended by adding a substantive provision to the effect 
that a shareholder of a company may maintain an action in 
a representative capacity for himself and all other 
shareholders of the company suing for and on behalf of 
the company to enforce any rights, duties or obligations 
owed to the company which could be enforced by the 
company itself or to obtain damages for any breach 
thereof.92 
The Committee also thought that to avoid the problems that 
occurred in America with the use of the derivative action,93 the 
shareholder should have to establish that he is acting bona fide, 
90 	Id. at p.60. 
91 	Id. at p.62. 
92 	Id. at p.63. 
93 	Id. at p.62-63. 
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and that it is prima facie in the interests of the company that the 
action be brought.94 
The Committee were particularly concerned that minority 
interests bring derivative actions, "solely for the purpose of 
provoking secret settlements with the companies even in 
circumstances when the action is not well founded".95 They 
considered that, by requiring the twin elements of bona fides of 
the applicant, and that it be in the interests of the company, the 
problems surrounding the derivative action could be resolved. 
It is submitted that these elements are a necessary part of a 
derivative action so as to avoid the problem of strike suits and 
the vexatious minority shareholder. 
Dickerson Committee - Canada 
The Dickerson Committee, 96 when considering a corporation's 
law for Canada, adopted the premise that: 
94 	Id. at p.63. 
95 	The Lawrence Committee at p.63. 
96 	Proposals for a New Business Corporation Law for Canada, Ottawa, 1971 
(hereafter referred to as the Dickerson Committee). 
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...a corporation's Act should be largely self-enforcing by 
civil action initiated by the aggrieved party not by severe 
penal sanctions or sweeping investigatory powers.97 
On the basis of this premise, the Dickerson Committee 
submitted that not only should a minority shareholder have the 
right to bring a statutory derivative action, but that an oppression 
section should also be introduced, implicitly therefore 
disagreeing with the criticisms of an oppression section by the 
Lawrence Committee. 
The Dickerson Committee saw great promise in the statutory 
derivative action commenting that: 
...in effect, this provision abrogates the notorious rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle and substitutes for that rule a new 
regime to govern the conduct of derivative actions ... we 
have relegated the rule to legal limbo without 
compunction, convinced that the alternative system 
recommended is preferable to the uncertainties - and 
obvious injustices - engendered by that infamous 
doctrine.98 
97 	Id. at p.161. 
98 	Ibid. 
50 
The Dickerson Committee saw the oppression section as being 
used in a different context to the statutory derivative action. 
The object of the statutory derivative action was to remedy a 
wrong done to the company, whereas the oppression section: 
...will be invoked most frequently - but not always - in 
respect of a corporation the shares of which are held by 
only a relatively small number of persons, so-called "close 
corporation" since its usual object is to remedy any wrong 
done to minority shareholders. 99 
The Committee also recognised that in many instances a wrong 
to the minority shareholder will also be a wrong to the 
corporation. In those instances, the minority shareholder may 
select the remedy that, in his opinion, will best resolve the 
problem. 100 The Canadian experience with the statutory 
derivative action has been relatively successful, and the 
possibility of its introduction in Australia will be considered at a 
later stage. 
99 	Id. at p.162. 
100 Ibid. 
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Australia:  
Australian company law has traditionally been based on 
legislation of the United Kingdom. 101 The first Australian 
companies legislation was introduced in the 1860s and 1870s 
when the English Act of 1862 was adopted by each colony. 
Generally, English reforms and consolidations were 
transcribed. 102 The recommendations of the Cohen Committee 
were first adopted by Victoria in 1958, and the oppression 
section was then reproduced in the uniform Companies Act 
1961. 103 The scope of the section, now section 260, was 
expanded in the Companies Code 1981, and was substantially 
amended in 1983. In 1983 the terms unfairly prejudicial, 
unfairly discriminatory and contrary to the interests of members 
as a whole were added. The range of remedies was also 
expanded in line with the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee. 104 
101 See for example the comments by A.C. Castles, An Australian Legal 
History, Law Book Co. 1982 at p.45311. 
102 See the comments by P. Redmond, Companies and Securities Law, Law 
Book Co. 1988 at p.31. 
103 The initial oppression section being s.186 of the Uniform Companies 
Act 1961. 
104 The problems associated with the legislation will be considered in 
Chapter 4 of the thesis. This section follows from the recommendations 
of the Jenkins Report, see for example the comments of the N.S.W. 
Attorney-General in the N.S.W. Legislative Assembly 1971, Volume 91 
Hansard at p.911-912. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE OPPRESSION 
REMEDY BY THE JUDICIARY. 
The various law reform committees such as the Cohen' and 
Jenldns2 Committee outlined some of the problems associated 
with the fraud on the minority exception to the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle3 . In response to these problems the oppression 
section was introduced in England in 1947 and adopted by 
Queensland in 1955;4 Victoria in 1958;5 and Tasmania in 
1958.6 It was introduced Australian wide in the Uniform 
Companies Act 1961.7 The 1981 Companies Code added to 
the forerunner of s.260 two further grounds to establish 
oppression; "that the directors have acted in the affairs of the 
company in their own interests and not in the interests of 
members as a whole," and, "that directors of the company have 
acted in affairs of the company in any other manner whatsoever 
that is unfair or unjust to other members". The 1983 
amendments to the predecessor of s.260 were introduced by the 
Companies and Securities Legislation (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act 1983 and result principally from the 
(1945) Cmd 6659. 
(1962) Cmnd. 1749. 
[1843] 2 Ha. 461; 67 E.R. 189. 
Companies Act (Qld.), s.379A. 
Companies Act (Vic.), s.94. 
Companies Act (Tas.), s.128. 
Section 186 of the Uniform Companies Act (Tas.). 
53 
recommendations of the Jenkins Committee and the Ghanian 
Companies Report of 1961. 8 The substantive provisions of 
s.260 of the Corporations Law now read: 
PART 3 - 4 - Oppressive Conduct of Affairs 
SECTION 260: REMEDY IN CASES OF 
OPPRESSION OR INJUSTICE. 
260(1) [Application to Court] An application to the Court 
for an order under this section in relation to a 
company may be made - 
(a) by a member who believes - 
(i) that affairs of the company are being conducted in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against a member or 
members, or in a manner that is contrary to the 
interests of the members as a whole; or 
These two reports were primarily the work of English company law 
reformer, L.C.B. Gower, see the comments of J.F. Corkery, "Oppression 
or Unfairness by Controllers - What Can a Shareholder do about it? An 
Analysis of s.320 of the Companies Code" (1988) 9 Adel. Law. Rev. 437 
at p.438. 
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(ii) that an act or omission, or a proposed act or 
omission, by or on behalf of the company, or a 
resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of 
members, was or would be oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a 
member or members or was or would be contrary to 
the interests of the members as a whole; or 
260(2) [Orders that Court may make] If the Court 
is of the opinion - 
(a) that affairs of a company are being conducted in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or 
members (in the section called the "oppressed 
member or members") or in a manner that is contrary 
to the interests of the members as a whole; or 
(b) that an act or omission, or a proposed act or 
omission, by or on behalf, of a company, or a 
resolution, or a proposed resolution, of a class of 
members of a company, was or would be oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory 
against, a member or members (in this section also 
called the "oppressed member or members") or was 
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or would be contrary to the interests of the members 
as a whole, 
the Court may, subject to sub-section (4), make such order or 
orders as it thinks fit, including, but not limited to, one or more 
of the following orders: 
(c) an order that the company be wound up; 
(d) an order for regulating the conduct of affairs of the 
company in the future; 
(e) an order for the purchase of the shares of any 
member by other members; 
(f) an order for the purchase of the shares of any 
member by the company and for the reduction 
accordingly of the company's capital; 
(g) an order directing the company to institute, 
prosecute, defend or discontinue specified 
proceedings, or authorising a member or members of 
the company to institute, prosecute, defend or 
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discontinue specified proceedings in the name and on 
behalf of the company; 
(h) an order appointing a receiver or a receiver and 
manager of property of the company; 
(j) an order restraining a person from engaging in 
specified conduct or from doing a specified act or 
thing; 
(k) an order requiring a person to do a specified act or 
thing. 
260(5) [Interpretation] In this section and in 
paragraphs 461(1)(f), (g) and (h): 
(a) a reference to a member, in relation to a company, 
includes, in the case of a company limited by shares, 
or a company limited both by shares and by 
guarantee, a reference to a person to whom a share in 
the company has been transmitted by will or by 
operation of law; 
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(b) a reference to affairs of a company being conducted 
in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member is a 
reference to affairs of a company being conducted in 
a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a person who is a 
member, whether in his capacity as a member or in 
any other capacity; and 
(c) a reference to an act or omission by or on behalf of a 
company or a resolution of a class of members of a 
company being oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a member is a 
reference to an act or omission by or on behalf of a 
company or a resolution of a class of members of a 
company being oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, 
or unfairly discriminatory against, a person who is a 
member, whether in the person's capacity as a 
member or in any other capacity. 
I will briefly outline who can apply for relief under the section, 
then consider the grounds for relief, and finally examine a 
number of issues that may arise in respect of the legislation. 
Who can apply for relief 
Section 260(5) provides that in s.260 and in s.461(1)(f), (g) and 
(h) a reference to a member includes a reference to a person to 
whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by 
operation of law. This provision allows executors, 
administrators and trustees in bankruptcy to bring proceedings. 
Prior to the 1983 amendments this was not possible. Section 
260(5) also makes it clear that a member who has been 
oppressed in some capacity, other than that as a member, will 
still be able to institute proceedings under s.260. Thus, a 
solicitor who is also a member, but who has been injured in his 
capacity as a solicitor will still be able to claim oppressive or 
unjust conduct. 
Section 260 however, does not allow a former member who has 
been denied his shares in an oppressive or unjust manner to 
bring proceedings. This may be contrasted with s. 231 of the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act 1974 which permits 
persons other than members to apply. The Canadian legislation 
allows standing to former shareholders, former officers and 
"any other person who, in the discretion of the Court, is a 
proper person to make an application". This would be a useful 
improvement to our legislation particularly in the instance of a 
person who has lost their shareholding due to oppressive or 
unjust conduct. If this legislation is to be regarded as remedial 
legislation designed to correct the abuses of those in control, 
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then a person should not be denied a remedy by the 
requirements that he be a member at the time of the bringing of 
the action. Relief should not be denied for purely technical 
reasons. 
Section 260, read literally, does not require that the person 
bringing the action be a member at the time of the oppressive or 
unjust conduct. Indeed, a member could purchase shares to 
allow them to pursue proceedings against the wrongdoers; in 
effect members of the public could act as corporate watchdogs. 
This possibility is arguably not likely in the case of the 
incorporated partnership as the directors usually have the right to 
refuse a transfer of shares in a close corporation of that type. If 
a member did purchase shares after the oppressive or unjust 
conduct had occurred, that person may not have the range of 
remedies otherwise available to an affected member. It is 
difficult to see that a court would make an order for the purchase 
of a member's shares where that member did not have a 
shareholding at the time of the unjust conduct; that shareholder 
not being able to argue that there has been a diminution in the 
value of his shareholding as a result of the conduct in question. 
The shareholder would presumably have brought into the 
company at the prevailing market price. 9 
In Re Spargos Mining NL (1990) 3 A.C.S.R. 1 the shareholders were 
allowed standing even thought they were not members at that time of the 
unjust conduct. 
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Finally, s.260 is not restricted to minority shareholders, there is 
nothing to stop a majority shareholder bringing an action, 
though considering the control that can be exercised by the 
majority in a general meeting, it is difficult to envisage situations 
where a majority shareholder would need to utilise s.260. 
Grounds for relief 
Four grounds for relief are stated in section 260. The conduct 
complained of must be either: 
(i) oppressive; 
(ii) unfairly prejudicial; 
(iii) unfairly discriminatory; or 
(iv) contrary to the interests of members as a whole. 
It is now appropriate to consider how the judiciary has defined 
these terms. 
Oppression:  
The earliest statutory protection for minority shareholders was 
generally limited to a winding up of the company on the just and 
equitable ground. 10 This remedy has a serious limitation in that 
if the minority are successful, the company will be terminated. 
Upon termination the assets of the company will be realised, and 
it may be that the only willing purchasers will be the majority 
from whose conduct the minority are claiming to seek relief. It 
was these limitations that led the Cohen Committeel 1 to 
recommend that an oppression section be introduced. 
Oppression has been generally interpreted in one of three 
ways: 
(i) "burdensome, harsh and wrongful." 12 
(ii) "an unfair abuse of powers and an impairment of 
confidence in the probity with which the company's 
affairs are being conducted as distinguished from 
See now ss.460-1 of the Corporations Law. 
(1945) Cmd 6659. 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer [1959] A.C. 324 
at p.342 per Viscount Simonds. 
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mere resentment on the part of the minority at being 
outvoted on some issue of domestic policy." 13 
"at the lowest involve a visible departure from the 
standards of fair dealing, and a violation of the 
conditions of fair play on which every shareholder 
who entrusts his money to the company is entitled to 
rely:A.4 
The oppression section, even with the restrictive interpretations 
adopted did allow the judiciary to take a positive role in the 
regulation and control of corporate behaviour. However, 
Wishart comments, "[a]s the judiciary became more aware of the 
extent of possible regulation offered to it, the judges tightened 
the description of 'oppressive behaviour' to exclude all but 
positive wrongs. In Re Lundie Brothers Ltd., 15 they went so 
far as to apply the proper plaintiff aspect of the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle" 16 
The judiciary thus adopted a highly restrictive approach as to 
what constitutes oppressive behaviour. This was after initially 
13 	Cooper CI in Elder v. Elder and Watson [1952] S.C. 49 at p.55. 
14 	Ibid. 
15 	[1965] 2 All E.R. 692; [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1051. 
16 	D. Wishart, "A Fresh Approach to Section 320" (1987) 17 W.A.L.R. 94 
at 99. 
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adopting a broad approach to the definition of oppression. This 
change of attitude by the judiciary occurred because of a desire 
not to interfere or regulate the internal affairs of companies. 
They were not to be the arbiters of business judgment. The 
court rather than considering the purpose of the legislation or the 
intent of the legislature chose a highly legalistic method of 
interpretation; that of considering the dictionary meaning of the 
words in question. This approach by the courts allowed the 
confines of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle to be reimposed. This 
general theme of non-interference by the court in business 
decisions was expressed by Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith 
v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. 17 His Honour stated: 
It would be wrong for the court to substitute its opinion 
for that of the management, or indeed to question the 
correctness of the management's decision ... if bona fide 
arrived at. There is no appeal on merits from management 
decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume 
to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within 
the powers of management honestly arrived at.18 
It is this type of policy decision which has influenced the 
judiciary's thinking on the interpretation of s.260, and the issue 
that must now be considered is to what extent the 1983 
17 	[1974] A.C. 821. 
18 	Id. at p.832. 
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amendments to the statute, that is the extent to which the 
addition of the terms unfairly prejudicial, unfairly discriminatory 
and contrary to the interests of members as a whole has 
overridden the courts traditional reluctance to interfere in 
management of companies. As Shapira comments: 
Is the [1983] amendment to be construed as a deliberate, 
across the board, departure from a century and a half of 
pronounced policy of judicial non-intervention in 
corporate affairs. 19 
Unfairly Prejudicial/Unfairly Discriminatory/Contrary to the 
Interests of Members as a Whole  
The first major decision that considers the amendments to the 
legislation is Re G. Jeffrey (Mens Store) Pty. Ltd.20 In this 
case two companies were formed by G. Jeffrey to run his two 
businesses. He was the majority shareholder and governing 
director in both companies. After his death, the shareholding in 
each company passed in the following manner: 30 percent to 
each of his sons, Richard and Anthony, 20 percent to his widow 
and 10 percent to each of his two daughters. Richard, Anthony 
and the widow were the directors of each company. Richard 
19 	G. Shapira, "Minority Shareholders' Protection - Recent Developments" 
[1982] 10 N.Z.U.L.R. 134. 
20 	(1984) 9 A.C.L.R. 193. 
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was to be managing director of one company, Anthony the 
managing director of the other company. The company under 
the management of Anthony declined financially, whilst the 
company under the control of Richard prospered. Accordingly, 
Richard replaced Anthony as managing director, Anthony 
ceasing to be an officer of the company, but retaining his 
shareholding in the company. The company prospered under 
Richard who also gained control of a further 10 per cent of the 
shareholding, and came to a voting arrangement with the widow 
as to her 20 per cent. In practical terms Richard had control of 
both companies and treated them as his own. Anthony became 
displeased at what he saw as an authoritarian approach by 
Richard to decision making. He wished for a greater role in 
management and unsuccessfully argued at company meetings 
that assets of the company could be more profitably employed. 
Anthony also wanted a greater distribution of dividends but 
Richard insisted on accumulating substantial cash reserves. 
Ultimately Anthony requested Richard to buy his shares but the 
price offered by Richard was unrealistically low. Anthony then 
sought various orders under the then equivalent of s.260, or a 
winding up of the company under the precursor to ss.460-461 
of the Corporations Law. 
The main issue before His Honour Crockett J. in the Supreme 
Court of Victoria, was whether Richard had acted in the affairs 
of the company in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory against a member, in this 
instance, Anthony. This Honour first examined the term 
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oppression and considered that it should be given the same 
interpretation as it was given prior to the amendments. 21 The 
statement by Menhennitt J. in Re Tivoli Freeholds,22 that 
oppression involves conduct which is unfair, burdensome, 
harsh or which lacks probity was approved. 23 He considered 
that the newly introduced expressions clearly contemplate 
conduct of greater amplitude than is understood by the term 
"oppressive". The new subsection has made the task of the 
applicant shareholder less onerous in respect of the conduct 
about which he is entitled to complain. 24 Crockett J. however, 
was not persuaded that the affairs of the company had been 
conducted in an unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory 
manner against Anthony. In finding for Richard, Crockett J. 
held that on the facts that Richard had continued to conduct 
business in much the same way as the applicants father had 
conducted the business, and that on the commercial wisdom of 
retaining profits rather than distributing dividends, the court 
would not make a judgment: 
In relation to commercial questions such as retention of 
profits for use in the business I should in this case ... be 
unprepared to take any action so long as the managing 
director was acting bona fide and in what he honestly 
21 	Id. at p.198. 
22 	[1972] V.R. 445. 
23 	(1984) 9 A.C.L.R. 193 at p.198. 
24 	Ibid. 
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believed were the best interests of each company's 
members.25 
His Honour whilst recognising the greater possibilities of the 
new legislation still indicated that the policy of non-interference 
by the judiciary in commercial decisions would still influence the 
court in this area and ultimately would be paramount to the 
intention of the legislature. 
This recognition by Crockett J. that the amendments to the 
legislation have made the task of the minority shareholder less 
onerous was also recognised by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Thomas v. H. W. Thomas Ltd. 26 In Thomas v. 
H.W. Thomas Ltd27 the company of H.W. Thomas Ltd was 
established in 1930 to carry on the business of general carriers. 
• The issued capital was 3000 shares of $2 each. H.W. Thomas, 
the founder of this company was the first managing director. 
The articles of association conferred upon him all the powers of 
the directors, and required any other director to conform to his 
wishes. At the time of the action, Alan Thomas, a grandson of 
H.W. Thomas was the managing director pursuant to the same 
article. He held 50 shares. Another grandson of H.W. 
Thomas, Malcolm Thomas, held 1000 shares. The remaining 
25 	Ibid. 
26 	(1984) 2 A.C.L.C. 610. 
27 	ibid. 
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shares were held by various family members. Transference of 
shares was within the control of the managing director. The 
financial management had for the most part been conservative. 
Large profits were not made and the company had only 
distributed modest dividends. Accumulated revenue reserves 
stood at $220,000. In 1980 Malcolm Thomas unsuccessfully 
moved a motion at the annual general meeting that certain assets 
be sold and that the proceeds be invested in income earning 
investments. In 1981, he gave notice that he wished to sell his 
shares; nothing further proceeded from this. In 1982, he 
complained that he was locked into the company and that the 
affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner that 
was unfairly prejudicial and/or unfairly discriminatory to him. 
His Honour Richardson J. in similar terms to Re G. Jeffrey Pty 
Ltd. agreed that Parliament in using the words unfairly 
prejudicial and unfairly discriminatory were providing 
shareholders a wider base on which to found a complaint. 28 
Richardson J. adopted an approach that was in some respects to 
be repeated by the High Court in Wayde v. N.S.W. Rugby 
League.29 
His Honours states: 
28 	Id. at p.616. 
29 	(1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 798. 
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Fairness cannot be assessed in a vacuum or simply from 
one member's point of view. It will often depend on 
weighing conflicting interests of different groups within 
the company. It is a matter of balancing all the interests 
involved in terms of the policies underlying the companies 
legislation in general and s.[260] in particular: thus to 
have regard to the principles governing the duties of a 
director in the conduct of the affairs of a company and the 
rights and duties of a majority shareholder in relation to 
the minority; but to recognise that s.[260] is a remedial 
provision designed to allow the court to intervene where 
there is a visible departure from the standards of fair 
dealing; and in the light of the history and structure of the 
particular company and the reasonable expectations of 
members to determine whether the detriment occasioned to 
the complaining member's interests arising from the acts 
or conduct of the company in that way is justifiable.30 
The judgment is important in the context of the interpretation of 
s.260 because it recognises that the intent and purpose of the 
legislature was to provide a remedy to the minority shareholder, 
and that in considering whether detriment had been occasioned, 
the history, type and structure of the family company was 
important. The judgment also recognises that a balancing of 
interests will be appropriate. This balancing of interests must 
not only consider the policy of the legislature as regards s.260, 
30 	Thomas v. H.W. Thomas Lid (1984) 2 A.C.L.C. 610 at p.618. 
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but also the principle that a court will not readily interfere with 
business management. 
Having stated the principles Richardson J. considers the facts of 
the case before him. The history of the company involved 
traditionally conservative financial policies and involvement in a 
narrow field, that being the transport field. Accordingly "it 
would be unrealistic in a family company to ignore family 
considerations of that kind." 31 This being so, it was found that 
there had not been any unjust conduct. 
The effect of these two decisions was that the judiciary gave 
s.260 of the Corporations Law an expanded role after the 
amendments. They saw the amendments as improving the 
position of the minority shareholder but the section did not allow 
the courts to intervene in the commercial decision making 
process. 
The High Court had their first opportunity to consider the 
legislation in Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd.32 
The New South Wales Rugby League was a company limited by 
guarantee. It was incorporated to take over the functions of an 
unincorporated association which had conducted rugby league 
31 	Ibid. 
32 	(1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 798. 
71 
competitions since 1907. Membership of the League consisted 
of representatives of the various clubs. Clause 3 of the 
League's memorandum stated the objects of the League. In 
particular paragraphs 3(b) and 3(j) set out the following objects: 
(b) To foster and control the game of rugby league 
football throughout the State of New South Wales 
and the Australian Capital Territory and generally to 
take such action as may be conducive to its best 
interests. 
(j) To determine which clubs shall be entitled to enter 
teams in the Rugby League Premiership and other 
competitions conducted by the League and the terms 
and conditions upon which and the manner in which 
clubs shall make and renew such applications." 
Article 76 of the League's articles of association facilitated the 
object in paragraph (j). That article provided: 
The League may conduct such competitions between 
teams representing all or any of the Clubs or Junior 
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Leagues as the Board of Directors may from time to time 
determine provided that the Board of Directors may at its 
discretion invite other clubs to participate in any 
competition conducted pursuant to the provisions of this 
clause. 
In September 1984, the League decided to limit the number of 
teams in the Winfield Cup premiership competition in 1985 to 
twelve teams, and to refuse the application of the Western 
Suburbs District Rugby League Football Club (Wests) for entry 
into that competition. Two members of the company, in their 
capacity as representatives of Wests sought an injunction 
pursuant to the predecessor of s.260 of the Corporations Law. 
The two members were successful in first instance 33 but lost an 
appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appea1.34 Wests' 
representatives then appealed to the High Court. 
Mason A.C.J., Wilson, Deane and Dawson J.J. delivered a 
joint judgment dismissing Wests' appeal. Brennan J. agreed 
with the conclusion of the majority in a separate judgment. The 
joint judgment considered it crucial that the decisions made by 
the board were made in good faith, and that there was no 
suggestion that the board had in making the decision taken into 
33 	(1985) 3 A.C.L.C. 158. 
34 	(1985) 3 A.C.L.C. 177. 
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account irrelevant considerations, or had failed to take into 
account relevant considerations. 
It is not a case where the directors of a company in the 
exercise of the general powers of management of the 
company, might bona fide adopt a policy or decide upon a 
course of action which is alleged to be unfairly prejudicial 
to a minority of the members of the company. In that 
kind of case it may well be appropriate for the court on an 
application for relief under [s.260], to examine the policy 
which has been pursued or the proposed course of action 
in order to determine the fairness or unfairness of the 
course which has been taken by those in control of the 
company. The court may be required in such 
circumstances to undertake a balancing exercise between 
the competing considerations disclosed by the evidence: 
compare Thomas v. H.W. Thomas Ltd. 35 
Wests argued that while the board of directors may reasonably 
conclude that a competition involving twelve clubs was 
preferable to a competition involving thirteen clubs, the fact that 
a thirteen team competition was not unworkable and that Wests 
was a viable competitor lead to the conclusion that the prejudice 
to Wests by their exclusion so outweighed the benefit to the 
League as to be unfair. Their Honours answered this by noting 
35 	(1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 798 at p.801. 
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that the League was expressly constituted to promote the sport 
and to determine which clubs should be entitled to participate. 
Accordingly, Wests could only succeed if they could show that 
the decisions of the board were such that no board acting 
reasonably could have made them. Wests could not show this 
and their appeal was dismissed: 
Given the special expertise and the experience of the 
board, the bona fide and proper exercise of the power in 
pursuit of the purpose for which it was conferred and the 
caution which a court must exercise in determining an 
application under [s.260J of the Code in order to avoid an 
unwarranted assumption of the responsibility for 
management of the company, the appellants faced a 
difficult task in seeking to prove that the decisions in 
question were unfairly prejudicial to Wests and therefore 
not in the overall interests of the members as a whole. It 
has not been shown that decisions of the board were such 
that no board acting reasonably could have made them. 
The effect of those decisions on Wests was harsh indeed. 
It has not, however, been shown that they were 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory or that 
their effect was such as to warrant the conclusion that the 
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affairs of the League were or are being conducted in a 
manner that was or is oppressive or unfairly prejudicia1. 36 
His Honour Brennan J. adopted a similar analysis to the joint 
judgment. The test he formulated was based on standards of 
reasonableness and fair dealing: 
The Court must determine whether reasonable directors, 
possessing any special skills, knowledge or acumen 
possessed by the directors and having in mind the 
importance of furthering the corporate object on the one 
hand and the disadvantage, disability or burden which 
their decision will impose on a member on the other, 
would have decided that it was unfair to make that 
decision.37 
On this test, Brennan J. considered that while there was 
prejudice and discrimination against Wests, there was nothing to 
suggest unfairness. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 
The major difference in analysis between the joint judgment and 
the judgment of Brennan J. is that His Honour specifically 
36 	Ibid. 
37 	Id. at p.803. 
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considered the term "contrary to the interests of members as a 
whole", an area not specifically addressed by the joint judgment. 
His Honour states: 
The expression 'the interests of the members as a whole' 
is not likely to provide a criterion for intervention in 
respect of a decision made in exercise of a power that is 
conferred to resolve a conflict of interests between one or 
more members on the one hand and the League's object of 
fostering the game on the other. 38 
The relevant expressions to be considered were oppression, 
unfairly discriminatory and unfairly prejudicial. 
The interpretation of s.260 by the High Court is limiting. The 
Court adopted a test based on what a reasonable board of 
directors would have done in the same situation. They made no 
reference to a test of injustice based on the nature of the 
particular company, its history or the expectation of the 
founding members. The Court did however, recognise that the 
amendments to the legislation provided "a greater measure of 
curial protection to members of a company, especially if they be 
in a minority, than the protection afforded under earlier 
38 	Ibid. 
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Companies Acts." 39 However, the High Court failed to 
recognise that special considerations may apply to the 
incorporated partnership. In deference to the High Court the 
New South Wales Rugby League Ltd. was previously 
conducted as an unincorporated association rather than as a 
partnership, and as such the considerations that were applicable 
in Thomas v. Thomas were not directly before the Court. 
Nevertheless, the Court emphasised the need for caution in 
usurping the role of management in corporations. They did not 
consider the possibility that the section was introduced to allow 
the judiciary to have a supervisory role over the decisions of 
management. The decision, therefore is restrictive but given that 
it was an unusual set of facts the opportunity to re-examine 
s.260 in a truly commercial context will no doubt be given to the 
High Court at some point in the future. 
Decisions subsequent to Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby 
League  
There has been a succession of decisions subsequent to Wayde 
v. New South Wales Rugby League which have considered the 
s.260 remedy.40 In three of these decisions Sandford v. 
Sandford, Re Norvabron and Shears v. Phosphate Co-operative 
39 	Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd. (1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 798 at 
p.803. 
40 	Sandford v. Sandford (1987) 5 A.C.L.C. 394; Re Norvabron (1987) 5 
A.C.L.C. 184; Re Terri Co. Ltd. (1988) 6 A.C.L.C. 402; Zephyr 
Holdings v. Jack Chia Ltd. (1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 30; Shears and Anon v. 
Phosphate Co-operative Co. of Aust. Ltd. (1989) 14 A.L.C.R. 747; 
Parker v. N.R.M.A. (1990) 1 A.C.S.R. 227; Re Dernacourt Investments 
Pty Ltd (1990) 2 A.C.S.R. 553 and Re Spargos Mining N.L (1990) 3 
A.C.S.R. 1. 
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s.260 was successfully invoked. However it is probably only 
Sandford v. Sandford that can be considered as a liberalisation 
of the law. 
In that case the plaintiff had become involved in a family 
company which had been founded by his brother Richard 
Sandford and his brothers wife Itha Sandford. The business 
was that of a courier service. Mr and Mrs Sandford were 
initially partners but in 1974, the plaintiff was taken into the 
business on an equal basis, through the incorporation of the 
defendant company. Three shares were issued, one each to the 
plaintiff and Mr and Mrs Sandford. The partnership business 
was not transferred to the company in any formal way, but the 
company carried on the business of the partnership from July 1, 
1974. Mr and Mrs Sandford carried out the bulk of the work. 
Salaries paid to the working directors were fixed as high as was 
acceptable to the Commissioner for Taxation. Dividends were 
quite modest. In 1977, the directors resolved that 2499 shares 
be issued to them. In 1983, the plaintiff resigned as a director 
from the company requesting Mr and Mrs Sandford to purchase 
his shares. The plaintiff asked for $200,000 for his shares, the 
directors valued the shares at $4,000. The plaintiff sought, 
inter alia an order that Mr and Mrs Sandford purchase his 
shares. The most important aspect of the plaintiffs case was 
the allegation that the level of emoluments given to the 
defendants as directors were too high. This had the effect of 
reducing the amount of money available for dividend 
distribution. In response to this, the defendants argued that the 
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plaintiff had been involved with the establishment of the 
company and had agreed to the system of remuneration of the 
directors. Waddell C.J. in the Equity division of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, considered that the plaintiff was an 
equal shareholder in the business and entitled to a corresponding 
share of profits. Thus Waddell C.J. concluded that: 
The defendants have conducted the affairs of the company 
in respect of their own salaries and emoluments in their 
own interests and not in the interests of members as a 
whole, and that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in a manner which is oppressive to the 
plaintiff.41 
The importance of this case is difficult to estimate. The plaintiff 
was able to establish cogent evidence that the dividend policy 
coupled with the high remuneration was unreasonable. As Baxt 
comments: 
This decision might be seen as an important one in the 
development of the oppression remedy. It shows that the 
remedy may be used in a closely held company to force a 
more reasonable attitude by those in control to minority 
shareholders insofar as dividends of the company are 
41 	(1987) 5 A.C.L.C. 394 at p.403. 
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concerned. The cases however, will depend very much 
on the evidence and the facts that the plaintiff can lead.42 
The other two decisions where s.260 was successfully invoked 
are also an example of where a breach of s.260 was readily 
apparent. 
The first of those two decisions to consider is that of Re 
Norvabron Pty Ltd.43 The facts of this case are somewhat 
complex. Norvabron Pty Ltd had been incorporated in 1984 
with an authorised capital of one million and an issued capital of 
three dollars; the three one dollar shares being held by Alpine 
Ltd, which represented the family interests of a Mr Panizza, 
Salteri Investments, which represented the family interests of a 
Mr Salteri, and Exben, representing the family interests of a Mr 
Belgiorno-Nettis. Panizza, Salteri and Belgiorno-Nettis were 
the directors of Norvabron and two other wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Norvabron, Transfield and Zincline. 
In 1986, Panizza was overridden at a board meeting of 
Transfield by the other two directors. The other two directors 
had awarded a sub-contract to one of their own companies at a 
42 	R. Baxt, "Oppression through Failure to pay dividends - the first 
successful result" [1987] Company and Sec. L.J. 102 at p.185; It should 
be noted that Waddell CJ. did. not refer to the decision of Wayde v. New 
South Wales Rugby League. 
43 	(1987) 5 A.C.L.C. 184. 
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price substantially higher than the competitor's tender. As a 
result of this, Panizza formed two other companies which 
became sub-contractors to Transfield. While the other directors 
acknowledged the advantages of using these sub-contractors, it 
left open the possibility that Panizza would be subject to a 
conflict of interest. Inevitably, disputes arose because of the 
profits made by these companies. These disputes led to the 
removal of Panizza as managing director of Transfield. Prior to 
the removal of Panizza the co-directors had used their majority 
on the board to control the company for their own advantage. 
Alpine Ltd, representing the interests of Panizza sought a 
winding up order against Norvabron Pty Ltd on the ground of 
oppression or alternatively an order that its share in Norvabron 
be bought by the respondents. The respondents argued that the 
application was directed at Norvabron, whereas the conduct 
complained of was limited to the affairs of Transfield. The 
directors of Norvabron had not been shown to be at fault in the 
affairs of that company. 
Derrington J. in the Supreme Court of Queensland, held that the 
applicant's share was to be purchased by the respondents. His 
Honour found that the directors of Norvabron knew what was 
happening in respect of Transfield, as they were one and the 
same. Their omission to take action as directors of Norvabron 
to prevent their own conduct as directors of Transfield 
constituted unfairly prejudicial and/or oppressive conduct, for 
which an order would be made for the purchase of the 
appellant's share by the respondents. 
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Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd was quoted by 
Derrington J. in Re Norvabron though little use was required to 
be made of this decision. The facts were, as in Sandford v. 
Sandford, presented in such a manner as to leave no alternative 
to the court. The decision however, does again indicate how a 
minority shareholder may, in a closely held company force those 
in control to adopt a more reasonable attitude. 
The next decision to consider is that of Shears & Anor v. 
Phosphate Co-operative Co. of Aust. Ltd. 44 In this case, the 
appellant Shears was the beneficial owner of the appellant 
company Cityfarm. Cityfarm had entered into contracts to 
purchase shares in the respondent company. However, 
Cityfarm did not become the registered holder of those shares. 
Each contract by which Cityfarm agreed to purchase shares in 
the respondent company contained a clause, whereby Cityfann 
was appointed the attorney of the holder of the shares, allowing 
Cityfann to attend and vote, and generally to exercise all the 
rights as the holder of the shares in the respondent company. 
By this stratagem, Shears planned to bypass restrictions in the 
respondent company's articles prescribing the maximum number 
of shares and the number of votes to which a shareholder was 
entitled. In response article 5A was adopted by the members of 
the respondent company. Article 5A was as follows: 
44 	[1989] 14 A.C.L.R. 747 - Special leave to appeal this decision to the 
High Court was refused, (1989) 7 A.C.L.C. 1225. 
83 
For the purposes of these articles a person shall be deemed 
to hold a share if he has a relevant interest in the share for 
the purposes of s.9 of the Companies (Acquisition of 
Shares) (Vic) Code. The directors may at any time and 
from time to time require a shareholder to furnish to the 
company satisfactory evidence that no other person has a 
relevant interest in the shares held by him and in the 
absence of such evidence the shareholder shall not be 
entitled to vote in respect of the shares held by him. 
This Article was used to deny voting rights to shares acquired 
by Cityfarm. The appellants appealed to the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria against declarations to the effect that 
the operation of Article 5A was valid. 
One of the bases for allowing the appeal was that Article 5A was 
invalidated by the predecessor of s.260 of the Corporations 
Law; the article was unfairly prejudicial and oppressive by 
reason of the width of the definition of relevant interest in the 
Acquisition of Shares Code. 45 In reaching this conclusion their 
Honours followed Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League 
Ltd; and in particular the judgment of Brennan J. Article 5A 
imposed upon a member a burden which according to the 
45 	See now Chapter 6 of the Corporations Law. 
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ordinary standards of reasonableness and fair dealing was 
unfair.46 
The decisions subsequent to Wayde, where s.260 was not 
successfully used may indicate a more restrictive interpretation 
of the scope of s.260 than the decision of Sandford v. 
Sandford. 
In Re Terri Co Pty. Ltd.47 a shareholder sought an order 
restraining a scheme administrator from disbursing payment to 
certain alleged creditors. The scheme administrator of Terri Co 
Pty Ltd had stepped in following a provisional liquidation. 
Under the scheme the scheme administrator was obliged to list 
the creditors and then determine the amount of each creditor's 
claim. The applicant shareholder claimed to be oppressed and 
sought to rely on the oppression section. 
The application was dismissed, there being no element of 
wrongdoing, lack of probity or fair dealing. Importantly His 
Honour Martin J. considered that matters of business judgment 
cannot constitute grounds for relief under section 320. Thus, in 
this case we see a reaffirmation of the traditional rule that the 
46 	The other basis for the decision was that the alteration of the articles 
could not be considered 'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole.' 
47 	(1988) 6 A.C.L.C. p.402 There was no discussion of the High Court 
decision of Wayde v. N.S.W. Rugby League. 
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courts will not substitute their own judgment for that of the 
business community. 
This line of thought was reinforced in Zephyr Holdings Pty Ltd 
v. Jack Chia Ltd.48 Jack Chia Ltd was a public company 
which had issued two series of options exercisable in 1990 and 
1991. There was no reasonable prospect of the options being 
exercised. Resolutions were passed eliminating the existing 
options and offering new more attractive options. The applicant 
sought an injunction restraining the issue on the options on the 
bases, first, of a breach of s.260 of the Code and secondly, a 
breach of the Stock Exchange Listing Rules. The injunction 
was granted on the basis that there had been a breach of the 
Listing Rules though the Court held that there was no breach of 
the then equivalent of s.260 of the Corporations Law. 
Interestingly, the Court stated that it: 
...must take care that it does not too readily intervene in 
the affairs of a company under [s.260] ... It is only 
stating the obvious to say that under [s.260], the Court 
does not sit as an appellate tribunal to review the decisions 
of the organs of a company or of a class of its members on 
the footing that the court will, as it were, automatically 
reverse the decision if it disagrees with it.49 
48 	[1988] 14 A.C.L.R. 30. Wayde v. N.S.W. Rugby League was mentioned 
though there was no detailed discussion of the decision. 
49 	Id. at p.37. 
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Having adopted that statement Brooking J. held that while there 
were doubts as to whether the proposed course was in the 
interests of members, it could not be said that no board of 
directors, acting reasonably, could have decided that the 
proposed issue was in the interests of members as a whole. 50 
The Effect of the Decision of Wqvde v. N.S.W. Rugby League 
In summary the decision of Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby 
League Ltd. can be considered a restrictive interpretation of the 
legislation. The High Court reinforced the traditional view that 
the judiciary should not interfere with the decisions of the 
business community. They also failed to recognise that in 
certain corporate structures such as the incorporated partnership, 
the type, history and nature of the company should be relevant. 
The decisions subsequent to Wayde, such as Sandford v. 
Sandford, Re Norvabron and Shears and Anor. v. Phosphate 
Co. where s.260 was successfully invoked, 51 were not so 
50 	Section 260 was also unsuccessfully alleged in Re Dernacourt 
Investments Pty. Ltd. [1940] 2 A.C.S.R. 553 where a failure to allow a 
member to inspect financial records was held not to be oppressive. 
Wayde v. N.S.W. Rugby League was followed. 
51 	Section 260 was also successfully invoked in Parker v. N.R.M.A (1990) 
1 A.C.S.R. 227 where a persistent failure by executives of a company to 
investigate or pursue complaints made by a director was held to be 
oppressive within the meaning of s.260. The section was again 
successfully utilised in Re Spargos Mining N.L (1990) 3 A.C.S.R. 1. See 
also J.D. Hamer v. M.J.H. Pty. Ltd [1992] 7 A.C.S.R. 8, Jenkins v. 
Enterprise Gold Mines (1992) 6 A.C.S.R 539, Re Quests Exploration 
Pty. Ltd. (1992) 6 A.C.S.R. 659 and Starr v. Andrew (1991) 9 A.C.L.C. 
1372. 
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much an extension of the law, but an example of factual 
situations where a violation of s.260 was readily apparent. 
Indeed this area of the law may be like so many other areas of 
the law; the evidence led being of more significance than the 
interpretation of the law. 
It is now appropriate to discuss alternative interpretations of 
s.260 which may provide it with a greater remedial role than the 
High Court presently gives it. Shapira comments that the 
formula for establishing unfair prejudice should be as follows: 
The court should seek to balance protection of the 
minority's interest against the policy of preserving 
freedom of action for management and the right of the 
members to back up their investment by their vote. The 
fair view of the majority should carry considerable weight, 
but should not be critically important. The history, nature 
and structure of the company, the essential nature of the 
association, the type of rights affected and general 
company practice should all be material. More 
concretely, the test of unfair prejudice should encompass 
the following considerations: the protection of underlying 
expectation of shareholders in closely held companies; 
and the detriment to the members proprietary interests as a 
shareholder.52 
52 	G. Shapira, "Minority Shareholders Protection - Recent Developments" 
[1982] 10 N.Z.U.L.R. 134 at p.145-6. 
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This test of Shapira goes further than the test adopted by the 
High Court in Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd. 
Shapira's test, in particular, looks at the history and the structure 
of the company. He thus recognises that s.260 will be of 
particular use in the closely-held company, the incorporated or 
quasi-partnership. In this context Shapira recognises the 
importance of the decision of Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries 
Ltd.53 In this case Nazar and Ebrahimi operated a business of 
dealing in carpets as equal partners. They decided to incorporate 
the business. On incorporation they each subscribed for 500 
shares and were appointed directors. Later, Nazar's son was 
made a director, and the other two transferred 100 shares to 
him. No dividends were ever paid. The profits were 
distributed as directors remuneration. Eleven years after 
incorporation, the two Nazar's passed a resolution to remove 
Ebrahimi from office as director. Ebrahimi petitioned for a 
winding up of the company on the just and equitable ground. 
At first instance the order was made but this was set aside by the 
Court of Appeal. Ebrahimi appealed and the House of Lords 
allowed the appeal. 
Importantly, Lord Wilberforce recognised that in the 
incorporated partnership there may be circumstances where the 
history and structure of the company dictate that the rights and 
53 	[1973] A.C. 360. 
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obligations of the members are not submerged in the 
incorporation of the business. His Honour states: 
There is room in company law for recognition of the fact 
that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with 
rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure.54 
This statement was made in the context of a discussion of the 
just and equitable ground of winding up, nevertheless there is 
no reason to suggest his comments are not applicable to s.260. 
Importantly, they have been adopted in the context of the 
Canadian equivalent of s.260. In Diligenti v. R.W.M.D. 
Operations Ltd.55 the British Columbia Supreme Court was 
considering the then recently introduced oppression and unfairly 
prejudicial section. Diligenti was one of four founding member 
directors of two companies. He was employed by the 
companies as managing director of two restaurants. 
Differences of opinion arose between himself and the other three 
directors. The other three then removed Diligenti from his 
position as director of the two companies. A management 
contract in respect of the two restaurants was then awarded to 
another company, the only members of this third company were 
the other three directors. His Honour Fulton, J. conceded that 
54 	Id. at p.379. 
55 	[1976] 1 B.C.L.R. 36. 
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the conduct was not oppressive, however, he did find the 
conduct unfairly prejudicial to Diligenti: 
Although his fellow members may be entitled as a matter 
of strict law to remove him as director, for them to do so 
is unjust and inequitable, and is a breach of equitable 
rights which he in fact possesses as a member ... such 
unjust and inequitable denial of his rights and expectations 
is undoubtedly 'unfairly prejudicial' to him in his status as 
a member.56 
The High Court decision in Wayde v. N.S.W. Rugby League 
can be criticised on the basis that it made no reference to the 
previous structure of the business or the need to impose 
equitable considerations upon the operation of the separate legal 
entity, the company. In the closely held company minority 
shareholders are vulnerable to a number of injustices that have 
no counterpart in the listed public company. These include 
exclusion from management, refusal to register a share transfer, 
refusal to purchase the shares at a price that reflects the 
commercial value of those shares, refusal to declare a dividend 
and disloyalty to the company by favouring another business 
entity, which quite often they control. The shareholder in the 
listed public company will generally have no role to play in 
management and has the remedy of selling his shareholding on 
56 	Id. at p.51. 
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the open market. The minority shareholder in the closely-held 
company, the incorporated partnership for example, will usually 
be locked-in, unless the majority shareholders are willing to 
allow a transfer of his shares to another party. It is because of 
this reason that he minority shareholder in the closely-held 
company needs special protection, and that in giving protection 
the courts must go behind the corporate entity, and consider its 
previous form together with the reasons for incorporation. 
Because of these criticisms of the High Court judgment the 
analysis by Shapira does offer more assistance to the minority 
shareholder. In essence he is prepared to impose equitable 
considerations on the operation of s.260. In contrast the High 
Court made no mention of this, and added the caveat that the 
court should be reluctant to intervene in the commercial decision 
making process. 
Another approach to the interpretation of s.260 has been 
suggested by Wishart.57 He considers that Wayde v. New 
South Wales Rugby League Ltd. is a restrictive interpretation of 
the legislation and that: 
In summary, courts have failed to develop a means of 
ascertaining the standard by which the conduct of a 
company's affairs are to be measured. Indeed: 
'unfairness' seems to have added to their confusions and 
57 	D. Wishart, "A Fresh Approach to s.320" [1987] 17 W.A.L.R. 94. 
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forced a retreat behind the walls of managerial 
discretion.58 
Wishart, then puts forward his criteria for the operation of 
s.260, "[the] standard of unfair discrimination or prejudice 
should be a test something like: Could this member be taken to 
have acquiesced on joining the company to this decision or 
inaction? If not, then the decision or failure to decide is unfair to 
the member".59 The test proposed by Wishart does not 
derogate from the freedom that the company needs to make 
rational decisions, as s.260 in his opinion allows the 
enforcement of the limits imposed upon decision making, to 
which the members upon joining the company have agreed. 
There are some difficulties with Wishart's approach. He is 
submitting that all the shareholders choose to incorporate, or 
join, a company to maximise their own economic interests. 
While this may be the case with the listed public company, the 
situation involving the closely-held company can often be 
radically different. Re G. Jeffrey (Mens Store) Pty Ltd. 60 and 
Thomas v. H.W. Thomas Ltd. 61 are examples of this. The 
minority shareholder in both cases obtained his interest in the 
company by way of inheritance, they did not in any way choose 
58 	Id. at p.108. 
59 	Id. at p.127. 
60 	(1984) 9 A.C.L.R. 193. 
61 	(1984) 2 A.C.L.C. 610. 
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that particular structure. Further the minority shareholder, 'was 
factually, if not legally, "locked-in", unable to recover the real 
value of his inheritance'. 62 The minority shareholder was not 
in a position to choose any particular form of investment 
Further, the business may have been incorporated to obtain the 
benefits of limited liability and legal personality, rather than 
seeing the corporate form as the vehicle most likely to maximise 
the economic interests of the partner. 
Overall, the most positive approach to an interpretation of s.260 
is that of Shapira. He emphasises the need to balance the 
interests of the minority against the judicial policy of not 
interfering in commercial decisions but recognises that equitable 
considerations deriving from the history, nature and structure of 
the business can be superimposed on the corporate shell. He 
also recognises that management should not be unduly inhibited 
in the decision making process but that their decisions are not 
sacrosanct and that the judiciary should be prepared to re-
examine their decisions. The High Court in Wayde were 
reluctant to take this step and failed to consider the remedial 
nature of the legislation. They still reiterated the judicial 
reluctance to intervene in corporate affairs and didn't inquire into 
the previous nature of the corporation in question. 
62 	S.S. Berns, "The Structure of Minority Remedies" unpublished, 
University of Tasmania, 1988 at p.20. 
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They did however cite the New Zealand decision of Thomas v. 
Thomas and it may be possible for a differently constituted High 
Court bench to adopt the reasoning of the New Zealand Court of 
appeal, and accept that equitable considerations could be 
imposed upon the corporate shell. 63 
Having discussed how the judiciary should interpret s.260 in a 
overall sense I will now discuss some of the particular issues 
that can arise in respect of s.260. 
63 	The High Court only used Thomas v. Thomas as a point of comparison. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE OPPRESSION 
SECTION 
The oppression section was introduced and amended to 
overcome the problems associated with the common law and in 
particular with the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 1 However, the 
section has created some difficulties of its own. Firstly, the 
definition of 'affairs of the company' may not include the acts of 
nominee directors appointed to a subsidiary. This would be 
unusual considering the widespread use of groups of 
companies. The second problem that may occur is that there is 
authority to suggest that a resolution of the general meeting is 
not an act by or on behalf of the company. If this is the case 
then the problems associated with the fraud on the minority 
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle may not have been 
overcome. The third problem to be considered is, whether 
conduct can be said to be unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
discriminatory if it affects all members the same. It is necessary 
to address the term contrary to the interests of members as a 
whole, and consider whether this requires the conduct in 
question to be contrary to each and every member of the 
corporation. Discussion will also be made as to whether s.260 
can be used where there is a specific statutory provision 
governing the conduct in question, or where members could 
have their claims in contract in tort. Further a number of issues 
[1843] 2 Ha. 461; 67 E.R. 189. 
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arise in respect of the interaction of s.260 with the general law 
remedies available to the minority shareholder. Problems 
associated with the remedies available to the successful minority 
shareholder will be raised as will the utilisation of s.1324 as a 
statutory remedy. Finally, the question of whether the Courts 
should interfere in matters of business judgment, will be 
examined. 
The Definition of 'Affairs of the Company'  
Section 260 of the Code refers to the situation where the affairs 
of the company are being conducted in an oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial, unfairly discriminatory, or in a manner that is 
contrary to the interests of the members as a whole. Section 53 
defines the affairs of a body corporate:2 
53 For the purposes of section 260... the affairs of a 
body corporate include: 
(a) the promotion, formation, membership, control, 
business, trading, transactions and dealings 
(whether alone or jointly with another person or 
It should be noted that s.260 refers to a company whereas 53 refers to a 
body corporate. This is probably of no consequence, but such looseness 
of terminology should have been avoided. 
97 
other persons and including transactions and 
dealings as agent, bailee or trustee), property 
(whether held alone or jointly with another person or 
other persons and including property held as agent, 
bailee or trustee), liabilities (including liabilities 
owed jointly with another person or other persons 
and liabilities as trustee), profits and other income, 
receipts, losses, outgoings and expenditure of the 
body; 
(b) in the case of a body corporate (not being an 
authorised trustee corporation) that is a trustee (but 
without limiting the generality of paragraph (a)) - 
matters concerned with the ascertainment of the 
identity of the persons who are beneficiaries under 
the trust, their rights under the trust and any 
payments that they have received, or are entitled to 
receive, under the terms of the trust; 
(c) the internal management and proceedings of the 
corporation; 
(d) any act or thing done (including any contract made 
and any transaction entered into) by or on behalf of 
the body, or to or in relation to the body or its 
business or property, at a time when - 
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(i) a receiver, or a receiver and manager, is in 
possession of, or has control over, property 
of the body; 
(ii) the body is under official management; 
(iii) a compromise or arrangement made between 
the body and another person or other persons 
is being administered; or 
(iv) the body is being wound up, 
and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
any conduct of such a receiver or such a receiver and 
manager, of any official manager or deputy official 
manager of the body, of any person administering 
such a compromise or arrangement or of any 
liquidator or provisional liquidator of the body; 
(e) the ownership of shares in, debentures of, and 
prescribed interests made available by, the body; 
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(f) the power of persons to exercise, or to control the 
exercise of, the rights to vote attached to shares in 
the body or to dispose of, or to exercise control over 
the disposal of, such shares; 
(g) matters concerned with the ascertainment of the 
persons who are to have been financially interested 
in the success or failure, or apparent success or 
failure, of the body or are or have been able to 
control or materially to influence the policy of the 
body; 
(h) the circumstances under which a person acquired or 
disposed of, or became entitled to acquire or dispose 
of, shares in, debentures of, or prescribed interests 
made available by, the body; 
(j) where the body has made available prescribed 
interests - any matters concerning the fmancial or 
business undertaking, scheme, common enterprise 
or investment contract to which the interests relate; 
and 
(k) matters relating to or arising out of the audit of, or 
working papers or reports of an auditor concerning, 
C-,- 
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any matters referred to in any of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
As can be seen from the section, the definition is widely drafted. 
However, a number of problems still arise in respect of the 
definition. The first problem is that of nominee directors. In 
Morgan v. 45 Fleurs Avenue Pty. Ltd. 3 Company A held 45% 
of the equity of Company B. Company A appointed a nominee 
director to the Board of Company B. The plaintiff, a 
shareholder in Company A, claimed that conduct of the nominee 
director was oppressive and unfair to him. The Supreme Court 
of New South Wales dismissed the suit on the basis that the 
complaint referred to the affairs of Company B, and not to 
Company A. The plaintiff had no shareholding in Company B; 
thus he did not have standing to pursue the matter. 
It is of course true that a person who is what might be 
called a nominee director, may legitimately exercise his 
votes on a board in the interests of the person who 
appointed him without being in breach of a fiduciary duty 
to the company on whose board he sits. However, I do 
not consider that this state of affairs is sufficient for one to 
conclude that when so taking part in a board meeting of a 
3 	(1987) 5 A.C.L.C. 222. 
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company one is acting in the affairs of the appointor 
company.4 
As Redmond comments, "[t]he outcome is anomalous in view 
of the widespread adoption of the group of companies as a 
model of business organisation. The Morgan decision 
effectively denies shareholders in the parent company a right of 
complaint concerning the conduct of nominees appointed to the 
board of a subsidiary company." 5 
The solution to this problem may be in expanding the definition 
of the affairs of the company to include that of a nominee 
director appointed to the board of another company. This would 
have the advantage of allowing judicial intervention where 
appropriate, but if there was no legitimate shareholder interest 
the court could still deny a remedy, as it did in Morgan. 
Prentice states that: 
...where activities are carried out in group form, the 
economic reality of group activity should be recognised 
and the manner in which the affairs of one member of the 
4 	Id. at p. 234. 
5 	P. Redmond, "Nominee Directors" [1987] 10 UNSWLJ 194. 
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group are conducted should, in most circumstances, be 
treated as part of the affairs of other group members. 6 
What constitutes an act/omission by or on behalf of the 
company?  
Section 260 requires that the unfairly prejudicial, unfairly 
discriminatory, oppressive conduct be related to the affairs of 
the company, or alternatively that the act or omission or 
resolution etc. be by or on behalf of the company. "This 
description can hardly cover acts of sheer misfeasance, such as 
the misapplication of the company's funds, where the company 
is the victim and not the agent". 7 
If an act such as the misappropriation of company funds does 
not come within the terms of the section the minority 
shareholder may still have to rely on an exception to the Rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle,8 or seek a winding up order on the just and 
equitable ground.9 In this writer's view it would be unusual if 
s.260 was interpreted in such a legalistic manner. Section 260 
was introduced and then amended to amplify the remedies 
6 	D.D. Prentice, "The Theory of the Firm: Minority Shareholders 
Oppression: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985" [1988] 8 
Oxford J. of Legal Stud. 55. 
7 	R. Instone, "Unfair Prejudice to Shareholders" [1981] NU 1316. 
8 	[1843] 2 Ha. 461, 67 E.R. 189. 
9 	See 460-461 of the Corporations Law. 
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available to the minority shareholder, and it would be 
inconsistent with the philosophy of the section if it did not 
provide a remedy where there was a misapplication of company 
funds by a director. 10 
In addition to the preceding problems there is doubt that the 
passing of a resolution by the general meeting can be considered 
an act by or on behalf of the company. Burridge submits that, 
"there are many acts or omissions which may very well unfairly 
prejudice the interests of members but which are not acts or 
omissions of the company or acts or omissions performed or 
omitted to be performed on its behalf'. 11 Authority for this 
proposition is Northern Counties Securities Ltd. v. Jackson and 
Steeple Ltd. 12 In this case, the directors of the defendant 
company summoned a meeting of shareholders to obtain 
approval for certain matters which would allow the company to 
comply with an order for specific performance made in favour 
of the plaintiff. One of the issues before Walton J. was 
whether the specific performance order made against the 
company was binding on the shareholders. His Honour held 
that it was not: 
10 	Similar questions could arise with a director passing on corporate 
information. This could hardly be considered an act by or on behalf of 
the company. 
11 	S. Burridge, 'Wrongful Rights Issues" [1981] 44 MLR 40. 
12 	[1974] 1 WLR 1133. 
104 
...although it is perfectly true that the acts of the members, 
in passing certain special types of resolutions, binds the 
company, their acts are not the acts of the company. 
There would ... be no real doubt about this, were it not for 
the use of the curious expression 'the company in general 
meeting' which in a sense drags in the name of the 
company unnecessarily, what the phrase really means 
[counsel submitted] is 'the members (or corporators) of 
the company assembled in general meeting', and that if the 
phrase is written out full in this manner, it becomes quite 
clear that the decisions taken at such a meeting, and the 
resolutions passed there at, are decisions taken by, and 
resolutions passed by, the members of the company, and 
not by the company itself. 13 
The view of Burridge, that a resolution of the general meeting 
may not be an act by or on behalf of the company has been 
criticised by Prentice, 14 and Shapira. 15 Shapira considers that 
the decision of Northern Counties is an isolated, first instance 
decision decided in an exceptional context and that it is a thin 
base, 16 from which to argue that the legislation has failed in its 
objective to overcome the problems associated with the fraud on 
the minority exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 
13 	Id. at p.1144. 
14 	D. Prentice, op. cit. at p.71-72. 
15 	G. Shapira, "Minority Shareholders Protection - Recent Developments" 
[1982] 10 NZULR 134. 
16 	Id. at p.140. 
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Prentice comments that, "[a]lthough the decisions of 
shareholders may not necessarily be those of the company so as 
to affect the company's relationships with a third party, they will 
be binding on the shareholders inter se and affect the 
shareholders' interest and it is this dimension to their operation 
that brings them within the ambit of section [260]". 17 The 
submissions of Prentice and Shapira are preferable, especially 
when one considers the remedial nature of the legislation, and 
the intention of the legislature to overcome the problems 
associated with the common law the judiciary is unlikely to 
follow Northern Counties. 
In any event, a small amendment to our legislation would 
overcome any problems. Section 260 already refers to a 
resolution or proposed resolution of a class of members. This 
can be compared to the equivalent section of the Malaysia 
Companies Act s.181(1)(b) which refers to a resolution of the 
members, holders of debentures or any class of them. 
Therefore to remove any doubt about the effectiveness of s.260, 
the section could be amended to read "...a resolution, or a 
proposed resolution, of the members or of a class of 
members..." 
17 	D.D. Prentice, op. cit. at p.72. 
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Is the conduct unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory if it 
affects all members the same? 
One issue that arises in respect of the terms unfairly prejudicial 
and unfairly discriminatory is whether the conduct in question 
can be said to be unfairly prejudicial or unfairly discriminatory if 
it affects all members equally. Corkery comments that: 
...while an action - the non-payment of dividends, for 
instance - may apply to all shareholders equally, it may 
still unfairly prejudice some of them and not others. For 
example, some shareholders may rely entirely on income 
from their investments; others who are well paid 
executives of the company may not. In Re Overton 
Holdings Pty. Ltd. the defendants unsuccessfully argued 
that s.[260](a)(i) and (ii) did not apply because the actions 
complained of affected all members the same. Rowland 
J., without conceding that the words "prejudicial" and 
"discriminatory" call for evidence of unequal treatment of 
members, focussed on the word "oppression". 
Oppression was made out: 
"The fact that a loss if suffered by Overton [Pty. Ltd.] 
will eventually also be borne equally by the other 
shareholders does not make the conduct any less 
oppressive to the petitioner." 
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Similar things cannot be said of "prejudice" and 
"discrimination". Unequal treatment of members is at the 
heart of those words. 18 
This view of Corkery that unequal treatment is at the heart of 
these terms is supported by a decision, emanating from 
England. In Re Carrington Vijella, 19 a minority shareholder 
complained that the board of directors had entered into a 
disadvantageous service contract with its chief executive. 
Vinelott J. held that this was a breach which would affect all 
shareholders equally, and to succeed the complainant had to 
show the conduct was unfairly prejudicial to part of the 
members. Support for Vinelott J.'s view can be found in the 
particular wording of the English legislation. Section 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 U.K. requires conduct which is "unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of some part of the members" 
(emphasis added). There is no such wording in s.260. Austin 
questions the Vinelott J. reasoning that unfairly prejudicial and 
unfairly discriminatory are restricted to situations involving 
inequality of treatment between shareholders. 20 The term 
"oppressive" did not require inequality of treatment between 
18 	J.F. Corkery, "Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers - What can a 
shareholder do about it? An Analysis of s.320 of the Companies code." 
(1988) 9 Adel. Law Review 437 at p.447. 
19 	(1983) 1 B.C.C. 98, 951 ; noted (1983) 4 Co. Lawyer 164 (L. Sealy). 
20 	R.P. Austin, 'Protection of Minority Shareholders: Changes to Section 
320" Committee for Postgraduate Studies in the Department of Law. 
University of Sydney, 102 at p.122. 
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shareholders21 and it would be unusual if the new terms were 
interpreted in a more restrictive manner than the old legislation. 
If the legislation is interpreted to mean inequality of treatment, 
the term "contrary to the interests of members as a whole" will 
assume particular importance. 22 
Contrary to the Interests of Members as a Whole. 
This ground for relief contained in s.260 will generally cover 
those breaches of fiduciary duty which directors owe to the 
company: 
Negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty by directors, 
even though those duties are owed to the company and not 
the shareholders, are indirectly contrary to the interests of 
members as a whole. If the company suffers then the 
members' investment is hurt. 23 
21 	Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer [1959] AC 324. 
22 	It should be noted that the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in Re H. W. 
Thomas Ltd. (1983) 1 A.C.L.C. 1256 at p.1262 indicated in obiter 
comments that conduct could be unfairly prejudicial or unfairly 
discriminatory even if it does affect all the members equally. 
23 	J.F. Corkery, op. cit. at p.447-8. 
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One concern in respect of this term is what interpretation the 
judiciary will give to members as a whole. This ground for 
relief will be of little use if the conduct or act in question must be 
contrary to each and every individual member: 
The controllers' interests as members may well be served 
by their selfish manner of acting. Thus not all members 
would be disadvantaged. More likely those words mean 
that, where controllers act in their own interests only, they 
will be seen to be acting contrary to the interests of 
members as a whole. Even if the controllers act in the 
majority's interests they will not, under this interpretation, 
be acting in the interests of members as a whole. 24 
It is submitted given the remedial nature of the legislation that 
the court should accept this view. 
Can Section 260 be used where there is a specific statutory 
Provision concerning the conduct in question or where the claim 
could be based in contract or tort 
Section 260 has the potential to be utilised where the conduct in 
question is governed by a specific statutory provision. Does 
24 
	
Id. at p.448. 
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the existence of a specific statutory provision bar a remedy 
pursuant to s.260? Austin suggests not. He comments that: 
The mere fact that there is another more specific statutory 
provision is surely no automatic bar to relief under the 
oppression section. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that 
s.260 will be allowed to replace the more specific 
regimes. The key to a partial reconciliation, I suggest, is 
to remember that the cardinal utility of s.260 is that it 
makes available a much more extensive range of remedies 
than the more specific areas of law.25 
One area of possible conflict that could occur is between s.260 
and s.1002 of the Corporations Law. Section 1002 provides 
for a "Prohibition of Dealings in Securities by Insiders." In 
particular s.1002(G) provides for possible prosecution if a 
person with information not generally available, (and that person 
knows, or ought to know, that that information might have a 
material effect on the value of securities) utilises that information 
to buy or sell securities. 
If one of the elements of s. 1002(G) is not made out should the 
court still provide relief under s.260. Austin argues that s.260 
should not be used where the section in question, such as the 
25 	R.P. Austin, op. cit. at p.114-5. 
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insider trading provisions, create a criminal offence. "There is a 
major issue of maintaining certainty and predicability."26 The 
issue of the interaction of s.260 will also arise with respect to 
the rights of holders of classes of shares,27 together with 
questions concerning acquisition of shares.28 The Court when 
approaching these issues should proceed on a case by case basis 
without adopting general principles that cannot be justified for 
particular sections. I would agree with Austin, 29 that if the 
specific statutory provision provides for criminal penalties then 
s.260 should not be invoked. Other than that each case should 
depend on its own circumstances. 30 
Questions will also arise concerning the interaction of the law of 
contract and tort with the oppression section. Shapira provides 
the following example: 
Assume that A and B own and manage a manufacturing 
company. X is prepared to invest in the company, 
provided he is awarded exclusive rights to market a range 
of the company's products. The agreement may be 
embodied in the company's articles, in a separate contract, 
26 	Id. at p.115. 
27 	See ss.197-199 of the Corporations Law. 
28 	See ss. 732-736 of the Corporations Law. 
29 	op. cit. 
30 	In Re Zephyr Holdings [1988] 14 ACLR 30, the precursor to s.260 was 
argued as was a breach of the Stock Exchange Listing Rules. there was 
however no question of criminal sanctions. 
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or in both. X takes a minority share and operates as the 
company's marketing agent Eventually A and B vote 
resolutions cancelling X's agency, leading to its ruin. X, 
whom we may further assume has invested all his savings 
in the company and in his franchise, brings proceedings 
under [s.260], alleging that he had been unfairly 
prejudiced in his capacity as the company's marketing 
agent. 31 
X in this hypothetical case has a possible remedy for breach of 
contract or wrongful dismissal. Should X also be able to 
invoke s.260? I would submit that X, in this case, should be 
able to invoke s.260. His "rights, expectations and obligations 
are not necessarily submerged in the company structure". 32 
"The test should be whether the particular capacity in which the 
member has been prejudiced was, in part or in whole, the raison 
d'etre for his subscribing to, or remaining a member of, the 
company."33 If, however, the obligation sought to be enforced 
is only incidental to the incorporation relationship and not the 
principal reason for incorporation, then remedies pursuant to the 
Companies Code should not be utilised. 
31 	G. Shapira, op. cit. at p.155. 
32 	See Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries lid. [1973] A.C. 360 at p. 379. 
33 	Ibid. 
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The Nature of Relief Available to a Minority Shareholder - 
$ection 260(2)(g).  
Section 260(2) provides a number of orders that the court can 
make if it is satisfied that injustice has been made out. The 
remedy that has attracted the most attention is s.260(2)(g). This 
provides for an order: 
... directing the company to institute, prosecute, defend or 
discontinue specified proceedings, or authorising a 
member or members of the company to institute, 
prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings in 
the name and on behalf of the company. 
This order derives from the recommendations of the Jenkins 
Committee34 and is designed to overcome the "legendary" 
problems associated with the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 35 
Some writers, however, see some difficulties with this 
subsection. Section 260 was originally designed to protect 
shareholders' interests, but this order introduces a wider sphere 
of complaints - that of complaints about wrongs done to the 
company. Shapira comments that this "indicates the 
legislature's disregard for the fundamental distinction between 
34 	Cmnd 1749 at paras. 206-207 and 212(e). 
35 	See the comments made by J.F. Corkery, op. cit. at p. 458. 
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the corporate cause of action and the member's personal 
rights."36 He further comments that [s.260(2)(g)] is ill-
conceived. It makes s.[260] blow hot and cold on the 
distinction between corporate rights and shareholders' 
interests."37 
Corkery, however, considers that "any confusion would 
probably only be of academic concern". 38 The distinction: 
...should not be a problem if the courts accept that actions 
that hurt the company also prejudice or hurt the members' 
interests in the company. Injury to the company - 
through misappropriation of assets, improper use of 
powers and negligence, for example - depreciates the 
value of its shares and thereby hurts members. Indirectly 
the company's property is the shareholders' property ... 
It is almost too much to hope that paragraph (g) will 
sweep away the troubles of Foss v. Harbottle. But 
applied liberally it could do just that.39 
I would accept Corkery's comment that s.260(2)(g) has the 
potential to sweep away the troubles of Foss v. Harbottle, but I 
36 	G. Shapira, O. cit. at p.159. 
37 	Ibid. 
38 	J.F. Corkery, op. cit. at p. 461. 
39 	J.F. Corkery, op. cit. at p. 460. 
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would submit that Shapira is right when criticising the 
introduction of a corporate remedy for a provision designed 
primarily for the remedy of personal injuries. This remedy 
does bring into question the issue of ratification and it is 
submitted that the preferable approach would be to introduce the 
statutory derivative action which would allow s.260 to be used 
for the remedy of personal wrongs and the statutory derivative 
action for the remedy of corporate wrongs. 40 
Section 260(2)(g) was used by Rowlands J. in Re Overton 
Holdings Pty. Ltd.'" His Honour was satisfied by 
establishment of a prima facie case of oppression, the defendant 
having "chosen to remain silent". The applicant supported his 
allegations by affidavit, the company then failed to provide 
answering affidavits. This case offers some hope that 
applications to bring derivative proceedings can be brought 
expeditiously. 
Hannigan suggests that this remedy, "calls into question the 
whole issue of ratification. If ratification of a ratifiable wrong 
is 'unfairly prejudicial' ... entitling the minority shareholder to a 
litigation order, does the rule in Foss v. Harbottle still exist?"42 
40 	I will consider the introduction of the statutory derivative action in 
chapter 5. 
41 	(1984) 2 A.C.L.C. 777. 
42 	B.M. Hannigan, "Statutory Protection for Minority Shareholders - 
Section 75 of the Companies Act 1980" (1982) 11 Anglo-Am.L.Rev. 20 
at p. 32. 
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It is submitted that if the court is not likely to award a litigation 
order if the conduct in question is ratifiable, particularly in light 
of their desire not to interfere in the decisions of the business 
community. 
It would appear that the court faces three options. Firstly, 
ratification by an independent majority, reaching a bona 
fide decision can never come within "unfairly prejudicial". 
Secondly, they could decide that ratification, regardless of 
bona fides, amounts to unfairly prejudicial conduct and 
grant a litigation order. Finally, the court could decide that 
ratification may, in certain circumstances, amount to 
unfairly prejudicial conduct, but the proper remedy is 
compensation rather than a litigation order. The chances 
of getting a litigation order then seem slim, nor is it indeed 
clear that minority shareholders will resort to [s.260] in an 
attempt to circumvent the rule in Foss v. Harbotde.43 
Hannigan further considers, that it is "most unsatisfactory" that 
the problems surrounding the rule in Foss v. Harbonle have 
been imported into the new statutory regime, and that the 
s.260(2)(g) order is a convoluted way to deal with the problems 
of Foss v. Harbonle." 
43 	Id. at p. 33. 
44 	Hannigan, op. cit. at p33. 
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In conclusion, I would agree with Corkery that the litigation 
order does have the potential to sweep away the problems 
surrounding the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. "[T]tle complexities 
of proving fraud, dealing with the potential absurdities of 
ratification, and showing control by the wrongdoers - the 
problems that have dogged derivative suit proceedings in the 
past"45 could all be of historical interest if the judiciary apply 
s.260(2)(g) liberally. However, my argument would be that a 
more acceptable way to overcome the problems associated with 
the rule in Foss v. Harbottle and to maintain a clear distinction 
between personal and corporate rights, would be to retain s.260 
as the remedial provision for personal injuries, and to introduce 
a statutory derivative action for the remedy of corporate wrongs. 
This would have the advantage of resolving the issue of 
ratification46 and maintaining the separation between corporate 
and personal rights.47 
45 	J.F. Corkery, Directors' Powers and Duties, Longman Professional, 
1987, at p.259. 
46 	See the discussion of the statutory derivative action in chapter 5. 
47 	Another provision which would allow the minority shareholder to 
overcome the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is s.1324. This section provides: 
1324(1) [Court may grant injunction restraining] Where a 
person has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage in any 
conduct that constituted, constitutes or would constitute: 
(a) a contravention of this Law; 
the court may grant an injunction restraining the first-mentioned person 
from engaging in the conduct and, if in the opinion of the Court it is 
desirable to do so, requiring that person to do any act or thing. 
In certain circumstances an injunction obtained pursuant to s.1324 will 
provide a quicker and less complex remedy for the minority shareholder. 
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Should the Courts interfere in matters of Business Judgment.  
The courts have recently reiterated that they should not interfere 
in matters of business judgment. His Honour Martin J. in Re 
Terri Co. Ltd. 48 considered that matters of business judgment 
cannot constitute grounds for relief under s.260. In a similar 
fashion, Brooking J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria in Zephyr 
Holdings v. Jack Chia49 commented that: 
Whereas in the present case, bad faith is not established 
and where, as in the present case, the allegation is that the 
proposed course of action is detrimental to the members as 
a whole, the court must take care that it does not too 
readily intervene in the affairs of a company under s.[260] 
... It is only stating the obvious to say that, under 
s.[260], the court does not sit as an appellate tribunal to 
review the decisions of the organs of a company, or of a 
class of its members on the footing that the court will, as it 
The main limitation on the section, however, is that it only applies to 
breaches of the Corporation Law. Examples of the types of applications 
that come within the ambit of s.1324 are breaches of statutory duty under 
s.232, breach of a duty to disclose interests in contracts under s.231 or a 
breach of a duty to convene a general meeting pursuant to s.246. 
Section 1324 has substantial potential and it may well serve as a useful 
adjunct to s.260. Indeed Baxt comments that s.1324 on its own "may 
well overcome the strictness of the rule in Foss v. Harboide" (R. Baxt, 
"Intervention by Members and N.C.S.C. in Statutory Breaches" (1980) 8 
A. Bus. L. Rev. 406 at p. 412; see also R. Baxt, "Will s.1324 of the 
Companies Code Please Stand Up" (1989) 7 Company and Sec. L.I. 
388). 
48 	(1988) 6 A.C.L.C. 402. 
49 	(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 30. 
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were, automatically reverse the decision if it disagrees 
with it.50 
The difficulty with this approach is that the judiciary have never 
adequately explained why they refuse to intervene in the internal 
management of corporations. It has generally been explained 
by academics on the grounds of economic efficiency. The firm 
is generally seen as more efficient "for the simple reason that it 
could in certain circumstances reduce the costs of 
contracting."51 This reduction in the cost of contracting occurs 
because of a number of reasons including: 
(i) the firm is able to reduce the possibility of default; 
(ii) the firm is more able to adjust to unforeseen 
circumstances; 
(iii) the firm provides a mechanism for regulating the 
terms and conditions on which labour is supplied 
and rewarded.52 
50 	Id. at p. 37. 
51 	D.D. Prentice, op. cit. at p.56. 
52 	See the discussion by D.D. Prentice, op. cit. at p. 56-58. 
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Nevertheless, this efficiency will be largely eroded should the 
courts intervene in the internal management of companies. The 
efficient use of the capital of the company requires that the 
courts do not interfere. It is obviously not practicable to have 
the unanimous agreement of all the shareholders before a 
decision is made by the company. "The motivating rationale for 
the internal management rule is just as valid now as it was in the 
nineteenth century. Economic efficiency requires freedom to 
make rational decisions and the courts should not derogate from 
this freedom." 53 
This theory fails to consider that a clear distinction has to be 
drawn between a publicly listed company and an incorporated 
partnership. With a company listed on the Stock Exchange the 
opportunity for oppression is substantially reduced. The 
minority shareholder being able to freely transfer his 
shareholding can, "therefore expeditiously liquidate his 
investment." 54 This opportunity is not available to the minority 
shareholder in the incorporated or quasi-partnership as there is 
no market for such shares. Accordingly, it is submitted that the 
courts should not adopt an inflexible approach as to when they 
should interfere. In particular the court should adopt a positive 
role in the regulation of the incorporated partnership. As 
Prentice comments: 
53 	D. Wishart, "A Fresh Approach to Section 320" [1987] 17 WALR 94 at 
p. 127. 
54 	D.D. Prentice, op. cit. at p.60. 
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The interests of a member in an incorporated partnership 
will be broadly as follows: (i) the right to participate in the 
affairs of the company so as to guarantee some return on 
his investment; (ii) the right to protect his investment in 
the company which will often take the form of the 
investment of skills and labour; (iii) the ability to monitor 
the conduct of his co-venturers. The response of the law 
should be to protect these interests as the law will then be 
doing for the parties what they would have done for 
themselves.55 
Another reason for the courts refusing to intervene in intra-
corporate disputes is the problem of escalating costs: 
, As with all civil actions, the costs of derivative suits have 
skyrocketed. In fact, the legal expenses incurred by a 
corporation are often especially onerous, not only because 
many of these actions are complex but because the 
corporation typically is called upon to pay for several 
separate teams of lawyers in the same action ... Expense 
is not the only burden imposed upon the corporation by 
the derivative suit. Typically these cases seriously disrupt 
corporate business, as top management personnel are 
divested from their normal pursuits and assume the role of 
55 	Op. cit. at p.61. 
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witness; and the corporation may also be damaged by bad 
publicity generated by the suit... Moreover, even where 
the derivative suit does have some merit, often the relief 
sought, even if obtained, would not justify the costs 
incurred in obtaining it.56 
It is submitted that the introduction, and reform of the 
oppression section was to provide a more active role for the 
courts, particularly in disputes involving the close corporation or 
the incorporated partnership. As Shapira concludes: 
If the price of meaningful minority protection is increased 
judicial involvement, so be it. Lack of business expertise 
of the judiciary has never been a convincing argument. 
After all, laying down fair standards of corporate practice 
and ethics is no more intractable than, say, formulating 
standards of liability in complex negligence cases. The 
courts conduct this type of inquiry every day. 57 
56 	G. Shapira, op. cit. at p.160; Shapira was quoting from a summary of the 
American experience with derivative suits. 
57 	Id. at p.163: 	In the area of fiduciary obligations there are similar 
questions being asked as were discussed in the preceding paragraphs. 
Some commentators suggest that the courts should not impose strict 
standards of fiduciary obligations as this inhibits economic efficiency. 
The contrary argument is that by imposing strict standards the courts 
have helped to legitimise corporate managerial power. For an excellent 
discussion of this area see M. Chesterman and G. Moffatt, Trust Law: 
Text and Materials, London, Weidenfeld Publishers, 1988 at p.603-604. 
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I would support the conclusions of Shapira. The legislature 
introduced s.260 to give the judiciary a more interventionist role 
in corporate decision making. When the original oppression 
remedy failed to achieve satisfactory protection the legislative 
amendments were introduced to cover a wider range of conduct. 
The courts should no longer hide behind the veil of non-
interference in matters of business judgment. These questions 
are no less difficult than the myriad of issues that the courts face 
regularly. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES IN 
ENGLAND, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
The existing statutory remedies have not resolved all of the 
problems for the minority shareholder who seeks to remedy a 
wrong done to the company. In particular s.260 has not been 
interpreted as broadly as perhaps the law reform committees 
who proposed its introduction would have hoped, and there are 
still problems associated with its relationship between personal 
rights and corporate rights. In addition the legislation has not 
resolved the problems surrounding ratification and it is certainly 
not appropriate to state that the legislation has rid corporate law 
of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 1 Overseas jurisdictions have 
adopted a different approach to the problem of minority 
shareholder complaints, and this chapter will be considering the 
options given to the minority shareholder in the England, 
Canada and the United States. 
England 
The English equivalent to our s.260 is contained in ss.459-461 
of the Companies Act 1985. Section 459-provides: 
See Scarel Pty. Ltd. v. City Loan and Credit Corporation Pty. Ltd. (1988) 
79 A.L.R. 483 and Smith v. Croft (No. 2) [1987] 3 W.L.R. 405. 
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A member of a company may apply to the court by 
petition for an order under this Part on the ground that the 
company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
some part of the members (including at least himself) or 
that any actual or proposed act or omission of the 
company (including an act or omission on its behalf) is or 
would be so prejudicial. 
The first point of comparison is that Australia has a number of 
additional terms, these being oppression, unfairly discriminatory 
and contrary to the interests of members as a whole. The 
English legislation only contains the term unfairly prejudicial. It 
is arguable therefore that Australia is attempting by the use of the 
additional terms to cover a wider range of conduct than that 
prohibited by the English legislation. 
One issue that arises from the English legislation, due to the 
more restrictive wording, is whether some aspect of 
discrimination is required to establish unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. In Re Carrington Viyella plc., 2 Vinelott J. considered 
that if the directors had acted in breach of their fiduciary duty, 
this would affect all shareholders equally, and as such would 
not come within the ambit of the English legislation. This 
2 	(1983) 1 BCC 98,951. 
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conclusion of Vinelott J. has been questioned in a number of 
decisions.3 The Australian legislation indicates that 
discrimination is not necessarily an element of prejudice by 
providing the additional terrns.4 In particular the words 
"contrary to the interests of members as a whole" would appear 
to be wide enough to cover breaches of fiduciary duty, which 
presumably affect all shareholders equally. Further support for 
an argument that the Vinelott interpretation is incorrect is the fact 
that the English legislation allows for the awarding of a court 
order requiring the company to institute civil proceedings. 5 
Presumably this type of order will be used where a wrong has 
been done to the company, such as a breach of fiduciary duty 
and where the impugned conduct has affected all shareholders 
equally. Macintosh, recognises this problem in the English 
legislation and states: 
It may simply be better to recognise that the legislation as 
currently drafted (as least, if the Carrington Interpretation 
of the statute is sound), presents the court with a legal 
impossibility. The court cannot allow an action to proceed 
in the name and on behalf of the company (that is, in a 
situation where all shareholders are affected equally) if to 
do so would violate the requirement that only some part of 
See Re Cumana Ltd. [1986] BCLC 430 and Re London School of 
Electronics lid. [1986] Ch. 211. 
4 	This is also supported by the New Zealand legislation, s.209 of the 
Companies Act 1955, is drafted in similar terms to the Australian 
legislation. 
5 	See s.461 of the Companies Act 1985. 
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the members be affected. But that is precisely what the 
statute authorises the court to do. A statutory amendment 
to resolve the ambiguity is clearly indicated. 6 
As Farrar points out: 
The lesson seems to have been learnt here for s.27 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (which provides an unfairly 
prejudicial remedy for creditors and members when an 
administration order is in force) states that such a 
petitioner may apply on the grounds that: 
...the company's affairs, business and property are 
being or have been managed by the administrator in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
it creditors or members generally or some part of its 
creditors or members. 
For the avoidance of doubt s.459 should be similarly re-
worded at the earliest opportunity.7 
J.G. Macintosh, "The Oppression Remedy: Personal or Derivative" 
(1991) 70 Can. B. R. 29 at p.41. 
J.H. Farrar, N.E. Furey and B.M. Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law, 
Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 1988 at p.401. 
Origins of English legislation 
The English legislation emanates from the recommendations of 
the Cohen Committee, 8 which gave two instances of oppressive 
conduct. The instances being the taking of excessive 
remuneration by directors and the refusal of directors to register 
transfers on the death of shareholders.9 
The report led to the introduction of s.210 of the Companies Act 
1948. This allowed a member to petition the Court if the affairs 
of the company were conducted in an oppressive manner: 
Unfortunately, in summarising this recommendation in 
para 153 of the report [the Cohen Committee] used 
language which evidently misled the Department of Trade 
into supposing that the Committee intended the new 
jurisdiction of the Court to be coextensive with its power 
to make a winding-up order. It is this limitation 
(embodied in s.210(2)(b) of the 1948 Act) which long ago 
gave rise to a general recognition that the section was 
inadequate. 10 
8 	Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, United 
Kingdom, Cmd. 6659 (1945). See Chapter 2. 
9 	Id. at paras. 58-60. The Committee noted at paragraph 60 that these 
were only illustrations of a general problem. 
10 	R. Instone, "Unfair Prejudice to Shareholders" (1981) N.L.J. 1316; 
Section 210(2)(b) states that: 
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Not surprisingly, the oppression remedy was seen as 
underutilised by the Jenkins Committee." The Jenkins 
Committee therefore recommended that the legislation be 
amended by the introduction of the term unfairly prejudicial, and 
by the removal of the requirement that the remedy be linked to 
facts justifying a winding up. 12 The Jenkins Committee also 
considered that the available remedies should be altered to allow 
an order that the company institute legal proceedings. 13 
Unfair prejudice 
The concept of unfair prejudice has been variously 
described as opaque and elusive; but it has never caused 
practitioners or the courts any difficulty. Prejudice 
denotes detriment of some kind; but because it must also 
qualify as unfair it must be a form of detriment which 
would strike a man of business as unjust or inequitable. 
The role of the non-controlling shareholder is that of an 
"If on any such petition the Court is of the opinion that to wind up the 
company would unfairly prejudice that part of the members, but otherwise 
the facts would justify the making of a winding-up order on the ground 
that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up, the 
Court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, 
make such order as it thinks fit," 
11 	Report of the Company Law Committee, United Kingdom, Cmnd. 1749 
(1962). See Chapter 2. 
12 	The recommendation s of the Jenkins committee were originally included 
in s.75 of the Companies Act 1980 and are now contained in ss.459-461 
of the Companies Act 1985. 
13 	Jenkins Report, at paras. 205-207. 
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investor, however he acquired his holding; and the 
standpoint from which the statutory criterion must be 
judged is plainly that of the average investor-the man on 
the Throgmorton Street omnibus. 14 
To satisfy this test of unfair prejudice, four elements are needed. 
It is required to be established that: (1) the interests of, (2) some 
part of the members have been, (3) prejudiced, (4) unfairly. 
Obviously as the Australian legislation includes the term 
"unfairly prejudicial," much can be learnt by a consideration of 
the English legislation. 
(1) Interests 
Under the previous English legislation the oppression had to be 
suffered by the member in his capacity as a member. 15 This is 
no longer the case. 16 This now mirrors the Australian 
legislation which does not require the member to be affected in 
his capacity as a member. 17 
14 	R. Instone, "Unfair Prejudice: An Interim Report" (1988) Journal of 
Business Law 20 at p.21. 
15 	R Hollington, Minority Shareholder Rights, Sweet and Maxwell 1990, 
at p.56. 
16 	See the comments of Lord Hoffmann in Re A Company (No. 00477 of 
1986) [1986] B.C.L.0 376 at p.378-379. 
17 	See s.260(4) of the Corporations Law. 
(2)Parts of the members 
This aspect was previously discussed in the context of whether 
discrimination was an element of unfair prejudice. The view of 
Vinelott J. in Re Carrington Viyella has support in the decision 
of Harman J. in Re A Company (No. 00370 of 1987), 18 where 
his honour stated: 
It may be regrettable but, in my view, the statute 
providing a statutory remedy, although in wide terms in 
part, does contain the essential provision that the conduct 
complained of must be conduct unfairly prejudicial to 
some part of the members, and that cannot possibly mean 
unfairly prejudicial to all of the members. 19 
There is no doubt that the English legislation is narrower in this 
context than Australia. The additional terms in Australia allows 
a wider range of conduct to be impugned. Nevertheless, as 
noted previously, the Insolvency Act 1986 of England has 
amended the equivalent remedy in their legislation and it may be 
that an amendment to the Companies Act 1985 may follow suit. 
18 	(1988) B.C.C. 507. 
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19 	Contrast the judgment of Gibson J. in Re Sam Weller & Sons lid (1989) 
5 B.C.C. 810. 
(3) Prejudice 
"The variety of ways in which prejudice may be suffered by 
members is almost unlimited." 20 Common examples include, 
exclusion from management, lack of dividends, coupled with 
excessive remuneration for the controllers, competition with the 
company and refusal to register a transfer of shares. 21 
(4) Unfairness 
Under the English legislation, and the Australian legislation, it is 
necessary to show both prejudicial conduct and that the conduct 
is unfair: 
The manner in which these two requirements interrelate is 
not particularly clear. Obviously something may be 
prejudicial but not unfair. For example, if a company 
retains its earnings for expansion purposes, this would be 
prejudicial to shareholders who did not have an 
20 	R.Hollington, op. cit. at p.61. 
21 	See D.D. Prentice "The Theory of the Firm: Minority Shareholder 
Oppression: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985" (1988) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 55 at p.77ff for a discussion of the 
various types of prejudice. See also R. Holling ton, op. cit at p.62ff. 
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employment relationship with the company but not 
necessarily unfair.22 
This test of unfairness is extremely wide 23 and allows the court 
considerable flexibility in determining what sort of conduct 
should be challenged. 
The Remedies Available Under the English Legislation 
Section 461 of the Companies Act 1985 does not offer the range 
of remedies that Australia does under s.260 of the Corporations 
Law. In England the judiciary can make orders regulating the 
conduct of the company's affairs, require the company to do, or 
to refrain from doing certain acts, to authorise the company to 
institute civil proceedings and to order the purchase of the 
petitioner's shares. With Australia offering a greater range of 
remedies,24 this may again demonstrate that we are considering 
a wider operation for our legislation than our English 
counterparts. This distinction may be more illusory than real, as 
both sets of legislation provide that the remedies listed are 
without prejudice to the generality of the court's power. 
22 	D.D. Prentice, op. cit. at p.79. 
23 	See the comments by R.Hollington, O. cit. at p.62. 
24 	See s.260(2) of the Corporations Law. 
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Australia's injustice remedy has been modelled on the English 
legislation. However with the additional terms, Australia has 
attempted to provide a greater potential for use by minority 
shareholders. It would be my submission that the differences 
are more cosmetic than of substance. As indicated by the 
amendments to the English Insolvency Act, the intent of the 
parliament in England was to entrap the same breadth of conduct 
as Australia. 
Canada 
The trend in Canada, like Australia, has been a move away from 
majority rule to protection of minority rights. Anisman states: 
The direction in Canada, primarily in the last 20 years, has 
been toward greater egalitarianism, emphasising notions 
of fairness to minority shareholders in determining the 
balance to be drawn between majority and minority 
interests....It has affected the standards applicable to the 
conduct of majority shareholders in carrying on their 
corporation's affairs and the remedies available to minority 
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shareholders for enforcing those standards in the event of 
a conflict.25 
Canada has differed from England, the United States and 
Australia by its enactment of a virtual "bill of remedies." 26 The 
result of this is that remedies for minority shareholders are more 
expansive than the equivalent Australia shareholder. The 
remedies available in Canada include the statutory derivative 
action, oppression remedy, various restraining orders, an 
appraisal remedy, and a remedy allowing for a just and equitable 
winding up. 
Statutory Derivative Action 
Canada has (unlike Australia, 27 New Zealand and England) 
enacted a statutory derivative action for the use of minority 
shareholders. This was adopted in Canada following the 
recommendations of various law reform committees such as the 
25 	P. Anisman, "Majority-Minority Relations in Canadian Corporation 
Law: M Overview" (1986-1987) 12 Can. Bus.L.J. 473 at p.474. 
26 	See the comments by Palmer E.E. & Welling B.L,. Canadian Company 
Law - Cases, Notes and Materials, 3rd. ed. 1986, Butterworths, Toronto 
and Vancouver at p.7-42. 
27 	In Australia the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee have 
released (July 1990), discussion paper No. 11 which is titled 
"Enforcement of the Duties of Directors and Officers of a Company by 
means of a Statutory Derivative Action". New Zealand is also 
considering the introduction of the statutory derivative action, see 1989 
draft Companies Act, s.127. 
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Lawrence Comrnittee28 and the Dickerson Committee. 29 In the 
words of the Dickerson Committee, the new statutory provision: 
...requires a shareholder who seeks to bring a derivative 
action to obtain a court order before commencing legal 
proceedings. At one stroke, this provision circumvents 
most of the procedural barriers that surround the present 
right to bring a derivative action and, incidentally, 
minimises the possible abuse of "strike suits" that might 
otherwise be instituted as a device to blackmail 
management into a costly settlement at the expense of the 
corporation.. ..In effect this provision abrogates the 
notorious rule in Foss v. Harbottle and substitutes for that 
rule a new regime to govern the conduct of derivative 
actions. In the preface (page v) to the second edition of 
this text, Modern Company Law Professor Gower states 
that "...an attempt has been made to elucidate the 
mysteries of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. I believe that I 
now understand this rule, but have little confidence that 
readers will share this belief". We have been so 
persuaded by Professor Gower's elucidation of these 
"mysteries" that we have relegated the rule to legal limbo 
without compunction, convinced that the alternative 
system recommended is preferable to the uncertainties - 
28 	Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, Ontario, 
1967. See Chapter 2. 
29 	Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, Information 
Canada, Ottawa, 1971. See Chapter 2. 
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and obvious injustices - engendered by that infamous 
doctrine.30 
In this section I will examine the judiciary's involvement in the 
interpretation of the new section to determine if the optimism of 
the Dickerson Committee was justified. 
The Canada Business Corporation Act (C.B.C.A.) introduced 
the statutory derivative action in 1974. The section reads: 
232(1) Subject to subsection (2) a complainant may apply 
to a court for leave to bring an action in the name and on 
behalf of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or 
intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is 
a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or 
discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate. 
(2) No action may be brought and no intervention in an 
action may be made under subsection (1) unless the court 
is satisfied that: 
30 	Id. at para.482. 
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(a) the complainant has given reasonable notice to 
the directors of the corporation or its 
subsidiary of his intention to apply to the court 
under subsection(1) if the directors of the 
corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, 
diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue 
the action; 
(b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and 
(c) it appears to be in the interests of the 
corporation or its subsidiary that the action be 
brought, prosecuted, defended or 
discontinued. 31 
(a) Is the Statutory Derivative Action Personal or Derivative 
Beck states that: 
31 	Many of the provinces of Canada have statutory derivative action which 
are similar to the Federal provisions: see Alberta Business Corporations 
Act 1981, s.232: Manitoba Business Corporations Act 1976, s.232; 
New Brunswick Corporations Act 1981, s.164; Ontario Business 
Corporations Act 1981, s.245; Saskatchewan Business Corporations 
Act 1978, s.232 and British Columbia Company Act 1979, s.225. 
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The critical threshhold question in shareholder 
litigation...is whether the action is personal or derivative. 
It was the answer to this question that tripped the plaintiffs 
in Farnham v. Fin gold which was potentially the most 
significant corporate action ever launched in Canada, and 
which has bedevilled the course of action in Goldex Mines 
Ltd v. Revill et al.32 
In Farnham v. Fingold33 the minority shareholders sought to 
share in the premium that the controlling shareholders had 
received on the sale of their shares. The action was brought by 
a minority shareholder on behalf of himself and all other 
shareholders, except the defendants, alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority. The 
defendants sought to strike out the action on the basis that the 
action was derivative and, therefore; it could only be brought 
pursuant to the legislative provision dealing with statutory 
derivative actions, and this required leave of the court. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the statement of claim was 
concerned with damage allegedly suffered by the corporation 
and therefore, leave should have been requested to bring a 
statutory derivative action, rather than the instituting of a 
personal action." It was clear in Farnham that the plaintiffs were 
32 	S.M. Beck, The Shareholder's Derivative Action" (1974) 52 Can. B.R. 
159 at 169. 
33 	[1972] 3 O.R. 688, 33 D.L.R. (3d) 156 (Ont. C.A.). 
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not themselves sure as to whether their claim was personal or 
derivative and they tried to have it both ways." 34 The case is 
therefore important because it indicates that it is the 
responsibility of the plaintiff to correctly identify whether the 
cause of action is personal or derivative. 
Goldex Mines v. Revinconcerned a fight for control of Probes 
Mines Ltd. At issue was misconduct by the directors and 
defendant shareholders, including misleading proxy solicitation; 
however, it was not clearly stated whether the claim was 
personal or derivative. Leave to bring an action had not been 
sought. This was the central issue. Was leave required? 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the 
endorsement was deficient as it failed to differentiate between 
personal claims and derivative claims. The case is, therefore 
authority for the proposition, that while derivative and personal 
actions may be joined in the one writ, it is necessary to 
distinguish each cause of action in the statement of claim. 
These two cases establish that if a minority shareholder wants to 
seek redress for misconduct, it will be vitally important to 
determine whether the cause of action is personal or derivative 
and to correctly endorse the statement of claim. This will 
34 	Beck, op. cit. at p.I81. 
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become of crucial importance if the statutory derivative action is 
introduced into Australia and stands alongside the oppression 
remedy.35 
(b) Standing to Bring a Derivative Action.  
Section 231 of the C.B.C.A. provides for an application for a 
statutory derivative action to be made by "complainants" This 
term includes past and present shareholders and creditors and 
anyone considered a "proper person" at the court's discretion. 
The term "proper person" was considered by Wallace J. in Re 
Daon Development Corporation.36 His Honour stated: 
...The section requires that the category ["proper person"] 
be composed of those persons who have a direct financial 
interest in how the company is being managed and are in a 
position - somewhat analogous to minority shareholders - 
where they have no legal right to influence or change what 
they see to be abuses of management or conduct contrary 
to the company interest.37 
35 	In Canada the right to bring a common law derivative action has been 
excluded by the legislation introducing the statutory derivative action. 
See Shield Development Company Limited v. Snyder [1976] 3 W.W.R. 
44 (B.C.S.C) The distinction between personal and derivative actions 
also arises with the oppression remedy. See J.G. Macintosh, "The 
Oppression Remedy: Personal or Derivative?" (1991) 70 Can B.R. 29. 
36 	(1984) 54 B.C.L.R. 235. 
37 	Id. at p.243. 
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Adopting this definition, Wallace J. refused to allow a debenture 
holder standing to bring a statutory derivative action. The view 
of Wallace J. has been criticised as being, "unnecessarily 
restrictive and one which it is hoped will not be followed by 
future courts". 38 In particular it is submitted that employees 
should have standing to bring a statutory derivative action. 
They stand to lose their livelihood through mismanagement, a 
consequence not likely to happen to an investor with a 
diversified portfolio. 39 
Finally and importantly, the category of applicants should 
not remain or become static. The changing face of 
capitalism and the role which corporations play in 
furthering its aims dictate the necessity of flexibility...Any 
fears regarding floodgate possibilities or limitless 
applicants can be dealt with by the other procedural or 
substantive requirements. 40 
38 	M.A. Maloney, "Whether the Statutory Derivative Action?" [1986] 64 
Can. B.R. 309 at p318. 
39 	Id. at p.318-319. 
40 	Id. at 319. 
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(c) The Prerequisites for the Bringing of a Statutory Derivative 
The prerequisites for the complainant to bring a statutory 
derivative action are (1) that the complainant give reasonable 
notice to the directors of the corporation, (2) that the 
complainant be acting in good faith and (3) that it is in the 
interests of the corporation that the action be brought. 
(OM Notice 
The requirement of notice has been loosely interpreted. In 
Armstrong v. Gardner41 letters sent to the managing director, 
detailing the minority shareholders complaint, but without any 
particularity, were held to be sufficient. 42 
(c)(ii) The Good Faith Requirement 
Palmer and Welling, comment that this requirement, "probably 
does not mean much." 43 It could be used to disallow suits 
41 	(1978) 20 O.R. (2d) 648 (Ont. H.C.). 
42 	See also Bellman v. Western Approaches Ltd. (1981) 33 B.C.L.R. 45. 
43 	Palmer and Welling, op. cit. at p.7-65. 
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brought by disgruntled minority shareholders in the hope that 
the company will settle the matter quickly, rather than pursue 
litigation which is time-consuming and expensive. In this 
instance I would consider that the requirement does serve a 
useful purpose in discouraging the vexatious litigant. Maloney 
criticises this prerequisite. He states: 
Indeed it is difficult to justify the need for the good faith 
requirement in any case. If a wrong has been committed 
and the other prerequisites fulfilled, it should make little, if 
any difference whether a plaintiffs motives are pure or 
not. This is all the more the case if the main reason for 
allowing statutory derivative actions is to ensure some 
watchdog role over corporate management which society 
cannot do or does not wish to undertake for administrative 
and expense reasons. The other procedural devices 
already deal adequately with malicious or unmeritorious 
actions.44 
My submission would be as litigation is generally undesirable 
and costly, the vexatious litigant should be discouraged and only 
genuine grievances encouraged. The good faith requirement 
does serve as a useful safeguard and its abolition would, in my 
opinion, only lead to the tainting of the altruistic nature of the 
remedy. 
44 	M.A. Maloney, op. cit. at p.320. 
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(c)(iii) That the Interests of the Corporation would be Served 
by the Bringing of the Action.  
The section requires that the court be satisfied that it is in the 
interests of the corporation that the action be brought, 
prosecuted, defended or discontinued. Does this allow a court 
to reject a valid cause of action if they consider that it is not in 
the interests of the company to continue the action? The English 
Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v. Newman 
Industries45 was mindful that although there may exist a valid 
cause of action, the benefits of a successful action may be less 
than the detriment caused to the company. They comment: 
...the board clearly doubted whether there were sufficient 
reasons for supposing that the company would at the end 
of the day be in a position to count its blessings, and 
clearly feared, as counsel said, that it might be killed by 
kindness.46 
Further on, after noting that costs of the trial were in the region 
of three quarter of a million pounds, state: 
45 	[1982] 1 All E.R. 354. 
46 	Id. at p.365. 
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The innocent shareholders.... may well wonder, whether 
this appeal succeeds or not, if there is not something to be 
said after all for the old fashioned rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle.47 
In the Canadian context this issue was discussed in Bellman v. 
Western Approaches Ltd. 48 In this case the minority 
shareholders alleged that the directors had breached their 
fiduciary duty. The board of directors requested a law firm to 
investigate the allegations. The conclusion of the law firm was 
that there was no evidence to support the allegations. The 
minority shareholders sought leave to commence a derivative 
action. 
The court held that the legal report was inconclusive as regards 
the substantive issues and that it could not be said that the 
resolution by the directors following this report was impartial. 
Accordingly it was in the interests of the company that the action 
be brought. 
Maloney again criticises this requirement He comments: 
47 	Id. at p.368. 
48 	(1981) 33 B.C.L.R. 45, 130 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A). 
147 
It moves the derivative action increasingly away from a 
policy-oriented, macro-level to a micro-level measure 
designed to fit the individual circumstances of a 
company. ...Even from a fairly narrow perspective, the 
company must be viewed as a continuing concern which 
must encompass the interests of past, present and future 
shareholders, creditors and (one would hope) employees. 
From a broader perspective, given the major economic 
force of the modern corporation, it must also have an 
interest in society's needs and/or at least, economic 
concerns. Viewed in this light it is nearly impossible to 
delineate all the criteria and different needs of the various 
interest groups and then judge which, if any, is the 
appropriate course of action. Obviously a macro view of 
the corporate world is required.49 
I would submit that in the case of the close corporation or the 
quasi-partnership, a macro view of the corporate world is not 
required. These types of corporations cannot be considered a 
major economic force, the number of employees is relatively 
small, as is the number of shareholders. To pursue every prima 
facie case of wrongdoing may be economic lunacy for the small 
corporation. 
49 	Maloney, op. cit. at p. 328. 
Ratification 
Section 242 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act states 
that an action shall not be: 
...stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that 
an alleged breach of a right or duty owed to the 
corporation or its subsidiary has been or may be approved 
by the shareholders of such body corporate, but evidence 
of approval by the shareholders may be taken into account 
by the court in making an order... 
This is, in my opinion, the best approach to ratification. In 
certain situations a majority of shareholders should be entitled to 
forgive a breach of duty by the directors, however, if the 
directors control the general meeting, ratification should only be 
treated as a piece of evidence, with the court giving it the 
appropriate weight for each individual case. 50 
By treating ratification as something to be taken into account, yet 
not be determinative of the matter, allows the premise of 
majority rule to remain yet gives the minority shareholder a 
remedy if his, "rights, expectations and obligations," have been 
50 
	
See the comments to this effect by S. Beck, O. cit. at p.198. 
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infringed. It will allow the judiciary flexibility and discretion in 
determining the boundaries of majority rule. Schreiner 
comments that: 
...the courts will now have to formulate new criteria of 
permissible conduct on the part of directors, and set new 
limits to the extent to which they will intervene in the so-
called internal affairs of companies...What is important to 
note here is that the mere fact of or potential for ratification 
will not automatically prevent a suit being heard. 51 
Conclusion on the Statutory Derivative Action.  
There is no doubt that the statutory derivative action has an 
important role to play in the correction of abuses by directors: 
The next decade may prove decisive for the fate of the 
statutory derivative action. It is only hoped that the courts 
will fully grasp its significance and role in society. As 
corporations become increasingly powerful, as 
management becomes increasingly isolated from criticism 
and accountability, the derivative action may be one of the 
51 	O.C. Shreiner, The Shareholders Derivative Action: A comparative 
study of procedures" (1979) 96 South African L..1. 203 at p.235. See 
also the comments of the Dickerson Committee op. cit. at para.487. 
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few remaining methods of ensuring some accountability. 
The courts, with the help of the legislature, should attempt 
to ensure that the derivative action plays the pivotal role 
for which it was designed. 52 
In Australia the introduction of the statutory derivative action 
would greatly increase the range of remedies for the minority 
shareholder. It could then play a pivotal role in correcting 
abuses of management. The statutory derivative action also has 
some advantages over the oppression remedy. To correct a 
wrong done to the company via s.260 requires proving some 
form of injustice to obtain an order that the company institute 
proceedings against the wrongdoers. In essence, you go to 
court to obtain an order for further litigation. It is obviously a 
circuitous route to correct wrongs to the company. In this sense 
the statutory derivative action provides a quicker and more 
efficient way to correct wrongs to the corporation. 
The Oppression Remedy 
In addition to the statutory derivative action, Canada also 
possesses the oppression remedy. The legislation differs 
throughout Canadian provinces, but s.241 of the Canadian 
52 	Maloney, op. cit. at p.341. 
151 
Business Corporations Act is typical. A complainant may apply 
to the court if the: 
...affairs of the corporation...have been conducted in a 
manner._ that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of any security 
holder, creditor, director, or officer, the court may make 
an order to rectify the matters complained of. 
Illustrative of how this section has been interpreted in Canada is 
Redekop v. Robco Construction Ltd. 53 In this case the English 
principles as regards oppression were adopted. His honour 
considered that oppression indicated burdensome harsh or 
wrongful conduct, a lack of probity or of fair dealing. 54 
Personal and Derivative Actions Under the Oppression Remedy.  
The presence in Canada of the statutory derivative action and the 
oppression remedy has led to the issue of whether both personal 
53 	(1978) 5 B.L.R. 58 (B.C.S.C.). 
54 	The Canadian court quoting from the English decisions of Re Harmer 
[1958] 3 All E.R. 689, Scottish Co -op Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer 
[1959] A.C. 324. See also the Canadian decision of Diligenti v. RWMD 
Operations (1976) 1 BCLR 36 which considered the words "unfairly 
prejudicial". Fulton J. found that actions of the board in removing one of 
the founding members of the company was unfairly prejudicial in that it 
was an unjust and inequitable denial of his rights and expectations. See 
(1976) 1 BCLR 36 at p.51 quoting from the decision of Lord Wilberforce 
in Ebrahimi v. Westboume Galleries Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360. 
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and derivative actions are available under the oppression 
remedy. It could be submitted that the derivative actions should 
exclusively be available under the legislation pertaining to the 
statutory derivative action and that the oppression remedy 
should be linked solely to personal wrongs against minority 
shareholders. Macintosh suggests that: 
...the derivative action and the oppression remedy are two 
pieces of a puzzle that steadfastly refuse to fit together in a 
tractable fashion. An amendment to the statute will best 
succeed in salvaging order from potential chaos. In 
particular, I suggest that the statutory derivative action and 
oppression provisions ought to be combined into a single 
all-embracing provision, the new unified provision will 
ensure that all actions involving derivative wrongs are 
funnelled through the statutory leave procedure.55 
The Dickerson Committee also commented on the relationship 
between the oppression remedy and derivative actions when 
recommending the adoption of the oppression remedy. They 
considered that the object of the statutory derivative action was 
to remedy wrongs to the corporation whereas the oppression 
remedy would generally be invoked by minority shareholders in 
close corporation. The committee also recognised that in some 
situations the actions may constitute a wrong to the corporation 
55 	MacIntosh, op. cit. at p.30. 
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and a wrong to minority shareholders. In this context they 
comment 
...but the payment of excessive salaries to dominant 
shareholders who appoint themselves officers is a 
borderline case: it may constitute a wrong to the 
corporation and, at the same time, may have as its specific 
goal the squeezing out of minority shareholders (at a low 
price reflecting the small dividends paid) whose 
investment is no longer required. In such a case the 
aggrieved person may select the remedy that will best 
resolve his problem. ..In sum, we think that the courts 
should have very broad discretion, applying general 
standards of fairness, to decide these cases on their 
merits. 56 
Despite the opinion of the Dickerson Committee that the 
relationship between the two provisions could work, Macintosh 
considers that the interaction in unclear and confusing and that: 
...a better alternative is to combine the derivative and 
oppression actions in a single provision, embracing all 
forms of action. A unified provision could funnel all 
derivative actions through a leave procedure, while 
56 	Dickerson Committee, op. cit. at para.484. 
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eliminating insupportable differences in matters of 
standing, procedure, remedies and substance as between 
derivative and oppression actions. 57 
Macintosh does mount a powerful argument for the amendment 
of the legislation. I would submit that an equally valid 
alternative would be to allow personal actions under the 
oppression section, leaving corporate wrongs to be remedied 
under the statutory derivative action. If the matter was doubtful, 
either party could seek directions of the court as to the 
appropriate course to take. This solution would not represent 
such a radical reappraisal of the remedies of the minority 
shareholder, but would still give the minority shareholders 
appropriate avenues to pursue to correct abuses of management. 
Furthermore, in the case of corporate wrongs it is appropriate 
for the minority shareholder to seek leave of the court. The 
shareholder is seeking leave to institute proceedings on behalf of 
another entity, it is apposite that the judiciary be given an 
opportunity to consider if the claim is valid. However, in the 
case of personal wrongs, the shareholder is instituting 
proceedings on behalf of themselves and there is no reason for 
leave to be obtained. Ultimately, if the claim is found to be 
unjustified, the shareholder will suffer the penalty of having to 
pay the costs of the other party. 
57 	MacIntosh, op. cit. at p.68. 
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The Appraisal Remedy 
Canada also has available an appraisal remedy whereby 
minorities can force the corporation to purchase their shares at a 
mutually agreed price or at a "fair price". An example of the 
provisions found in this area is s.184 of the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act. 
184(1) Right to dissent.- Subject to sections 185 and 234, 
a holder of shares of any class of a corporation may 
dissent if the corporation is subject to an order under 
paragraph 185.1(4)(d) that affects the holder or if the 
corporation resolves to 
(a) amend its articles under section 167 or 168 to 
add, change or remove any provisions 
restricting or constraining the issue, transfer 
or ownership of shares of that class; 
(b) amend its articles under section 167 to add, 
change or remove any restriction upon the 
business or businesses that the corporation 
may carry on; 
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(c) amalgamate with another corporation, 
otherwise than under section 178; 
(d) be continued under the laws of another 
jurisdiction under section 182; or 
(e) sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all 
its property under subsection 183(2). 
(3) Payment for shares.- In addition to any other right he 
may have, but subject to subsection (26), a shareholder 
who complies with this section is entitled, when the action 
approved by the resolution from which he dissents or an 
order made under subsection 185.1(4) becomes effective, 
to be paid by the corporation the fair value of the shares 
held by him in respect of which he dissents, determined as 
of the close of the business on the day before the 
resolution was adopted or the order was made. 
This section has the potential to allow minorities dissenting from 
fundamental changes in corporate policy to exit the organisation. 
Nevertheless, the practice in Canada has shown that it will not 
be in contentious matters when the remedy is invoked. 58 As to 
58 	See the comments by Palmer and Welling, op. cit. at p.7-121. 
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what constitutes a fair value, Re Montgomery and Shell Canada 
Ltd59 indicates that this will be interpreted as meaning the 
market value of the shares, despite their asset value being 
significantly higher. 
Conclusion 
Canada provides a greater range of remedies for the minority 
shareholder than Australia. I would submit that Australia would 
benefit greatly from the introduction of the statutory derivative 
action. This would provide the minority shareholder with an 
appropriate remedy for the correction of derivative wrongs, 
leaving the oppression remedy for the recovery of personal 
wrongs. The Canadian approach with ratification also 
constitutes a significant improvement over the Australian 
position. By treating ratification as a piece of evidence, giving it 
due weight in the circumstances of the case, allows the court to 
treat ratification on its merits, preventing it from hindering the 
minority shareholder as it presently does in Australia. I would 
consider that the statutory derivative action would prove a 
quicker and more effective remedy for the minority shareholder 
(in preference to s.260 and requesting a s.260(2)(g) order), 
though s.260 has the potential to be interpreted as widely as the 
statutory derivative action. Nevertheless, the introduction of the 
59 	(1980) 11 D.L.R. (3d) 116 (Sask. Q.B.); for a fuller discussion of the 
appraisal remedy see Magnet "Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Canada" 
(1979) 11 Ottawa L Rev. 100. 
158 
statutory derivative action would provide a clearer picture of the 
relevant use of the provisions. 
United States of America 
The substantive method of control of corporate mismanagement 
in the United States has been the shareholder's derivative suit. 
The United States minority shareholder, though primarily 
depending upon the derivative suit, can also utilise the 
oppression remedy and the notion of a fiduciary duty owing 
from majority to minority to correct any perceived injustices. 
Derivative Suit 
The United States equivalent to the decision of Foss v. 
Harbottle60 is the case of Hawes v. City of Oak1and. 61 The 
two decisions provide a contrast as to the approach of the 
judiciary to derivative suits by shareholders. While the Rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle62 denies an action by a minority shareholder 
unless it comes within strict guidelines, the American decision 
60 	(1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 E.R. 189. 
61 	104 U.S. 450 (1882). 
62 	See my earlier discussion of this aspect in chapter 2. 
159 
established the procedural requirements for the bringing of a 
shareholder suit. These requirements were as follows: 
1) Before instituting the action, the complainant 
shareholders were required to make a demand on all 
the shareholders requesting that they resolve the 
matter. 
2) The complainant shareholders were also required to 
make a demand on the directors, requesting that the 
grievance be pursued. This requirement was 
excused if the demand would be futile. 
3) The complainant then had to specify with 
particularity the facts justifying the complaint and 
they also had to allege that there was no collusion 
between the parties so as to create federal rather than 
state jurisdiction. 
4) The plaintiff was also required to own shares at the 
time of the alleged wrongdoing. 
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The decision of Hawes v. City of Oakland led to the enactment 
of Equity Rule 94 in 1881, which is reproduced today in Rule 
23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 63 
23.1. In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders to enforce a right of a corporation, the 
corporation having failed to enforce a right which may 
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified 
and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at 
the time of the transaction of which he complains or that 
his share devolved upon him thereafter by operation of 
law; (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would 
not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to 
obtain the action he desires from the directors, and, if 
necessary, from the shareholders, and the reasons for his 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears 
that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the shareholders similarly situated in 
enforcing the right of the corporation. The action shall not 
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
63 	Obviously there are some differences from one state to another, however 
there is basic similarity with the federal procedure. See the comments by 
Shreiner, op. cit. at p.221. 
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compromise shall be given to shareholders in such manner 
as the court directs. 
Standing 
To pursue a derivative action a plaintiff is required to be a 
shareholder at the time of the wrongdoing, and generally must 
remain a shareholder during the course of the action. 64 It has 
also been held that unregistered shareholding will qualify as 
does equitable ownership.65 A shareholder in a parent 
corporation can bring a derivative action on behalf of a 
subsidiary,66 and a creditor will have no right to bring a 
derivative action.67 A shareholder will also be denied the right 
to bring an action 'if he consented to the wrong or explicitly 
ratified it; if he is guilty of laches, or even (under a few 
opinions) if he "acquiesced" in the wrong by failing to object. 
The theory of these cases is that the plaintiff is "estopped" to 
bring the action or lacks "clean hands: 168 
64 	See de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (1970); Werfel v. 
Kramarsky 61 F.R.D. 674 (1974); Schilling v.Bekher 582 F.2d 995 
(1978) and Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co. 58 F.2d 1258 (1975). 
65 	See the cases noted by W.L. Cary & M.A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials 
on Corporations 6th ed., The Foundation Press Inc., New York 1988 at p. 
936. 
66 	Ibid. 
67 	Dodge v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 394 F. Supp 1124 (1975). 
68 	Cary and Eisenberg, op. cit. at 937. 
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The most controversial aspect of standing in America is the 
contemporaneous ownership rule. This requirement stems from 
the concern of the United States Supreme Court in Hawes v. 
City of Oakland, that shareholders would collude to create 
federal jurisdiction: 
It appears to have been a well-established technique - 
particularly where a corporation itself desired the 
institution of litigation against persons who had injured it, 
but wished to remove the case from state jurisdiction - to 
sell a few shares to someone from out of the state of 
incorporation, who would then sue as a collusive plaintiff, 
federal jurisdiction existing on the basis of diversity of 
citizenship. This requirement, then, and that of an 
assertion that the plaintiff was not in collusion with the 
defendant to create federal jurisdiction, are based squarely 
on circumstances peculiar to the federal courts. 69 
There is no requirement in Australia that there be share-
ownership at both the time of the wrongdoing and the bringing 
of the action: 
Rejection of the contemporaneous-ownership doctrine is 
demanded by logic, since the shareholder sues in the right 
69 	Shreiner, op. cit at p.223. 
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of the corporation, and the corporation's right should not 
be affected by the date on which shares were acquired by 
the individual who sets the judicial machinery in 
motion.70 
I would submit that the Australian position is preferable to the 
United States. The altruistic nature of the derivative suit should 
be encouraged rather than hampered, and accordingly the 
rejection of the contemporaneous-ownership requirement is a 
salutary feature of the Australian derivative action. 
Requirement of Demand on the Board of Directors.  
The courts in the United States have accepted that demand not be 
made on the board of directors if this demand would be futile. 
This will obviously be the case where the alleged wrongdoers 
control the board or where the directors have a material interest 
in the matter. Demand will also not be required where the board 
is under the dominion and control of interested directors. 71 
The minority shareholder in Australia, rather than showing that 
he/she has made a demand on the board, has to show that the 
70 	Shreiner, op. cit at p.224. 
71 	Papilsky v. Berndt 59 F.R.D. 95 (1973). 
164 
wrongdoers are in control. This point reflects the different 
approaches of the judiciary of Australia and the United States. 
The United States approach is more expansive and permits the 
judge to examine the merits of the case, whereas in Australia, 
the judiciary has preferred to stay aloof from commercial 
decision making: 
In the core cases - where the directors have committed a 
fraud on the minority and are in effective control, i.e. 
where there is no doubt that an action must be allowed - 
the United States formulation is preferable to the English, 
as it encourages a concentration on the question of 
effective rather than formal contro1. 72 
Requirement of Demand on Shareholders 
The requirement of a demand on the shareholders does not have 
the degree of uniformity, as does the requirement of a demand 
on the board of directors. The law governing demand on the 
shareholders varies widely from state to state and to the federal 
jurisdiction. Some general points can be made: 
72 	Shreiner, op. cit. at p.225; See the discussion of the Australian aspect of 
control, in chapter 2. 
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1) Demand is not required where the wrongdoers hold 
a majority of the shareholding.73 
Demand will also be excused where it would be 
futae.74 
3) Demand may be excused where there is a large 
number of shareholders.75 
Approval by the Court 
Pursuant to the Federal rules of civil procedure, approval of the 
court is necessary for the settlement of any derivative action. 
The aim of this requirement is to prevent any possibility of 
abuse by minority shareholders and the company. For example, 
a minority shareholder may bring an action with the intention to 
settle out of court, thus retaining the benefit for themselves 
rather than recovering on behalf of the corporation. The 
potential for abuse is shown by the decision of Manufacturers' 
73 	Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp. 259 F. Supp 936 (1966). 
74 	Pioche Mines Consolidated Inc. v. Dolman 333 F.2d 257 (1964). 
75 	Contrast the decision of Weiss v. Sunasco Inc. 316 F. Supp 1197 (1970) 
with Quirke v. Sr. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 277 F.2d 705 (1960). 
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Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Rhode Island v. Hopson. 76 In 
this case the action was discontinued by the minority 
shareholder when his stock was purchased by the defendant 
corporation for seven times its market value. 
It is obviously advantageous for the approval of the court to be 
required before any settlement. By allowing private settlements 
the aim of the derivative suit is defeated. The corporation is the 
intended recipient of the action, but as Manufacturers' Mutual 
Fire Insurance shows the minority shareholder is the principal 
beneficiary by a settlement out of court: 
Moreover, the money for the settlement will usually come 
from company funds, so that the net result of the suit will 
be that the company has been milked twice - once to create 
the cause of action and once to pay off the discoverer of 
the wrong.77 
In the United States, the rule in Clarke v. Greenberg78 can be 
utilised to prevent a collusive settlement. In this case the 
plaintiff discontinued an action against the corporation after the 
corporation purchased his stock for $9000. The market value of 
76 	25 NYS 2d 502 (1940). 
77 	Shreiner, op. cit. at p.225. 
78 	296 N.Y. 146 (1947). 
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the stock as $51.88. The court held that the moneys received by 
the minority shareholder were held on trust for the corporation. 
Security for Costs 
In the United States, one limitation on the use of derivative suits 
has emerged. In many jurisdictions the minority shareholder 
may be required to post security for reasonably anticipated 
expenses that the corporation or other defendants may incur. 
"Most of these statutes are by their terms inapplicable if the 
plaintiff owns more than a specified amount of stock."79 In 
practice, these statutes do not provide a great impediment: 
...because once the defendant moves to require that the 
security be posted, the court stays the action to permit the 
plaintiff to seek additional shareholders as plaintiff-
intervenors so as to meet the requisite amount of 
shareownership to except the action from the statutory 
security requirement. 80 
79 	D.A. DeMott, "Shareholder Litigation in Australia and the United States: 
Common Problems, Uncommon Solutions" (1987) 11 Sydney Law 
Review 529 at p.266. 
80 	DeMott, op. cit. at p.267. 
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Special Litigation Committees 
At present in the United States the most controversial issue 
in derivative litigation concerns the use of "litigation 
committees". As this question is one controlled by state 
law, and only five state supreme courts have addressed the 
litigation committee device, further evolution of the law is 
inevitable. 81 
The first major authority to deal with litigation committees was 
Auerbach v. Bennea. 82 In this case the New York Court of 
Appeals held that the director's had the authority to appoint a 
committee of disinterested directors to determine if maintenance 
of the derivative suit was justified. Under this authority if the 
elected committee "utilise adequate and appropriate investigative 
procedures, and pursue the investigation in good faith, the 
committee's determination is shielded from judicial scrutiny." 83 
In effect the court adopted the business judgment rule to the 
appointment of a litigation committee. This rule providing that if 
commercial decisions are made in good faith and in a reasonable 
manner the court will not interfere. 
81 	Demott, op. cit. at p.275. 
82 	419 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (1979); In Alford v. Shaw N.C. 349 S.E. 2d 41 (1986) 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted Auerbach, but said, that if 
the independence of the directors is established as well as the 
investigation being deemed to be reasonable, the director's good faith 
will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
83 	K.S. Williams, "Derivative Actions", (1987) 22 Wake Forest Law 
Review 127 at p.132. 
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A second approach to the appointment of litigation committees 
was considered by Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata' Corp. v. 
Maldonado. 84 This court accepted the major elements of 
Auerbach with two amendments. Firstly, the burden of proof 
was shifted to the corporate defendant, and secondly, the courts 
were to exercise their own business judgment in determining 
whether the derivative suit should continue: 
[T]he court's response to the use of litigation committees 
is grounded in practical reality: Zapata Corp. articulates the 
fear that committee members will so empathise with the 
plight of their fellow directors - the defendants - that they 
will be unable fairly to assess the merits of the suit. 85 
A third response to litigation committees was adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Iowa in Miller v. Register and Tribune 
Syndicate, Inc. 86 The court adopting what has become known 
as the "structural bias" theory. 87 This theory suggests that if 
the directors are not in a position to control litigation in the first 
place, (because of some conflict of interest); those same 
directors are disqualified from participating in the selection of 
84 	430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
85 	Demott, O. cit. at p.276. 
86 	336 N.W. 2d 709 (Iowa 1983). 
87 	See the comments by Williams, op. cit. at p.133. 
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the litigation committee. Obviously this approach is the, "most 
critical of the motives and abilities of special litigation 
committees." 88 
The law in respect of litigation committees is still evolving, 
however: 
The credibility of the institution, however, is called into 
question by the uniformity with which committees 
determine derivative actions not to be in the corporation's 
best interests. Surely in eight years some claims worth 
pursuing were raised derivatively. Indeed, in some 
reported cases, the committee's recommendation appears 
to have been at odds with the advice as to the merits of 
claims received from its counse1. 89 
With this background in mind it is very difficult to see the 
efficacy of special litigation committees.% While their use has 
been embraced by the American courts, 91 "the litigation 
88 	Williams, op. cit. at p.133. 
89 	Demott, op. cit. at p.277. 
90 	The problems created by litigation committees would be reduced by the 
adoption of a proposal from the American Law Institute's Project on 
Corporate Governance. This proposal, while endorsing the use of 
litigation committees, restricts their use where a director is personally 
benefiting from the dismissal of a derivative action. See the comments 
by Demott, op. cit. at p.278. See also Carey and Eisenberg O. cit. at 
p.1005. 
91 	Demott, op. cit. at p.278-279 comments that this acceptance has resulted 
from the lack of judicial alternatives to dismiss a derivative claim 
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committee device ought not to commend itself to Australia or to 
the other commonwealth jurisdictions." 92 
[The] courts' acquiescence in the litigation committee as an 
instrument of the directors' "business judgment", ...may 
simply represent a transcendence of rhetoric over reality. 
The reality is a private non-judicial device to bring about 
the termination of litigation; the rhetoric is derived from a 
prudent judicial deference to decisions about the operation 
of business enterprises. 93 
Oppression Remedy 
In addition to the derivative action, many states of America also 
provide grounds for remedial action on the grounds of 
oppressive or unjust conduct. The legislation varies from state 
to state but an example of the United States provisions can be 
taken from the Model Business Corporations Act 1950. 
s.97 The ...courts shall have full power to liquidate the 
assets and business of a corporation: 
sununarily, and that the courts are sceptical of the minority shareholder's 
claim. 
92 	Demott, op. cit. at p.279. 
9 3 	Demott, O. cit. at p.279. See also Growbow v. Peret 539 A. 2d. 180 
(1988). 
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(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is 
established... 
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of 
the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; 
or 
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or 
wasted... 
Oppression as a ground for the dissolution of a company was 
first included in the Illinios and Pennsylvania corporations acts 
of 1933 and in the Model Business Corporation Act 1950. 
Approximately 37 states now have an oppression remedy (or 
something in similar terms) in their corporations legislation. 
The section was analysed in the United States by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia in White v. Perkins.94 The parties formed a 
company with White owing 55% and Perkins, 45% of the 
issued stock. The company was formed to act as a jobber for 
products of American Oil Company. The initial board consisted 
of Perkins, White and White's attorney. The company 
commenced operations in July 1967 with Perkins as the only 
94 	213 Va. 129, 189 S.E. 2d 315 (1972). 
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full time employee. A dividend was never distributed by the 
company, White never agreeing to this course of action. During 
1969 various disputes arose between White and Perkins, 
Perkins complaining about the lack of dividends, the alleged 
failure of White to honour certain agreements, and the refusal of 
White to grant Perkins a 50% equity in the company. In 1970 
Perkins instituted legal proceedings to dissolve the corporation, 
arguing that the actions of White were illegal oppressive or 
fraudulent. The court found that the actions of White were 
oppressive and in coming to this conclusion quoted from the 
English decisions of Elder v. Elder & Watson95 and Scottish 
Co-op Wholesale Society v. Meyer. 96 Accordingly oppression 
was held to constitute a visible departure from the standards of 
fair dealing, a violation of fair play and a lack of probity and fair 
dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of its 
members. 
As can be seen from this decision the United States courts have 
adopted an approach closely allied to the United Kingdom and 
thus integrally connected to the Australian position. Indeed 
many states in America now allow relief on the basis of unfair 
prejudice of persistent unfairness. 97 
95 	(1952) Sess. Cas. 49 at p.55. 
96 	[1958] 3 All. ER. 66 at p.86. 
97 	For a list of the applicable wording in each of the states see R.B. 
Thompson, "Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable 
Expectations" (1988) 66 Wash. U.LQ. 193 at p.206-207, fn.57. 
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Recently the courts in America have tied its oppression remedy 
to the concept of what constitutes a minority shareholder's 
reasonable expectations. As Thompson states: 
The highest courts in several states have adopted 
disappointment of reasonable expectations as the best 
guide to del-ming oppression, and this idea is now 
included in some state dissolution statutes. 98 
This idea of reasonable expectations guiding the content of the 
duty owed by the controllers to the minority mirrors the decision 
of the House of Lords in Ebrahimi v. Westboume Galleries. 99 
In this case the court ruled that the exercise by the majority of its 
legal power pursuant to the articles of association to remove a 
minority shareholder from management was sufficient to justify 
a winding up of the company on the basis that it was just and 
equitable. 100 Lord Wilberforce commented: 
[A] limited company is more than a mere entity...there is 
room in company law for recognition of the fact that 
behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
98 	Thompson, op. cit. at p.208. 
99 	[1972] 2 All. E.R. 492. 
100 In Australia see s.461 of the Corporations Law. 
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expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
necessarily submerged in the company structure. 101 
This idea of reasonable expectations constituting the basis for 
injustice has been recognised in a number of jurisdictions in 
America 102 and as Thompson concludes: 
...the reasonable expectation standard, provides an 
effective response to the problems of minority 
shareholders because they focus a court's attention on the 
ways in which the expectations of participants in a close 
corporation differ from the shareholder expectations 
reflected in the statutory norms and permits courts to 
provide relief consistent with those expectations in 
situations where advance private ordering would be 
inadequate. 103 
I would submit that Australia would benefit greatly from the 
introduction of a reasonable expectations standard within s.260 
of the Corporations Law. This would allow the court to fully 
utilise the remedial nature of s.260 and permit the minority 
101 	[1972] 2 All. E.R. 492 at p.500. 
102 These jurisdictions and the authorities from those jurisdictions are 
discussed by Thompson, op. cit. at p.213. 
103 Thompson, op. cit. at p.237-238. 
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shareholder an appropriate avenue for the redress of unjust 
conduct by the controllers. 
A Fiduciary Duty Owing from the Majority Shareholders to the 
Minority  
The United States courts have developed the notion of a 
fiduciary duty being owed by the majority shareholders of a 
corporation to the minority shareholders. 104 This idea was first 
given judicial support in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England 
/nc.. 105 Rodd was the principal founder of a family owned 
close corporation. He originally held 200 shares in the company 
which constituted an 80% interest. Rodd later brought two sons 
into management positions and made gifts of 39 shares to each 
of them. He also made a gift of 39 shares to another child. 
Rodd decided to retire and negotiated with the corporation to 
purchase 45 of his remaining shares. His eldest son, a director 
of the corporation, represented the company in these 
negotiations. Ultimately the corporation purchased his 45 
shares for $800 per share. Within 2 years he transferred the rest 
of his shareholding to his three children, increasing their 
interests to 52 shares each. 
104 Thompson, op. cit. at P.  237 states that "It is not entirely surprising that 
the enhanced fiduciary duty doctrine seems to have added appeal to courts 
in states which have narrow dissolution remedies." 
105 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
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Donahue, a minority shareholder with 50 shares, alleged that the 
corporation's purchase of Rodd's shares constituted an unlawful 
distribution of corporate assets to the controlling shareholder 
and that this was in breach of the fiduciary duty owed by the 
majority to the minority. The company had offered Donahue, 
$200 per share. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found in favour 
of Donahue. Donahue should have been given an equal 
opportunity to have the corporation purchase her stock at $800 
per share. The court stated: 
...because of the fundamental resemblance of the close 
corporation to the partnership, the trust and confidence 
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, 
and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close 
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close 
corporation owe one another substantially the same 
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that 
partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, 
we have defined the standard of duty owed by partners to 
one another as the "utmost good faith and 
loyalty."...Stockholders in close corporations must 
discharge their management and stockholder 
responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith 
standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or 
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self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the 
other stockholders and the corporation. 106 
This case was followed in the, "ground-breaking decision" 107 
of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 108 Four parties, 
Wilkes, Riche, Pipldn and Quinn were the four shareholders of 
a corporation which owned and operated a nursing home. At 
the time of incorporation, each person understood that they 
would be a director of the company and actively participate in 
the management and decision making. It was also agreed that 
each would receive an equal amount of remuneration, provided 
they continued to play an active role in the company. Initially, 
the operation ran smoothly. However a dispute arose between 
Quinn and Wilkes and the other shareholders sided with 
Quinn. 109 Because of the strained relationship between the 
parties, Wilkes' salary was terminated and Quinn's 
remuneration increased. Subsequently, Wilkes was not re-
elected as a director and he was informed that his services were 
no longer required. There was no allegation of misconduct or 
neglect by the majority shareholders as regards the conduct of 
Wilkes, they just wanted Wilkes to stop earning income from 
the corporation. Wilkes then instituted proceedings claiming 
106 Id. at p.582, 328 N.E. 2d at p.511. 
107 See the comments by F.H. O'Neal, "Oppression of Minority 
Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights" (1987) 35 Clev. St. L Rev. 
121 at p.127. 
108 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E. 2d 657 (1976). 
109 It should be noted that Pipkin was no longer a shareholder. In 1959 he 
sold his shareholding, with the knowledge of the other parties, to a Mr. 
Connor. 
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damages on the basis of the breach of fiduciary duty owing from 
the majority to the minority. 
The court held that the removal of Wilkes had breached the 
fiduciary duties that the majority shareholders owed him and that 
Wilkes should be entitled to recover the salary to which he 
would have been entitled if he had remained a director of the 
corporation. They stated: 
...the Donahue decision acknowledged, as a "natural 
outgrowth" of the case law of this Commonwealth, a strict 
obligation on the part of majority stockholders in a close 
corporation to deal with the minority with the utmost good 
faith and loyalty. On its face, this strict standard is 
applicable in the instant case. The distinction between the 
majority action in Donahue and the majority action in this 
case is more one of form than of substance.. ..When an 
asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by 
the majority, however, we think it is open to minority 
stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate 
objective could have been achieved through an alternative 
course of action less harmful to the minority's 
interest....applying this approach to the instant case it is 
apparent that the majority stockholders in Springside have 
not shown a legitimate business purpose for severing 
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Wilkes from the payroll of the corporation or for refusing 
to re-elect him as a salaried officer and director. 110 
There is no doubt that this notion of a fiduciary duty owed 
amongst the participants of a close corporation, greatly assists 
the minority shareholder to resist action which constitutes a 
violation of their expectations as a minority shareholder. In 
Anglo-Australian case law the decision which most closely 
reflects this idea of a fiduciary duty from the majority to the 
minority is the English decision of Clemens v. Clemens Bros. 
Ltd.. 111 In this case Foster J. set aside resolutions of a general 
meeting which approved an increase in capital, the allotment of 
shares and the setting up of a trust for employees. The effect of 
these resolutions would be to reduce the plaintiffs shareholding 
from 45% to less than 25%, thus preventing her from blocking 
any special resolution. His honour, relying on the House of 
Lords decision in Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries 112 held 
that the resolution were in breach of the expectations of the 
minority shareholder, and those expectations were not 
subsumed within the corporate structure. 
The Australian minority shareholder would significantly benefit 
from a common law development along the lines of a enhanced 
370 Mass. 842 at p.848 (1976). 
[1976] 2 All. E.R. 268. 
[1972] 2 All. E.R. 492. 
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fiduciary duty among the participants in a close corporation. 
However, there is the potential for s.260 to be interpreted in this 
expansive fashion and be able to achieve the same effect as the 
American decisions of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New England and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 
Conclusion 
The United States, like Canada, has a greater range of remedies 
for the minority shareholder than does Australia. Nevertheless, 
as noted, a liberal interpretation of s.260 of the Corporations 
Law would provide the minority shareholder with much the 
same protection as offered to his or her North American 
counterpart. However, to improve the lot of the minority 
shareholder in this country, I would submit that the introduction 
of a procedural framework for the statutory derivative action is 
necessary. The oppression remedy could be used for the 
correction of abuses of a personal nature, leaving the statutory 
derivative action for the remedy of corporate wrongs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PERSONAL RIGHTS AND THE MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDER 
The Rule in Foss v. Harbottlel established two principles. The 
first principle was that the corporation, being a separate legal 
entity, could only sue for wrongs done to it. The second 
principle was that the minority could not complain of an internal 
irregularity which the majority could put right. Beck explains 
the result of this case in the following terms: 
The corporate pleasure was to be determined by the 
shareholders in general meeting and as the plaintiffs did 
not represent a majority, or allege that the will of the 
majority had been determined, they had no standing to sue 
in the name of the company... Moreover, the decision 
whether or not to bring suit in the company name belongs 
at common law to the general meeting where, once again, 
the majority rules.2 
The two principles had the potential to trample minority interests 
to the benefit of majority shareholders: 
1 	[1843] 2 Ha. 461; 67 E.R. 189. 
S. Beck, "The Shareholders Derivative Action" [1974] 52 Can.B.R. 159 
at p.164-5. 
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It is, then, plain that beneath the two parts of it there is, 
after all, one "Rule in Foss v. Harbottle" and the limits of 
that Rule lie along the boundaries of majority rule. At 
first sight, this is a terrifying prospect for the minority, 
since it has been asserted that the majority can ratify any 
act which is intra vires the corporation itself, even if it be 
an act in breach of the internal agreement, i.e. in the case 
of a company, the articles of association.3 
Because of this possibility of majority abuse, the courts 
developed four exceptions to the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle.4 
I have previously discussed the fraud on the minority exception 
but it is now appropriate to consider the personal rights 
exception, the reason being that this exception, as held in 
Stanham v. National Trust of Australia5 has the potential to 
overcome many of the problems associated with the Rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle. The Supreme Court of New South Wales 
considered that if every matter in the articles of a company was 
elevated to the status of a contractual right vested in each and 
every member, the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle could be 
completely disregarded. 
3 	K.W. Wedderburn, "Shareholder Rights and the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle" [1957] C.L.J. 194 at p.198-9. 
4 	For a list of those exceptions see Chapter 2. 
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The major difficulty with this exception however, is that the 
distinction between a personal action and a derivative action (that 
is an action brought by shareholders to recover on behalf of the 
company) is unclear and ill-clef -med. As Beck states: 
The line between personal and derivative actions is neither 
clear nor settled and the shareholder who begins his suit 
believing he has a personal right of action may be met by a 
ruling that the wrong of which he complains is not to him 
but to the company and he must comply with the rule 
which may well mean that his grievance will go 
unremedied ... The critical -threshold question in 
shareholder litigation, therefore, is whether the action is 
personal or detivative. 6 
This chapter therefore aims to examine the personal rights 
exception to the rule, "a field which although perhaps best 
regarded as lying outside the ambit of the rule, has often become 
entangled with aspects of it and which, like the other exceptions, 
has many uncertain boundaries". 7 
• (1989) 7 A.C.L.R. 628. 
6 	S Beck, op. cit. at pp. 168-9. 
7 	C. Baxter, "The Role of the Judge in Enforcing Shareholder Rights", 
(1983) 42 C.L. I. 96. 
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The first aspect to consider is the problem associated with 
distinguishing personal and corporate rights. Directors owe 
their *fiduciary duties to the company. 8 Accordingly, any wrong 
committed by a director results in a cause of action arising in the 
corporation. Following from this, it has only been in the most 
limited circumstances where a shareholder's personal rights 
have been recognised. 
Personal rights can arise from a number of sources. They can 
arise from the s.180 contract9 or from some other source such 
as statute, independent service contract, the jurisdiction of equity 
or tortious principles. 
Examples of personal rights which the courts have already 
accepted include: 
Percival v. Wright [1902] Ch. 421. 
S. 180 of the Corporation Law states: 
Subject to this Law, the Constitution of a company have the effect of a 
contract under seal - 
(a) between the company and each member, 
(b) between the company and each eligible officer; and 
(c) between a member and each other member 
under which each of the above mentioned persons agrees to observe and 
perform the provisions of the constitution as in force for the time being 
so far as these provisions are applicable to that person. 
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1. The right to inspect the register of members. 10 
2. The right to vote at general meetings unless the articles 
deny that right. 11 
3. The right to protect preferential rights and class 
interests. 12 
4. The right to informative notice of meetings. 13 
5. The right to enforce a declared dividend as a legal 
debt. 14 
6. The right to have his or her voting rights protected or 
at least not diluted. 15 
10 	Mutter v. Eastern and Midlands Railway Co. (1888) 38 Ch.D. 92 at 
p. 104 . 
11 	Pender v. Lushington (1877) 6 Ch.D. 70 at p.81. 
12 	Greenhalge v. Arderne Cinemas [1945] 2 All E.R. 719. 
13 	Kaye v. Croyden Tramways [1898] 1 Ch. 358. 
14 	Godfrey Phillips lid. v. Investment Trust Ltd. [1953] Ch. 449 at p.457. 
15 	Residues Treatment and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Southern Resources lid. 
(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 569. 
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7. The right under the Corporations Law, s.777 to seek 
enforcement of stock exchange listing rules against the 
company. 
Beyond these accepted personal rights there has been three areas 
where the distinction between personal rights and corporate 
rights has caused difficult problems: 
(i) Internal Procedural Irregularities; 
(ii) Outsider Rights; and 
(iii) Issuing of Shares. 
I will now discuss each of these in turn. I will then deal with 
the question of whether the general meeting can ratify a wrong 
done to an individual shareholder. In the next chapter, the 
minority shareholder's action in tort will also be considered. 
Internal Procedural Irregularities 
Drury comments that: 
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If a shareholder did have an unrestricted right to sue to 
force the company to adhere to every provision of the 
company contract, then he could always bring an action to 
set aside any resolution of the general meeting obtained 
where there had been some breach, however, trifling, of 
the provisions of the articles relating to notice, the 
appointment of the chairman or the like ... However 
company law does not grant to a member an unrestricted 
right to sue. The doctrine of majority rule enshrined in 
the decision of Foss v. Harbottle and subsequent cases 
appears to provide that, where the irregularity complained 
of relates to the internal management of the company, an 
individual shareholder cannot bring an action in his own 
name because the company itself is the proper plaintiff. 16 
Against this statement is a line of cases, where in certain 
circumstances a breach of a procedural matter has allowed a 
personal action for a shareholder. 17 
16 	R.R. Drury, "The Relative Nature of a Shareholder's Right to Enforce the 
Company Contract", [1986] C.L.J. 219 at p.237. 
17 	See for example the discussion by K.W. Wedderbum op. cit. at p.210- 
211 and in particular, Spencer v. Kennedy [1926] Ch. 125, Henderson v. 
Bank of Australasia (1890) 45 Ch.D. 330 and Breay v. Browne (1891) 41 
S.J. 159 at p.160. 
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The difficulties in identifying where a personal action may lie 
can be seen by contrasting two decisions Pender v. 
Lushington 18 and McDougall v. Gardiner (No. 2). 19 
In Pender v. Lushington a majority shareholder transferred his 
votes to nominees to overcome an article restricting each 
shareholder to a maximum of 100 votes irrespective of how 
many shares were held. The nominees were permitted under 
the articles to vote but their vote was disallowed by the chairman 
of the meeting. The Court held that the nominee did have 
standing to sue: 
This is an action by Mr. Pender for himself. He is a 
member of the company and whether he votes with the 
majority or the minority he is entitled to have his vote 
recorded - an individual right in respect of which he has a 
right to sue. That has nothing to do with the question like 
that raised in Foss v. Harbottle.20 
This case can be contrasted with McDougall v. Gardiner (No. 2) 
where a shareholder suing on behalf of himself and all other 
shareholders, except the directors, sought a declaration that 
decisions taken at a general meeting were invalid and an 
18 	(1877) 6 Ch.D. 70. 
19 	(1875) 1 Ch.D. 13. 
20 
	
(1877) 6 Ch.D. 70 at p.81. 
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injunction to restrain the implementation of the decisions. The 
articles provided for the taking of a poll at the general meeting if 
demanded by five shareholders. This was done, but the 
chairman declined to take a poll. The court refused relief on the 
basis that the irregularity was such that the general meeting 
could condone: 
In my opinion, if the thing complained of is a thing which 
in substance the majority of the company are entitled to do 
or if something has been done irregularly which the 
majority of the company are entitled to do regularly, or if 
something has been done illegally which the majority of 
the company are entitled to do legally, there can be no use 
in having litigation about it, the ultimate end of which is 
only that a meeting has to be called, and then ultimately the 
majority gets its wishes. 21 
The effect of the decision of the Court was to postpone a vote on 
a matter which the plaintiffs considered important, and which it 
is probable that they would have won. In practical terms the 
Court denied the plaintiffs their vote, something which the Court 
in Pender v. Lushington said could not be done. 
21 	(1875) 1 Ch.D. 13 at p.25-6. 
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This issue has arisen in Australia in the decision of Kraus v. 
Lloyd.22 In this case A. and B. had been directors of a 
proprietary company. It was agreed that upon the death of B, 
B.'s widow would be entitled to be a director. Upon B.'s 
death, A. appointed his own wife to be a director. She 
continued to act as director and A. refused to allow B.'s widow 
to become a director, or to appoint further directors as 
authorised by the articles. In addition to this there were 
allegations that A. had acted without a proper quorum. The 
Victorian Supreme Court held that B.'s widow was entitled to a 
declaration that A.'s wife was not entitled to be a director and an 
injunction to restrain A. and his wife from continuing their 
conduct in breach of the articles. The rights of B.'s widow that 
were being infringed were individual membership rights and to, 
"allow the majority to act as if the articles had been altered is to 
deprive the minority shareholders of their right to have the 
company run according to the rules by which the company and 
each of the members are contractually bound". 23 
Many attempts have been made at a reconciliation of these 
authorities24 but it is Baxter,25 who I would submit has 
provided the most satisfactory rationale: 
22 	[19651 V.R. 232. 
23 	S. Beck, op. cit. at p.191. 
24 	See the discussion by R.R. Drury, op. cit. at p.240 ff. 
25 	C. Baxter, op. cit. at p.97-98. 
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The field has proved a happy hunting-ground for 
commentators wishing to choose distinctions. The 
general trend of opinion is to advance the cause of the 
somewhat more numerous Pender cases, saying variously 
that shareholders should always be able to sue for a breach 
of their company's constitution unless precluded by 
authority or policy, that the MacDougall authorities are 
unreliable in that most of them were decided before the 
Pender ideas were fully developed and that they have been 
so circumscribed as to present only an insignificant and 
unwarranted indentation in the Pender lines. 26 
Baxter then goes on to submit that the authorities can be 
reconciled by the principle that the court will intervene where: 
(1) [A] dispute situation has arisen in which it is 
impossible or impracticable for the members of the 
body to sort things out for themselves; and 
(2) there is something that the court can do about it. 27 
26 	C. Baxter, op. cit. at p.97-98. 
27 	C. Baxter, op. cit. at p.98. 
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In essence, the minority shareholder may be able to seek a 
remedy for a procedural irregularity utilising the s.180 contract 
where the matter is appropriate for judicial intervention. What 
must be identified is those cases appropriate for judicial 
intervention. 
The first point to make is that the courts should not be concerned 
with procedural irregularity, unless the irregularity was such that 
the vote at the meeting may have been influenced. 28 Having 
ascertained this, the court should allow the individual 
shareholder to sue where on the given facts of that case the 
matter is inappropriate to refer that minority shareholder's claim 
to the decision of a simple majority in general meeting: 
It is after all only a return to ancient principle to ask as "the 
first question" ... whether the general body of 
shareholders could not sanction such an act. If they could 
a single shareholder cannot object ... This was the 
principle of Foss v. Harbottle.29 
28 	See the comments by R.R. Drury, op. cit. at p.241 ff and C. Baxter, op. 
cit. at p.105 ff. 
29 	K.W. Wedderburn, op. cit. at p.215. See Chapter 2. 
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Outsider Rights 
There is no doubt that s.180 of the Corporations Law 
establishes a binding contract between the company and each 
member.30 However, to what extent does s. 180 allow a 
shareholder to enforce a right which affects that shareholder in a 
capacity other than as a member, for example, solicitor, 
accountant or governing director?31 
There has been three views in this area. Lord Wedderburn's 
view is that, "a member can compel the company not to depart 
from the contract with him under the articles, even if that means 
indirectly the enforcement of 'outsider' - rights vested either in 
third parties or himself, so long as, but only so long as, he sues 
qua member and not qua `outsider". 32 
The opinion of Lord Wedderburn is supported by a line of cases 
best represented by Quin and Axtens Ltd. v. Salmon.33 In 
Quin and Axtens v. Salmon the articles of association of a 
30 	Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Breeders Association [1915] 1 Ch. 
881. 
31 	Throughout this paper I will use the term outsider right to denote "a right 
or power bestowed by the memorandum or articles on a person otherwise 
than in his capacity as a member of the company" - per G.A. Goldberg, 
"The Enforcement of outsider-Rights under Section 20(1) of the 
Companies Act 1948" (1972) 35 M.L.R. 362 at p.364; Goldberg was 
adopting the expression of Lord Wedderburn, op. cit. at p.208. 
32 	K.W. Wedderburn, Op. Cit. at p.212-213. 
33 	[1909] 1 Ch. 311; affd [1909] A.C. 442: other cases cited by 
Wedderburn, op. cit. at p.212 that support this view include Edwards v. 
Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064; Catesby v. Burnett [1916] 2 Ch. 325 
and Wood v. Odessa Waterworks (1990) 42 Ch. D. 636. 
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registered company delegated the management of the company 
to the directors. However, Article 80 provided that no 
resolution of the directors upon a number of matters should be 
valid unless notice had been given, "to each of the managing 
directors" (A. and S.) and neither had dissented. S. had 
dissented from a decision within the purview of Article 80. 
Nevertheless, a simple majority of shareholders passed a 
resolution confirming the decision of the directors. The English 
Court of Appeal held that S. had the right to obtain an injunction 
restraining the company from acting inconsistently with the 
articles of association. Importantly, Salmon sued in the 
representative form. Thus, the Court could see that Salmon 
was protecting a right which was common to all the members. 
"It is therefore obvious that Salmon enforced the right of a 
member to have the articles observed by the company." 34 
By contrast to Wedderburn's view, Professor Gower states: 
... the memorandum and articles have no direct contractual 
effect in so far as they purport to confer rights or 
obligations on a member otherwise than in his capacity of 
a member ... 35 
34 	K.W. Wedderburn, op. cit. at p.212. 
35 	L.C.B. Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law, 2nd ed. Stevens 
and Sons, 1957 at p.252. 
196 
A case illustrating this principle is Eley v. Positive Government 
Security Life Assurance Co. 36 In this case, Article 118 of the 
Articles of Association provided that the plaintiff should be the 
company's solicitor, transact all the company's legal business 
and be removed only for misconduct. The company, however, 
began to employ other solicitors in place of Eley despite there 
being no allegation of impropriety. Eley, who was also a 
member of the company sued for breach of the contract 
incorporated by the articles. He was unsuccessful, the court 
holding the memorandum and articles conferred no contractual 
effect in so far as they confer outsider-rights. 37 
As Goldberg states, "[o]bviously there could be no 
reconciliation of such contradictory opinions," 38 and 
Wedderbum himself admits that his view is in conflict with 
cases such as Eley v. Positive Life Assurance Co. 39 
Goldberg submits that there is a middle way which will allow 
the cases to be reconciled: 
36 	(1875) 1 Ex. D. 20, affd. (1876) 1 Ex. D. 88. 
37 	Other cases supporting this line of authority include Browne v. La 
Trinidad (1887) 37 Ch.D. 1; Re Dale and Plant Ltd. (1889) 61 LT. 206 
and Beanie v. Beanie Ltd. [1938] Ch. 708. 
38 	G.D. Golding, op. cit. at p.362. 
39 	K.W. Wedderburn, op. cit. at p.212-3. 
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A member of a company has under [s.180] of the Act a 
contractual right to have any of the affairs of the company 
conducted by the particular organ of the company 
specified in the Act or the company's memorandum or 
articles, even though the enforcement of that right ... may 
incidentally enforce also a right or power bestowed by the 
memorandum or articles on a person in a capacity 
otherwise than as a member of the company.40 
Goldberg's view, while attractive in that the two lines of 
authorities can be reconciled, has attracted the criticism of 
Drury, who comments: 
Now it may or may not be true that the rationes decidendi 
of the conflicting cases can be reconciled by the adoption 
of Goldberg's elegant reasoning, but it certainly is true 
that such a technical formulation was not present in the 
minds of the judges, and never formed part of the basis on 
which they made their decisions.41 
Drury is able to resolve the authorities by an approach which is I 
suggest, consistent with the cases but also sound on principle. 
40 	G.D. Goldberg, op. cit. at p363. 
41 	R.R. Drury, op. cit. at p.227-8. 
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He adopts a relational approach to outsider rights, and submits 
that: 
[lit becomes possible to suggest that a member does have 
a contractual right to have a particular provision in the 
company's memorandum or articles observed but that this 
right is equal to the rights of every other member to have 
alternative or inconsistent articles observed, or ultimately 
to seek a change in the articles. 42 
Thus under this approach the plaintiff will be able to enforce the 
company's articles, unless 75% of the shareholders of the 
company are able to solve the dispute by altering the articles, or 
another member is seeking to enforce an alternative or 
inconsistent article. 
This approach by Drury recognises that the answers to the 
problems can be found by considering and contrasting the 
competing rights of the minority and majority shareholders to fit 
the particular circumstances of the case before the court rather 
than just an absolute enforcement of either the personal right of 
the minority shareholder, or the right of the majority to pass 
simple resolutions which would condone a breach of the 
articles. 
42 	R.R. Drury, op. cit. at p.229. 
Improper Issue of Shares 
Many cases have arisen in relation to the issuing of shares by 
directors to forestall a takeover. If it is accepted that this is an 
improper purpose, can an individual shareholder bring a 
personal action to prevent the issuing of those shares? Or is it by 
necessity a derivative action, as the directors owe their fiduciary 
duties to the company and to the company alone? 
The first case that I wish to consider is Hogg v. Cramphorn.43 
In this case the defendant company carried on a business which 
had previously been conducted in an unincorporated form by 
Cramphorn. Cramphorn was approached by Baxter who 
sought to obtain control of Cramphorn Ltd. Cramphorn 
considered that if Baxter obtained control there would be a 
harmful change in the nature of the company's business, and 
also that Baxter would have an unsettling effect on the company 
employees. Cramphorn informed his fellow directors of 
Baxter's intention. The directors issued 5,707 shares to three 
trustees, Cramphorn, the company accountant, and a 
representative of the staff. The trust was set up for the benefit 
of the employees. The voting rights attached to the shares 
ensured that the directors, their supporters and the trustees 
would have the major voting power in the company. 
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43 	[1967] Ch. 254. 
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The directors then informed Baxter that they considered his offer 
to be inadequate. Baxter allowed his bid to lapse but an 
associate, Hogg, holding some 50 shares, challenged the issue 
of shares to the trustees on the basis of an improper exercise of 
power. 
Buckley J. ruled that the issue of shares was done for an 
improper purpose and was therefore liable to be set aside: 
A majority of shareholders is entitled to pursue what 
course it chooses within the company's powers, however 
wrong-headed it may appear to others provided the 
majority do not unfairly oppress other members of the 
company. These considerations lead me to the conclusion 
that the issue of 5,707 shares, with the special voting 
rights which the directors purported to attach to them 
could not be justified by the view that the directors 
genuinely believed that it would benefit the company if 
they could command a majority of the votes in general 
meetings ... The power to issue shares was a fiduciary 
one and if, as I think, it was exercised for an improper 
motive, the issue of these shares is liable to be set aside." 
44 	Id. at p.268-9. 
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Buckley J. also held that the allotment to the trustees could be 
ratified by the general meeting, provided that the disputed shares 
were not voted. The company accordingly ratified the issue of 
shares. 
Buckley J. did not discuss the issue of the standing of Hogg. 
On the one hand as the directors owe their fiduciary duty to the 
company, the issue of shares was a wrong done to the company 
and the company alone had a right to seek redress. 
Accordingly, for Hogg to sue, the action must have been 
derivative, and presumably there was a fraud on the minority. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that if the directors do not 
act for a proper purpose, their actions are in breach of the statute 
and/or articles and memorandum of association, and thus Hogg 
had a personal right to bring the action. It is unclear from the 
judgment what was Hogg's capacity. 45 
The questions surrounding an allotment of shares to defeat a 
takeover bid were again raised in Bamford v. Bamford.46 In 
this case the articles of Bamford Company vested the power to 
issue shares in the directors. In response to a takeover bid they 
issued a substantial block of shares. A general meeting of the 
company at which full and frank disclosure was made, and at 
which the contested shares were not voted resolved to ratify the 
45 	For alternate views as to whether it was derivative or personal, see 
Wedderburn (1967) 30 M.L.R. 80 and L.C.B. Gower, The Principles of 
Modern Company Law, 4th ed., Stevens and Sons, 1979 at p.655. 
46 	[1969] 1 All E.R. 969. 
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allotment. The issue before the Court was not whether the 
directors had exceeded their powers, (it was assumed that they 
had) but whether the shareholders could ratify the issue. The 
action was brought as a representative suit with the plaintiff 
shareholders suing on behalf of themselves and all other 
shareholders apart from the defendant directors. 
At first instance the action was treated as a personal action to 
enforce the contract in the articles between the members and the 
company created by s.20 of the English Companies Act1948. 47 
The Court of Appeal also implicitly accepted that the action was 
persona1,48 and again the rule in Foss v. Harbottle was virtually 
ignored. Russell J.A., when discussing ratification stated: 
The point before us is not an objection to the proceedings 
on Foss v. Harbottle founds. But it seems to march in 
step with the principles that underlie the rule in that 
case.49 
47 	The English equivalent of our s.180 of the Corporations Law. 
48 	See the comments by S.M. Beck, op. cit. at p.175. 
49 	[1969] 1 All E.R. 969 at p.976. 
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Beck suggests that, "that the analogy,. ..to Foss v. Harbottle for 
the purpose of deciding the ratification point was 
unfortunate" •50 
In Australia the High Court has considered that an improper 
allotment of shares does give rise to a personal action. In 
Ngurli v. McCann51 the High Court decided that the directors 
of the company had breached their fiduciary duty in issuing new 
shares without considering the interests of the company as a 
whole, and accordingly, "the plaintiffs have a clear right to sue 
in their own names to remedy the breach of trust". 52 The 
problem with the approach of the High Court is that they relied 
on the decisions of the Privy Council in Burland v. Earle53 and 
Cook v. Deeks54 and in both those actions, the suit by the 
shareholders was derivative.55 
In addition to this case there has been a number of other 
Australian decisions in this area where the rule in Foss v. 
50 	S.M. Beck, op. cit. at p.175. 
51 	(1954) 90 C.L.R. 425. 
52 	Id. at p.447. 
53 	[1902] A.C. 83. 
54 	[1916] 1 A.C. 554. 
55 	See the comments by S.M. Beck, op. cit. at p.176. 
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Harbottle has had little or no role to play in the judgment.56 As 
Baxt comments: 
For many years that case, or rather the rule in that case, 
was hardly mentioned in the most often litigated area of 
corporate law involving directors - the charge that 
directors were using their powers for an improper purpose 
in issuing or allotting shares. It seemed "almost" that an 
agreement had been struck between lawyers on both sides 
of the cases, that it would be of little use to raise that 
procedural rule in this type of situation. If one looks at 
the classic cases involving the question of misuse of 
corporate power in the issue of shares, and indeed in other 
cases involving defensive tactics, there is hardly a mention 
of Foss v. Harbottle. 57 
In two recent Australian cases, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has 
again been raised by counsel and discussed by the judiciary. 58 
The first of these decisions is Eromanga Hydro Carbons N.L. 
v. Australian Mining N.L59 . In that case: 
56 	See, for example, Mills v. Mills (1938) 60 C.L.R. 150, Winthrop 
Investments Ltd. v. Winns [1975] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 666 and Whitehouse v. 
Carlton Hotel Pty. Ltd. (1987) 162 C.L.R. 285. 
57 	R. Baxt, "Is the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle dead and buried" (1987) 7 
Company. & Sec. Li. 199. 
58 	The two decisions are Residue Treatment v. Southern Resources Ltd. 
(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 569 and Eromanga Hydrocarbons v. Australis 
Mining (1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 486. 
59 	(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 486. 
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It was suggested obiter ... that the allotment by directors 
of shares for an improper purpose (such as to preserve 
their position on the board, by vesting effective control in 
a party or parties) may infringe a personal right of a 
minority shareholder.60 
As stated by Malcolm C.J.: 
In terms of that contract [created between the company and 
the members by the memorandum and articles of 
association] it has been suggested that if the directors 
acting as delegates of the company act otherwise than in 
good faith they render the company and themselves 
amenable to suit at the instance of an individual 
shareholder.61 
However, in that case, Malcolm C.J. considered that the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle was not to be applied despite the plaintiff not 
coming within any of the recognised exceptions to the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle. Malcolm C.J. was not prepared to throw the 
plaintiff out of court at this stage - to do so would have required 
a detailed examination of facts in order to determine whether 
60 	P. Gillies, The New Company Law, Federation Press, 1989 at p. 234. 
61 	(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 486 at pp. 491-2. 
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there was standing. Malcolm C.J. was not prepared to do this 
at the preliminary stage.62 
The second recent decision in this area, Residues Treatment & 
Trading Co. Ltd v. Southern Resources Ltd. 63 has been 
described as being of "exceptional importance to the general law 
remedies of minority shareholders". 64 
Residues was a shareholder in the defendant company. They 
argued that the directors of Southern Resources had breached 
their duty to act in the best interests of the company, by issuing 
shares to defeat a takeover. The defendant company argued that 
as the matter was one which could be ratified, 65 the plaintiff 
therefore had no standing. 
Residues, however, argued that if the shareholders in general 
meeting had the same improper purpose as the directors, then 
such ratification would not exclude the matter. 
62 	The approach of Malcolm C.J. echoed that undertaken by the Southern 
Australian Supreme Court in Hurley v. B.G.H. Nominees Pty. Ltd. (1982) 
6 A.C.L.R. 791; cf. Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries [1982] 1 
Ch. 204; see Chapter 2. 
63 	(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 569. 
64 	A.G. Diethelm, "Impugned Share Allotments and the Rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle" (1989) 5 Australian Bar Review 262. 
65 	See for example Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] Ch. 254 and Bamford v. 
Bamford [1970] Ch. 212. 
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The Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court upheld 
the plaintiffs claim: 
The case is authority for the proposition that a share 
allotment made by directors in breach of their fiduciary 
duty to exercise powers for proper purposes, and which 
has the effect of diluting a shareholder's voting power, is 
an infringement of a personal right vested in that 
shareholder; and that consequently the member has 
standing to bring proceedings to avoid the allotment or to 
restrain a threatened allotment notwithstanding the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle.66 
The importance of this decision is that the court held that the 
right to sue was based in equity, rather than the statutory 
contract embodied in s.180 of the Code. In the words of King 
C.J.: 
The personal right of a shareholder to which I refer is 
founded, in my opinion, upon general equitable 
considerations ... arising out of membership of a body 
whose management is in the hands of directors having 
fiduciary obligations. It is fortified by the nature of the 
contract between the company and the members 
66 	A.G. Diethelm, op. cit. at p.262. 
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constituted by the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association and given statutory force by [s.180] of the 
[Corporations Law]. I do not mean that the relevant right 
of a shareholder is founded in contract or that his remedies 
for infringement are remedies for breach of contract. The 
shareholder's right is founded in equity and is a right to 
have the say in the company which accrues to him by 
virtue of the voting rights which are attached to his shares 
by his contract with the company, preserved against 
improper actions by the company or the directors who 
manage its affairs. 67 
The decision of the South Australian Supreme Court while not 
supported by authority68 is consistent with principle. The 
articles of association will generally stipulate what powers the 
directors can undertake, but it will not stipulate the purposes for 
which the power can be employed. As such there is no breach 
of contract, the wrong is created by a breach of fiduciary 
obligations, that is by equity. "It is only because they are 
fiduciaries that they are bound to exercise that power in good 
faith for the purpose for which it was conferred, that is for the 
benefit of the company." 69 
67 	(1989) 14 A.C.L.R. 569 at p.574. 
68 	King C.J. noted that there were no authorities which were decisive on 
this point; Ibid. 
69 	A.G. Diethelm, op. cit. at p.265. 
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The importance of this finding that the personal right is based in 
equity has the consequence that it can then be said that the 
directors' fiduciary duties include the duty not to issue shares 
for improper purposes which will result in a dilution of a 
shareholder's voting power. In essence the case recognises that 
directors can sometimes owe a fiduciary duty to individual 
shareholders. 
Statutory Provisions Relevant to this Issue 
The issues in these cases surrounding the allotment of shares 
may have been avoided by relying on s. 212 of the Corporations 
Law. 
Section 212 of the Corporations Law provides inter alia that if; 
(b) an entry is made in the register without sufficient 
cause; 
(c) an entry wrongly exists in the register; 
(d) there is an error or defect in an entry in the register; 
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a person aggrieved, a member of the company may apply to the 
court for rectification of the register. 
The Court is given by s.212(2) a wide discretion to decide any 
matter with respect to rectification of the register. 
As stated by Baxt s.212 is, "seldom used but can be a 
bargaining tool in the appropriate circumstances as was noted by 
King C.J. in the Residue Treatments case".70 
There are possibly two major reasons why the section has not 
been used in this area; first, the majority view is that the section 
is procedural only and therefore does not confer any substantive 
rights, and is thus subject to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle71 and 
second, in most of the cases that involved an improper issue of 
shares the action is brought to stop the issue and allotment, or to 
stop a general meeting brought to ratify the directors' decision to 
issue. These actions precede any entry onto the register, and 
thus s.212 will have no application. 
Section 1324 of the Corporations Law may also be a useful 
provision in this area. Indeed Baxt comments that: 
70 	R. Baxt, "Will Section 574 of the Companies Code Please Stand Up!" 
(1989) 7 Company. & Sec. Li. 388 at p.392. 
71 	See the discussion by Diethelm, op. cit. at p.267. 
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If appropriate use is made of [s.1324] of the Corporations 
Law in the relevant case it is my view that the problems 
which may be thrown up by the operation of the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle would be insignificant - indeed probably 
non-existent72 
The directors in issuing shares to defeat a takeover bid may be 
susceptible to allegations that their actions constitute a breach of 
duty by the directors on the basis that they are not acting in the 
best interests of the company. Section 232(1) of the 
Corporations Law requires that "An officer of a corporation 
shall at all times act honestly in the exercise of his powers and 
the discharge of the duties of his office". By s.232, an officer 
includes a director. The question to be raised is whether there 
is any nexus between this section and the fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the company. In Marchesi v. Barnes 
,Gowans J. stated: 
To act honestly refers to acting bona fide in the interests of 
the company in the performance of the functions attaching 
to the office of director. A breach of the obligation to act 
bona fide in the interests of the company involves a 
consciousness that what is being done is not in the 
72 	R. But, "Will s.574 of the Companies Code Please Stand Up" (1989) 7 
Company and Sec. Li. 388. 
212 
interests of the company, and deliberate conduct in 
disregard of that knowledge. 73 
Further support for a correlation between the duty to act 
honestly and the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
stems from s. 232(11) which states that: 
This section has effect in addition to, and not in derogation 
of, any rule of law relating to the duty or liability of a 
person by reason of his office or employment in relation to 
a corporation and does not prevent the institution of any 
civil proceeding in respect of a breach of such a duty or in 
respect of such a liability. 
Therefore, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle could be disregarded in 
this area, if s.1324 was utilised by practitioners and then given a 
wide interpretation by the judiciary. "One would be surprised 
to see the section being ignored to the same extent in the next 
eight years"74 (as it has been in the last eight years). 
73 	[1970] V.R. 434 at p.438. 
74 	R. Baxt, "Will s.574 of the Companies Code Please Stand Up" at p. 398. 
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Ratification 
A further issue that arises here is the extent to which a personal 
action by a minority shareholder can be sustained where a 
majority of members has authorised, is, or is proposing to, 
authorise a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. This 
question was raised, but not answered in Winthrop v. Winns:75 
The question remains therefore whether it is open to the 
shareholders in general meeting to elect to affirm a 
transaction which is voidable because of the directors' 
collateral purpose, notwithstanding that, for example, the 
shareholders have the same collateral purpose, or whether 
a shareholders' resolution, that such a transaction be 
affirmed is, if passed for the purpose of defeating the 
takeover, ineffective as not being for the benefit of the 
company as a whole within the principles in Ngurli Ltd. v. 
McCann.76 
This issue was also considered in Residues Treatment v. 
Southern Resources Ltd. Prior to the Full Court of South 
Australia hearing this matter the general meeting had passed 
resolutions to the effect that the allotment of shares be approved 
and ratified. The Full Court having decided that the plaintiffs 
had personal rights capable of being asserted raised the issue of 
75 	[1975] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 666. 
76 	Id. at p.702. 
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whether such rights could be extinguished by the general 
meeting. 
The Full Court resolved not to determine this question; King 
C.J. commenting that: 
Mt is by no means clear to me that the allotment in 
question, if made for an improper purpose alleged, is 
capable of ratification ... If it is correct that a shareholder 
has a personal right to have the voting power of his shares 
undiminished by an allotment of shares made for an 
improper purpose, there is to my mind a substantial 
argument that an exercise of the voting power of the 
majority to ratify such an allotment would be beyond the 
scope of the purpose for which that power exists. This is 
an issue which may have to be resolved at tria1. 77 
However, if one approaches this question from principle then 
surely the matter is not capable of ratification. "Otherwise the 
very recognition of the personal equity is rendered nugatory ... 
The personal right makes no sense unless it is immune from 
destruction by the majority".78 
77 	(1989) 14 A.C.L.R. 569 at p377. 
78 	A.G. Diethelm, op. cit. at p.275-6. 
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Finally, I would note that if the minority shareholder brings an 
action via s.1324 of the Corporations Law then there could be 
no ratification of such a breach of duty. As Baxt comments: 
Whilst ratification of common law breaches of duty is 
recognised, such a course of action could not apply to 
ratification of a breach of statutory duty. It would seem 
highly unlikely that the courts would recognise that the 
shareholders in general meeting, even if they were acting 
unanimously (apart from the complaining shareholder) 
could ratify a course of conduct which amounted to a 
breach of the statute.79 
79 	R. Baia, "Will s.574 of the Companies Code Please Stand Up" at p.395. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDER'S REMEDY IN 
TORT 
Another avenue for the minority shareholder in attempting to 
recover on behalf of the company, while avoiding the problems 
associated with the fraud on the minority exception to the Rule 
in Foss v. Harbottle and s.260, is to attempt to bring a personal 
action in tort. The minority shareholder would be submitting 
that the wrong to the corporation has resulted in a wrong to him 
personally by way of an diminution in the value of his 
shareholding. The advantage of using a tortious remedy would 
be that the restrictive conditions of the exceptions to the Rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle and any problems associated with the statute 
would be negated as the minority shareholder would not be 
seeking to act on behalf of the company nor would he be 
seeking a remedy on their behalf but he would be attempting to 
obtain a personal remedy. Therefore, the minority shareholder 
is able to avoid the problem of establishing standing at common 
law and he will not be required to show control of the general 
meeting by the wrongdoers. 
The major authority to consider this question is Prudential 
Assurance Co. v. Newman Industries Ltd. 1 In this case 
1 	[1980] 2 All E.R. 841 (Vinelott J. Trial Judge). 
[1982] Ch. 204 (Court of Appeal). 
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Prudential Assurance had a small minority shareholding in 
Newman Industries. Prudential Assurance alleged that two 
directors of Newman Industries had conspired to sell the assets 
of a company known as T.P.G. (in which they had a substantial 
interest) to Newman Industries at an overvaluation. There were 
further allegations that misleading information had been 
distributed by the directors. Prudential Assurance in addition to 
a derivative action2 brought a representative personal action 
seeking a declaration that an unlawful conspiracy had occurred, 
and an individual personal action claiming damages in respect of 
their own loss arising from the conspiracy. 
Vinelott J., at first instance, allowed Prudential's claim for a 
declaration and ordered an inquiry into the damage suffered by 
Prudential. In His honour's opinion the conspiracy had 
resulted in Newman Industries paying 445,000 pounds more 
than the value of the assets that it had acquired: 
Newman therefore lost the interest on 445,000 pounds 
and to the extent of that interest its profits were less than 
they would otherwise have been. That reduction in profit 
or net earnings must, in turn, have affected the prices at 
which shares of Newman changed hands and, therefore, 
the quoted price...the evidence adduced by the Prudential 
is in my judgment sufficient to show that it (and other 
2 	See the discussion of this action in Chapter 2. 
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shareholders) have suffered some damage in consequence 
of the conspiracy and that is sufficient to complete their 
cause of action, the amount of the damage, being, if 
necessary, referred to an inquiry.3 
The Court of Appeal reversed this aspect of the judgment of 
Vinelott J. Three principal reasons emerged from the joint 
judgment of Cumming-Bruce, Templeman and Brightmann 
L.H. The first reason was that a shareholder had only a right 
of participation in the affairs of the company on the terms of the 
articles of association. Accordingly, the shareholder did not 
suffer any loss which was separate and distinct from the loss 
suffered by the company. The second reason adopted by the 
Court of Appeal follows on from the first. As the company 
was a separate legal entity, any wrong to the company meant 
that the company alone had a cause of action. The third reason 
was based on "intrinsic hostility":4 
In our judgment the personal aim is misconceived. [The 
minority shareholder] cannot recover a sum equal to the 
diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to 
the likely diminution in dividend, because such a loss is 
merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company. 
The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss...The 
[1981] 2 All E.R. 841 at p.859. 
M.J. Sterling, The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Torts" 
(1987) 50 M.L.R. 468 at p.469. 
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plaintiffs in this action were never concerned to recover in 
the personal action, the plaintiffs were only interested in 
the personal action as a means of circumventing the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle...A personal action would subvert the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle and that rule is not merely a 
tiresome procedural obstacle placed in the path of a 
shareholder by a legalistic judiciary. The rule is the 
consequence of the fact that a corporation is a separate 
legal entity.5 
Given this strong statement by the Court of Appeal in Prudential 
it could be said that no personal action in tort will lie for a 
diminution in value of shares resulting from a wrong done to the 
company. As Sterling comments; "This development would be 
acceptable only if the existing structure of remedies for the 
protection of minority shareholders is adequate. There are 
suggestions that it is not". 6 
Problems with the existing remedies for minority shareholders 
I will now further examine some of the defects of the fraud on 
the minority exception to Foss v. Harbottle and an action 
5 	[1982] 1 All E.R. 354 at pp. 366-367. 
6 	M.J. Sterling, op. cit. at p.479. 
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pursuant to s.260 to determine if a personal action in tort can 
alleviate these defects.7 
The fraud on the minority exception is defective in that it is 
uncertain as to the meaning of the concept of control. 
Obviously control can be established by less than 51% of the 
voting stock but there is no clear definition as to what type of 
control will be recognised by the courts. Vinelott J. in 
Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries adopted a liberal 
position as to when control could be shown. A minority 
shareholder could bring an action against directors who may 
only hold a small shareholding if the directors were in a position 
to manipulate their position so that an action would not be 
brought by the company: 
Mn ascertaining the view of the majority whether it is in 
the interests of the company that the claim be pursued, the 
court will disregard votes cast by shareholders who have 
an interest which directly conflicts with the interests of the 
company. ..it applies wherever the persons against whom 
the action is sought to be brought on behalf of the 
company are shown to be able 'by any means of 
manipulation of their position in the company' to ensure 
that the action is not brought by the company. 8 
7 	For further comment of the defects of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, see 
Chapter 2. 
8 	[1980] 2 All ER. 841 at p.874875. 
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However Vinelott J.'s statement of the concept of control may 
not represent the law. The Court of Appeal in Prudential 
Assurance v. Newman Industries saw the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle as essentially a rule about standing. The minority 
shareholder seeking to bring a derivative action should be 
required at the outset to establish a prima facie case that the 
company is entitled to the relief claimed and that the action falls 
within the proper boundaries of an exception to the rule in Foss 
v. Harbottle. In determining this prima facie case the allegations 
of fraud and control were not to be treated as facts. 
Importantly, the Court of Appeal considered that if the directors 
seek to strike out the action at the initial stage, it will not be 
assumed that the director is guilty of fraud so as to disentitle the 
director from casting his votes at a general meeting.9 
There are however problems with this approach by the Court of 
Appeal. If the minority shareholder establishes a prima facie 
case he will more than likely obtain an indemnity for his costs 
from the company. 10  What happens if at the conclusion of a 
full trial it was revealed that although there had been a prima 
facie case of fraud on the minority by those in control, the 
breaches of duty were able to be ratified. "Company money 
would then have been used to pursue an action which the 
9 	See the comments by the Court of Appeal [1982] 1 All E.R. 354 at 
p.362. 
10 	Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] Q.B. 373. 
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controllers could have prevented ab initio" . 11 To overcome this 
problem the courts may require a fairly detailed prima facie case; 
the difficulty with this is that the prima facie hearing will then 
resemble a full trial, and thus the basis of the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle, the need to prevent needless litigation, will be 
defeated. 12 
The statutory equivalent to the derivative action, the litigation 
order obtained pursuant to s.260(2)(g), may be beset with the 
same type of the problem associated with the derivative action. 
Presumably the court will not make a litigation order unless they 
are satisfied that there is at least a prima facie case, and in 
determining this the court will have to balance the respective 
interests of the minority shareholder in challenging the conduct 
in question, and of the company in ensuring that corporate funds 
are not used to impugn conduct which ultimately is shown to be 
reasonable. Another major problem with a s.260 action is that 
the minority shareholder must still be a member to bring his 
action. What happens where oppressive conduct occurs which 
results in a drop in the market value of his shares and the 
minority shareholder sells his shares at less than market value 
and then learns of the oppressive conduct? He has no remedy 
under s.260, or via a derivative action as he is no longer a 
member. However, the former member may be able to 
purchase shares to allow him to instigate the appropriate action. 
11 	M.J. Sterling, op. cit., at p.481. 
12 	See the comments by M.J. Sterling, op. cit. at p.480-481. 
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This course of action may not be available with a quasi-
partnership where it is quite common for directors to have the 
right to refuse to register a transfer of shares. 
It is therefore submitted that because of the problems associated 
with the derivative action, and the s.260 action, there is a place 
for the introduction of a personal action in tort. This will be 
particularly helpful where the aggrieved person is a former 
shareholder, or where it cannot be shown that the directors have 
control of the company. 
Working on the assumption that there is a role for the personal 
action in tort the first matter that needs to be considered is 
whether that personal action should be confined to torts of 
intention (such as deceit, conspiracy etc.), or whether it should 
extend to torts of negligence. 
Derivative actions have not been available for negligent acts by 
directors. 13 Further there are some good reasons for not 
allowing a personal action for the negligent acts of directors. 
Firstly, litigation is likely to be expensive and time consuming 14 
and companies run by incompetent management are liable to be 
13 	Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] Ch. 565; See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
14 	See the comments by M.J. Trebilcock, "Liability of Directors in 
Negligence" (1969) 32 M.L.R. 499 at p.512. 
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taken over by people who can run them more efficiently. 15 
This market regulation of companies may however not be 
applicable to the incorporated partnership, and it is this type of 
company where a personal action in negligence may provide an 
incentive for management to better its performance. "On the 
other hand, if the shareholder does have such an action, every 
fall in the value of shares becomes potentially actionable and 
competent management may suffer undue harassment from 
cantankerous minorities." 16 On balance an action in negligence 
should probably only lie where the negligence results in a 
benefit to the wrongdoers, as is the case with derivative 
actions. 17 To decide otherwise may constitute an unwarranted 
interference in the supervision and management of companies. 
To allow a personal action in tort "would be unacceptable if it 
were likely to lead to multiplicity of suits, prejudice to creditors 
and double recovery but the extent to which it would be likely to 
do so is open to a certain amount of doubt." 18 
15 	See D.R. Fischel, "Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for 
Corporate Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers" (1978) 57 
Tex LR. 1. 
16 	M.J. Sterling, op. cit. at p.483. 
17 	See Daniels v. Daniels [1978] 2 W.L.R. 73; See Chapter 2. 
18 	M.J. Sterling, op. cit. at p.485. 
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Multiplicity of Suits 
The danger of multiplicity of suits was recognised in Gray v. 
Lewis 19 where Lord Justice James, expressed the following: 
One object of incorporating bodies of this kind was, in my 
opinion, to avoid the multiplicity of suits which might 
have arisen where one shareholder was allowed to file a 
bill on behalf of himself and a great number of other 
shareholders. The shareholder who first filed a bill might 
dismiss it, and if he was a poor man the defendant would 
be unable to obtain his costs, then another shareholder 
might file a bill, and so on. It was also stated to us in the 
course of the argument that even after the plaintiff had 
dismissed his bill against a particular defendant a fresh bill 
might be filed against the defendant so dismissed. 
Therefore there might be as many bills as there are 
shareholders multiplied into the number of defendants. 
The result would be fearful, and I think the defendant has 
a right to have the case against him by the real body who 
are entitled to complain of what he has done.20 
This problem of multiplicity of suits can be overcome by the 
courts. As Sterling comments. "The arguments which have 
been put forward to justify refusal of such an action - 
19 	(1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 1035. 
20 	Id. at p.1050-51. 
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multiplicity of suit(s)... seem to have been overstated and 
underestimate the power of the court to prevent abuse of its 
proceedings".21 A court has an inherent jurisdiction to control 
an abuse of its process, and furthermore the rules of court 
generally allow for a representative personal action. For 
example in Tasmania, Order 18 Rule 9 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court 1965 provides: 
In any case in which seven or more persons - 
(a) have the same or a common right against the same 
person or persons; 
(b) have the same or a common interest or the like rights 
in, to, or in respect of the same fund or other 
property; or 
(c) otherwise have a common interest in any subject-
matter or controversy, 
21 	M.J. Sterling, Op. Cit. at p.490. 
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one or more of such persons may (either in a cause or a 
matter) sue on behalf or for the benefit of all persons 
having any such right or interest. 
This provision makes representative personal actions highly 
attractive as the liability for costs can be shared and thus avoids 
the possibility of full personal liability for costs. 
Double Recovery 
The second reason for not allowing a personal action is the 
danger of double recovery. That is if a personal action 
succeeds, the corporation being a separate entity can also bring 
an action thereby placing the wrongdoers in a position of double 
jeopardy. 
This possibility was recognised in the English decision of 
Nurcotnbe v. Nurcombe. 22 In this case a husband and wife 
were the only shareholders in a company. The husband held 
66% of the shares. The husband allowed options held by the 
company to lapse. These options were then acquired by a 
second company which was under the control of the husband 
22 	[1985] 1 All E.R. 65. 
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through his second wife. The property subject to these options 
was then resold, the profit being in the region of 293,000 
pounds. In divorce proceedings the first wife received 
"compensation" for the diminution in the value of her shares; 
the diminution resulting from the husband profiting at the 
expense of the first company. The first wife then brought 
derivative proceedings to recover the loss suffered by the first 
company. There was no doubt that the husband's conduct 
amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty and was thus fraudulent. 
Similarly, the element of control was satisfied. However, the 
Court of Appeal refused to allow her standing to bring derivative 
proceedings. In essence the majority in the Court adopted the 
clean hands doctrine to deny the wife any remedy. She was not 
seeking to do justice to the company but rather to feather her 
own nest. However, while this may be the appropriate result in 
that case, the situation would have been far more complicated 
had there been a third shareholder involved. This person would 
not have received compensation via the matrimonial proceedings 
and accordingly should have been entitled to bring a derivative 
action. Assuming that person was so entitled the first wife 
would have had double recovery as there would have been a rise 
in the value of her shares, as well as receiving compensation via 
the matrimonial proceedings. 23 
23 	Presumably if this scenario had occurred the husband could have gone 
back to the matrimonial court asking for a variation of the original order. 
Obviously this option will not always be available. 
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In English and Australian law it does not appear that this 
anomaly can be corrected. The company should not be denied 
the benefit of a derivative action because one of the shareholders 
has received compensation for the fall in the value of their 
shareholding. In this respect the benefits of the Canadian 
statutory derivative action can be seen. Section 233 of the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act 1975 allows for an order 
that the award of damages be paid to the security holders of the 
corporation instead of to the corporation itself. The section 
goes some way towards recognising that corporate and 
shareholder recovery may in certain circumstances be regarded 
as alternatives. Also there is no danger of double recovery as 
the shareholders are being allowed personal recovery in a 
corporate (i.e. derivative) action. 
Another reason that double recovery is unlikely is that 
shareholders are probably more likely to initiate a corporate 
action, rather than a personal action. This is because with a 
corporate action the shareholder will normally be able to obtain a 
Wallersteiner v. Moir order.24 This order gives the minority 
shareholder an indemnity for costs. With a personal action 
however, the liability for costs rests with the minority 
shareholder. It is fair to assume that most shareholders would 
prefer the company to bear the burden of costs. Overall, even 
though by allowing a personal action the possibility of double 
24 	[1975] Q.B. 373. 
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recovery exists; this problem should not on its own be used to 
deny a personal remedy: 
There are some occasions on which personal recovery by 
the shareholders may seem fairer than recovery by the 
corporation because direct recovery ensures that the 
shareholders, who suffer most directly from the 
wrongdoing are directly compensated. If one shareholder 
is successful in a personal action there is no reason why a 
similar action should not be available to other 
shareholders. If so, it may be acceptable to dismiss the 
corporation action, in which case all the shareholders can 
be compensated through a personal action but none may 
recover twice.25 
Prejudice to Creditors 
Another reason for disallowing a personal action in tort is the 
danger of prejudice to creditors. If personal action is allowed 
and a corporate action disallowed then there are fewer assets 
available to creditors on a liquidation of the company. Again to 
allow a derivative action as well as a personal action would place 
the wrongdoers in a position of double jeopardy. The position 
with creditors, though of concern, should not be a valid reason 
25 	M.J. Sterling, op. cit. at p.487. 
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for denying a shareholder a personal action in tort. The 
creditors will only be affected should the company go into 
insolvency, and if that is the position the court could thereby 
dismiss the personal action as an attempt to alter the normal rules 
of distribution of assets upon liquidation. It should be noted 
that s.195 of the Corporations Law allows a court to consider 
the objections of a creditor when considering a reduction of 
capital. Along similar lines the court could allow a creditor 
standing where the personal action would result in the capital of 
the company not being restored to its full value. 
I would submit that an action in the intentional torts, such as 
deceit and conspiracy should be available to the minority 
shareholder where the controllers have acted together to harm 
the corporation and thus indirectly to affect the investment of the 
minority shareholder. This would provide another alternative to 
the minority shareholder and overcome some of the problems 
associated with the existing remedies available to the minority 
shareholder. In particular the standing of the minority 
shareholder would not be in issue as he is suing in a personal 
capacity and other restrictive elements such as control and 
ratification could not be used to block the member. The reason 
being is that as the member is suing in a personal capacity it 
would not be an option for the general meeting to condone the 
wrongdoing; the personal action being unable to be ratified. 26 
26 	See the comments by A.G. Diethelm, "Impugned Share Allotments and 
the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, (1989) 5 Australian Bar Review 262 at 
p.275-6. 
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In conclusion the personal action would fill the void left by the 
problems associated with the common law and statute, and thus 
would constitute a useful addition to the shareholders armoury. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this thesis has been to contrast the common law 
remedies for minority shareholders, particularly the rule in Foss 
v. Harbottle with the statutory remedies for minority 
shareholders; concentrating on the private company or, as it has 
been frequently referred to, the incorporated partnership. 
The first observation that became apparent upon researching the 
common law was that there were obvious defects in the 
remedies available to the minority shareholders. At common 
law if you wished to establish the fraud on the minority 
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle you were first required 
to prove standing. In light of the decision in Prudential 
Assurance v. Newman Industries 1 this required the minority 
shareholder to establish a prima facie case without being able to 
discount the voting power of the controllers. This obviously 
became a major impediment to the minority shareholder. 
Having established standing the minority shareholder was then 
required to overcome a restrictive definition of what constitutes 
fraudulent conduct, a definition of control which ignored the 
power of the directors to manipulate the general meeting by use 
of proxy machinery and nominee shareholding and also the 
complex issue of ratification. These elements individually were 
[1982] Ch. 204. 
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difficult to prove, a composite of all the elements almost 
impossible. It was because of these difficulties for the minority 
shareholder that the remedial legislation, particularly s.260 was 
introduced. This legislation required the minority shareholder to 
prove that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a 
manner that was unfair to that member or to the members as a 
whole. The question raised by this thesis asks to what extent 
the statutory reforms have improved the position of the minority 
shareholder. As Shapira points out, "the whole point of the 
reform is to procure a more active role for the courts. If the 
price of meaningful minority protection is increased judicial 
involvement, so be it". 2 
My submission would be that the purpose and object of the 
statute has not been fulfilled. The High Court in Wayde v. 
N.S.W. Rugby League 3 placed a restrictive interpretation on the 
legislation and again reiterated that the judiciary should not 
become involved in matters of business judgment. 
In particular the High Court of Australia required the minority 
shareholder to show that the decision was such that no 
reasonable board of directors could have made it, and that the 
Court was not to assume the responsibility for the management 
of the company. In effect the minority shareholder had a heavy 
2 	G. Shapira, "Minority Shareholder Protection - Recent Developments" 
[1982] 10 N.Z.U.L.R. 134 at p.163. 
3 	(1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 798. 
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burden to prove if he wanted to establish commercial unfairness 
by the wrongdoers. 
Corkery comments that: 
Undoubtedly [s.260] and [s.1324] improve the minority 
shareholder's position markedly. There is now plenty of 
wag in the corporate tail. If the judiciary is receptive - and 
there is no reason for it not to be - then the minority 
shareholder will play an important monitoring role in 
corporate affairs in Australia.4 
In addition to the restrictive interpretation of the legislation by 
the judiciary, the legislation has a number of defects which 
could be overcome by amendment. I would submit that the 
definition of "affairs of a body corporate" in s.53 should be 
amended to allow a shareholder in a parent company to complain 
of the conduct of a nominee director appointed to the board of a 
subsidiary, and furthermore the legislation should be amended 
to allow a shareholder to complain of a resolution of the 
members. These amendments would take into account the 
commercial reality of groups of companies as a form of business 
organisation, and also remove any argument that a resolution of 
J.F. Corkery, "Oppression or Unfairness by Controllers - What Can a 
Shareholder do about it?: An analysis of s.320 of the Companies Code" 
(1985) 9 Adel. Law Review 437 at p.464. 
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members is not an act of the company. 5 The other statutory 
remedy for the minority shareholder is s.1324 and while it has 
great potential to overcome the problems of the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle it has not been utilised to its full extent and 
accordingly, the redrafting of s.260 and an interpretation 
consistent with its remedial nature become paramount if any 
assistance to the minority shareholder is to be given. 
The major amendment that I would submit Australia should 
adopt is the statutory derivative action. 6 The advantage of the 
statutory derivative action is that it would establish distinct 
statutory regimes to deal with both personal wrongs and 
corporate wrongs. Section 260 would be used to redress a 
personal wrong to the minority shareholder such as the refusal 
to declare dividends whereas the statutory derivative action 
would be utilised for those wrongs which run exclusively to the 
company; for example, the expropriation of corporate assets 
and the diversion of corporate profits. Those wrongs which can 
be seen both as a wrong to the shareholders and a wrong to the 
company such as the payment of excessive salaries to executives 
holding large shareholdings, the issue of shares to dominant 
shareholders on advantageous terms and the appointment of 
This will overcome the problems surrounding the decision of Northern 
Counties Securities Ltd. v. Jackson and Steeple Ltd. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 
1133; see Chapter 4. 
The Companies and Securities Law Review Committee has circulated a 
Discussion Paper (No. 11, July 1990), titled "Enforcement of the Duties 
of Directors and Officers of a Company By Means of a Statutory 
Derivative Action" which considers the introduction of the statutory 
derivative action. 
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dominant shareholders to executive positions within the 
company could be pursued under either provision. 
If this two tiered system of protection for the minority 
shareholder is adopted the rule in Foss v. Harbottle may be 
relegated to historical interest only. The minority shareholder 
seeking to remedy the corporate wrongdoing would be required 
to bring his action via the statute - his standing established by 
his good faith and the fact that reasonable notice has been given 
to the directors of the corporation of his intention to apply to the 
court. The Court would then be in a position to determine if it 
was in the interests of the corporation that the action be 
continued. Ratification would be taken into the court but it 
would not necessarily be determinative of the matter. If this 
process was adopted the common law and in particular, the rule 
in Foss v. Harbottle would be transposed to "legal limbo".7 
In Canada the statutory derivative action is seen as having a 
significant and important role to play. A role which could be 
adopted in Australia. If these improvements to the legislation are 
not made then the tortious remedy for minority shareholders will 
become more important and the need to overrule that aspect of 
the decision of Prudential Assurance v. Newman Industries 8 
7 	See the Comments by the Dickerson Committee, Ottawa 1971 at p.161- 
162; see Chapter 2. 
8 	[1982] Ch. 204. 
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which stated that the personal action cannot be used to overcome 
the rule in Foss v. Harbottle will become greater. 
The personal rights exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
could provide an avenue for the minority shareholder to redress 
a wrong done to the company especially if the decision of 
Residue Treatment v. Southern Resources Ltd. 9 is adopted. 
That decision which held that the right of the minority 
shareholder to sue in respect of an improper issue of shares is 
based not in contract but in equity has the potential to lead a 
court to hold that fiduciary obligations are owed by directors to 
individual shareholders in addition to the fiduciary duty owed to 
the company. The courts have so far resisted this. 10 
In conclusion the present state of authorities do not greatly assist 
the minority shareholder. It is important that this be redressed 
by the preceding amendments suggested. Section 260 should be 
amended to overcome any difficulties with its interpretation, and 
importantly, the statutory derivative action should be introduced 
to finally overcome the problems of the rule in Foss v. 
Harbottle. It is hoped that if these amendments were 
forthcoming the courts would recognise that the intent of the 
legislature was to give the judiciary a supervisory role over the 
(1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 569. 
10 	The genesis of the rule that fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to the 
company is Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421. 
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management of companies and therefore provide greater 
assistance for the minority shareholder: 
In conclusion, one can see that a full examination of the 
case law does not unveil a recent trend of court 
interference with the internal workings of corporations. 
The corporate theory remains unmarred. Similar duties 
are being enforced today as were before the oppression 
remedies took their present form. One should be wary 
upon forming a closely held corporation on the basis of an 
agreement of participation in management decisions. 
Although minority shareholders are now in a better 
position to obtain direct relief, the question remains 
whether there is also a duty running to them, from the 
majority, to protect minority interest. It is suggested that 
the majority shareholder need not be unduly alarmed - as 
of yet. To date the courts have taken a conservative 
stance interpreting the scope of the oppression remedies. 
The years to come, however, may bring a comfort with 
the available remedies and a concomitant innovative 
approach to their implementation. 11 
It is submitted that the Australian judiciary has not brought an 
innovative approach to the interpretation of s.260 and therefore, 
it is paramount that legislation be put into place that will increase 
11 	L.M. Schaef, "The Oppression Remedy for Minority Shareholders" 
(1985) 23 Alberta Law Review 512 at p.523. 
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the available remedies for the minority shareholder, and will 
provide the impetus for an innovative approach by the judiciary. 
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